registry / @lingjingai/scriptctl / 0.66.9
@lingjingai/scriptctl@0.66.9
剧本阶段统一 CLI：素材转 Script v4，并兼容 Script v3 的本地写作、精修、校验和发布。
AI Security Review
scanned 2d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe package performs automatic first-party agent skill setup during postinstall, leaving a concrete agent extension lifecycle risk. The inspected skill is product-aligned and no concrete exfiltration or other attack behavior was established, so this warrants a warning rather than a block.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
Installing the package with lifecycle scripts enabled, unless an environment opt-out is set.
Impact
Agent environments receive package-provided instructions without a separate setup command; the inspected skill describes screenplay CLI workflows.
Mechanism
The installer replaces the existing scriptctl skill subdirectory and copies in the bundled skill under the Claude, agents, and Codex skill roots.
AI rationale
The package performs automatic first-party agent skill setup during postinstall, leaving a concrete agent extension lifecycle risk. The inspected skill is product-aligned and no concrete exfiltration or other attack behavior was established, so this warrants a warning rather than a block.
Evidence
package.jsonscripts/install-skill.mjsskills/scriptctl/SKILL.md~/.claude/skills/scriptctl~/.agents/skills/scriptctl~/.codex/skills/scriptctl
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 88.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- package.json runs scripts/install-skill.mjs from postinstall.
- On a normal published-package install, the script copies the package-owned skill into the home directory's Claude, agents, and Codex skill roots; it removes an existing scriptctl subdirectory first.
- The installer has environment-variable opt-outs, but installation proceeds by default.
- The installed skill describes local screenplay reading and editing workflows, which are aligned with the package's CLI.
Evidence against
- The installer targets only the scriptctl skill subdirectory and copies the package's own skill files.
- The inspected installer contains no network request or credential transfer.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetwork
HighEntropyStringsMinifiedPossibleObfuscationUrlStrings
Source & flagged code
8 flagged · loading sourcepackage.jsonView file
•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/install-skill.mjs
High
Install Time Lifecycle Scripts
Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgdist/review-agent.jsView file
79L80: `)}),o.find=sn({id:"find",description:"\u6309\u6B63\u6587\u6B63\u5219 / \u8BF4\u8BDD\u4EBA / \u7C7B\u578B\u5B9A\u4F4D action\uFF0C\u8FD4\u56DE\u951A\u70B9 + \u4F4D\u7F6E + \u547D\u...
L81: `))[s(19)](s(7))}async function Gu(e,t,o,n,s){let i=la,r=await Pu(e,t,o),l=Date[i(8)]();try{let a=i(1)+t+i(17)+o+i(24)+(jo(o)-jo(t))+i(26)+t+i(3)+jo(t)+i(10)+n+i(4),c=await xi({con...
High
Child Process
Package source references child process execution.
dist/review-agent.jsView on unpkg · L7979L80: `)}),o.find=sn({id:"find",description:"\u6309\u6B63\u6587\u6B63\u5219 / \u8BF4\u8BDD\u4EBA / \u7C7B\u578B\u5B9A\u4F4D action\uFF0C\u8FD4\u56DE\u951A\u70B9 + \u4F4D\u7F6E + \u547D\u...
L81: `))[s(19)](s(7))}async function Gu(e,t,o,n,s){let i=la,r=await Pu(e,t,o),l=Date[i(8)]();try{let a=i(1)+t+i(17)+o+i(24)+(jo(o)-jo(t))+i(26)+t+i(3)+jo(t)+i(10)+n+i(4),c=await xi({con...
L82: `)}async function Ku(e,t){let o=process.env.SD_AUDIO_APIKEY?.trim();if(!o)throw new Error("\u5168\u5267 ASR \u7F3A\u5C11 SD_AUDIO_APIKEY\uFF0C\u5C1A\u672A\u542F\u52A8\u5267\u672C\u...
L83: `);return o}function zu(e,t){let o=Vt;return t+(e?.[o(52)][o(6)]((n,s)=>n+Hu(s)[o(49)],0)??0)}function WE(e){let t=Vt;return e?[t(37),t(18),e[t(23)],...e[t(39)][t(42)](o=>t(61)+o[t...
Findings
1 Critical6 High4 Medium5 Low
CriticalAi Agent Control Hijackscripts/install-skill.mjs
HighInstall Time Lifecycle Scriptspackage.json
HighChild Processdist/review-agent.js
HighSame File Env Network Executiondist/review-agent.js
HighCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/review-agent.js
HighCloud Metadata Accessdist/review-agent.js
HighTrigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltrationdist/chunk-4MGRUUNV.js
MediumDynamic Requiredist/chunk-4MGRUUNV.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts
LowScripts Present
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @lingjingai/scriptctl@0.66.9.
See all versions of @lingjingai/scriptctl for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @lingjingai/scriptctl@0.66.9 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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