---
canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@linzumi/cli/v/1.0.205"
markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@linzumi/cli/v/1.0.205.md"
package: "@linzumi/cli"
report_status: "published"
title: "@linzumi/cli@1.0.205 npm security report"
verdict: "clean"
version: "1.0.205"
---

# @linzumi/cli@1.0.205 npm security report

> **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document.

## Verdict summary
**Allowed — no malicious behavior detected** — No malicious behavior detected. 24 low-signal pattern(s) reviewed.

- **Verdict:** Clean
- **Product-default install policy:** Allow
- **Firewall policy:** No policy match
- **Public report status:** Published
- **Threat category:** None published
- **Selected version:** 1.0.205
- **Selected version is latest:** No
- **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai)

This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions.

AI assessment: clean; recommendation: mark clean. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy.

The flagged primitives support the advertised, user-invoked local agent runner and its authenticated Linzumi service. Source inspection found no lifecycle hook or concrete malicious execution/exfiltration chain.

## Latest scan
- **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1
- **Recorded final verdict:** Clean
- **Recorded analysis confidence:** 90.0%
- **Started:** 2026-08-11T00:53:51.004Z
- **Finished:** 2026-08-11T00:54:35.100Z
- **Download time:** 751 ms
- **Static scan time:** 8853 ms
- **AI review time:** 34487 ms
- **Total time:** 44096 ms

The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs.

## Security analysis

### Published attack-surface review

- **Summary:** No confirmed malicious attack surface. This is an explicit remote-agent runner CLI with package-aligned network and local process capabilities.

- **Trigger:** User runs linzumi commands such as signup, start, connect, or mcp server.

- **Impact:** Intended agent-runner capability; no install-time execution, covert exfiltration, or foreign agent-control mutation was confirmed.

- **Evidence paths:** package.json, bin/linzumi.js, dist/index.js, dist/impl-ts/index.js, dist/impl-ts/mcp-server.mjs, README.md

- **Review source:** ai\_review

- **Reviewed:** 2026-08-11T00:54:35.100Z

### AI review details

- **Review stage:** source\_first\_review

- **Mechanism:** Authenticated Linzumi runner launches configured Codex/MCP workflows in user-selected directories.

- **Rationale:** The flagged primitives support the advertised, user-invoked local agent runner and its authenticated Linzumi service. Source inspection found no lifecycle hook or concrete malicious execution/exfiltration chain.

- **Network endpoints:** https://serve.linzumi.com

### Review decision

- **Verdict:** Clean

- **Confidence:** 90.0%

- **Recommended action:** mark\_clean

- **Intent class:** Benign

- **False-positive risk:** Low

- **Evidence against:** package.json has no preinstall, install, or postinstall hook., bin/linzumi.js only dispatches explicit CLI arguments to dist/index.js., dist/index.js sends opt-out telemetry to serve.linzumi.com and selects a bundled implementation., dist/impl-ts/index.js starts Codex/MCP sessions only through explicit CLI runner flows and scopes access to configured folders., Dynamic Function usage is bundled AJV schema-validation code in dist/impl-ts/mcp-server.mjs, not fetched-payload execution., README.md documents user-approved project roots and device/browser authentication.

## Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @linzumi/cli@1.0.205.

- Review the evidence and your use of @linzumi/cli@1.0.205 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

## Public findings

### 1. Low: Scripts Present
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Package declares npm scripts.

### 2. High: Child Process
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 85.0%
- **Path:** dist/impl-res/cloud-supervisor.mjs
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@linzumi/cli@1.0.205/dist/impl-res/cloud-supervisor.mjs>)

Package source references child process execution.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L8: \r
L9: `+t)}function ee(e,n,t,r,o,i){if(e.listenerCount("wsClientError")){let s=new Error(o);Error.captureStackTrace(s,ee),e.emit("wsClientError",s,t,n)}else Te(t,r,o,i)}});import{spawn a...
L10: `,"utf8")}catch{return}}function Ni(){let e=process.env.LINZUMI_CLI_AUDIT_LOG?.trim();return e===void 0||e===""?sr(ir(),".linzumi","logs","command-events.jsonl"):e}function Ji(e){r...
```

### 3. High: Shell
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 85.0%

Package source references shell execution.

### 4. High: Eval
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 80.0%
- **Path:** dist/impl-res/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@linzumi/cli@1.0.205/dist/impl-res/index.js>)

Package source references dynamic code evaluation.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L7: || (${a} === "string" && ${i} && ${i} == +${i} && !(${i} % 1))`).assign(s,(0,Sr._)`+${i}`);return;case"boolean":n.elseIf((0,Sr._)`${i} === "false" || ${i} === 0 || ${i} === null`)....
L8: || ${a} === "boolean" || ${i} === null`).assign(s,(0,Sr._)`[${i}]`)}}}function gee({gen:e,parentData:t,parentDataProperty:r},n){e.if((0,Sr._)`${t} !== undefined`,()=>e.assign((0,Sr...
L9: missingProperty: ${n},
```

### 5. Medium: Dynamic Require
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%
- **Path:** dist/impl-res/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@linzumi/cli@1.0.205/dist/impl-res/index.js>)

Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L1: import { createRequire as __linzumiBundleCreateRequire } from 'node:module';
L2: const require = __linzumiBundleCreateRequire(import.meta.url);
L3: var hZ=Object.create;var D0=Object.defineProperty;var _Z=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var gZ=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var yZ=Object.getPrototypeOf,bZ=Object.prototype.hasOwnPr...
```

### 6. Medium: Network
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references network APIs.

### 7. Medium: Environment Vars
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references environment variables.

### 8. Medium: Install Persistence
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%
- **Path:** dist/impl-ts/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@linzumi/cli@1.0.205/dist/impl-ts/index.js>)

Source writes installer persistence such as shell profile or service configuration.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L2: const require = __linzumiBundleCreateRequire(import.meta.url);
L3: var _ce=Object.create;var xC=Object.defineProperty;var xce=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var bce=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var vce=Object.getPrototypeOf,wce=Object.prototype.has...
L4: const { workerData, parentPort } = require('node:worker_threads');
...
L19: if (parentPort) parentPort.postMessage(result);
L20: `});var VL={};uo(VL,{[redacted]:()=>Wce,discoverCurrentGitProject:()=>Vce});import{spawnSync as Fce}from"node:child_process";import{homedir as Nce}from"n...
L21: `).flatMap(t=>t.startsWith("worktree ")?[t.slice(9)]:[])}function cle(e){let n=["README.md","README.markdown","readme.md"].map(t=>tl(e,t)).find(t=>FL(t));if(n!==void 0)try{let r=zc...
L22: `).map(o=>o.trim()).find(o=>o.startsWith("# "))?.replace(/^#+
```

### 9. Low: Filesystem
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 70.0%

Package source references filesystem APIs.

### 10. Critical: Same File Env Network Execution
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** dist/impl-ts/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@linzumi/cli@1.0.205/dist/impl-ts/index.js>)

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution with blocking evidence.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L27: ${u}`.split(`
L28: `).filter(c=>c.trim()!=="")}catch{return[]}finally{n!==void 0&&ple(n)}}function Mle(e){return e.filter(n=>n.type==="response_item").map(n=>M(n.payload)).filter(n=>n!==void 0).filte...
L29: `,"utf8");let r=new Map,o=0,i={runDir:t,contentMode:e.contentMode,record:(s,a,d={})=>{let u=Zle(r,t,s);o+=1,u.write(`${JSON.stringify({ts:new Date().toISOString(),mono_ms:epe(),seq...
...
L41: `),d)},notices:()=>Array.from(n.values()),reset:()=>n.clear()}}function Wpe(e){switch(e){case"warning":return"WARNING: ";case"error":return"ERROR: ";case"info":return""}}function r...
L42: `)}function cN(e){return e.flatMap(n=>n.isImage?[{type:"localImage",path:n.path}]:[])}async function iT(e,n){let t=await rT(e,n),r=oT(n.body,t,{uploadInstructionMode:"footer"}),o=t...
L43: `)}function cfe(
```

### 11. High: Command Output Exfiltration
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 82.0%
- **Path:** dist/impl-res/cloud-supervisor.mjs
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@linzumi/cli@1.0.205/dist/impl-res/cloud-supervisor.mjs>)

Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L2: const require = __linzumiBundleCreateRequire(import.meta.url);
L3: var Hr=Object.create;var Kn=Object.defineProperty;var Kr=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var Qr=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var Zr=Object.getPrototypeOf,Xr=Object.prototype.hasOwnPr...
L4: `).join(`\r
...
L8: \r
L9: `+t)}function ee(e,n,t,r,o,i){if(e.listenerCount("wsClientError")){let s=new Error(o);Error.captureStackTrace(s,ee),e.emit("wsClientError",s,t,n)}else Te(t,r,o,i)}});import{spawn a...
L10: `,"utf8")}catch{return}}function Ni(){let e=process.env.LINZUMI_CLI_AUDIT_LOG?.trim();return e===void 0||e===""?sr(ir(),".linzumi","logs","command-events.jsonl"):e}function Ji(e){r...
L11: `,"utf8")}function xr(){let e=process.env.LINZUMI_AGENT_REPLAY_RECORD_FILE?.trim();return e===void 0||e===""?void 0:e}function Zi(e){ret
```

### 12. High: Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 84.0%
- **Path:** dist/impl-ts/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@linzumi/cli@1.0.205/dist/impl-ts/index.js>)

Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L2: const require = __linzumiBundleCreateRequire(import.meta.url);
L3: var _ce=Object.create;var xC=Object.defineProperty;var xce=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var bce=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var vce=Object.getPrototypeOf,wce=Object.prototype.has...
L4: const { workerData, parentPort } = require('node:worker_threads');
...
L19: if (parentPort) parentPort.postMessage(result);
L20: `});var VL={};uo(VL,{[redacted]:()=>Wce,discoverCurrentGitProject:()=>Vce});import{spawnSync as Fce}from"node:child_process";import{homedir as Nce}from"n...
L21: `).flatMap(t=>t.startsWith("worktree ")?[t.slice(9)]:[])}function cle(e){let n=["README.md","README.markdown","readme.md"].map(t=>tl(e,t)).find(t=>FL(t));if(n!==void 0)try{let r=zc...
L22: `).map(o=>o.trim()).find(o=>o.startsWith("# "))?.replace(/^#+
```

### 13. Critical: Remote Asset Decode Execute
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** dist/impl-res/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@linzumi/cli@1.0.205/dist/impl-res/index.js>)

Source fetches a remote non-code asset, decodes its contents, and dynamically executes the decoded payload.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L2: const require = __linzumiBundleCreateRequire(import.meta.url);
L3: var hZ=Object.create;var D0=Object.defineProperty;var _Z=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var gZ=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var yZ=Object.getPrototypeOf,bZ=Object.prototype.hasOwnPr...
L4: GFS4: `),console.error(e)});Mn[Mi]||(Xj=global[Mi]||[],eM(Mn,Xj),Mn.close=(function(e){function t(r,n){return e.call(Mn,r,function(i){i||Yj(),typeof n=="function"&&n.apply(this,arg...
L5: `:""},this._extScope=t,this._scope=new Za.Scope({parent:t}),this._nodes=[new yx]}toString(){return this._root.render(this.opts)}name(t){return this._scope.name(t)}scopeName(t){retu...
L6: || (${a} == "string" && ${i} && ${i} == +${i})`).assign(s,(0,Sr._)`+${i}`);return;case"integer":n.elseIf((0,Sr._)`${a} === "boolean" || ${i} === null
L7: || (${a} ==
```

### 14. High: Remote Agent Bridge
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 84.0%
- **Path:** dist/impl-res/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@linzumi/cli@1.0.205/dist/impl-res/index.js>)

Source exposes local file and command tools to a remote model endpoint.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L10: depsCount: ${t},
L11: deps: ${r}}`};var Nne={keyword:"dependencies",type:"object",schemaType:"object",error:js.error,code(e){let[t,r]=Fne(e);Rz(e,t),Iz(e,r)}};function Fne({schema:e}){let t={},r={};for(...
L12: 
...
L108: `),m=p.path,_=`
L109: - `+(m===""?"":"At "+m+": ")+h;d[_]||(d[_]=1,s=s+_)}}let l={code:"invalid_input",path:r,reason:s,expected:e,received:t,unionErrors:o};return i&&(l.input=n),l}function gw(e,t,r,n){r...
L110: `,f=n+".tmp."+process.pid.toString()+"."+Yg(6),_=g=>Pt(g.message);return pt(br(fr(by.dirname(n)),_),()=>{let g=pt(Xl(f,m,{encoding:"utf8",mode:384}),()=>Wn(f,n));return g.TAG==="Ok...
```

### 15. High: Cross File Remote Execution Context
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 72.0%
- **Path:** dist/impl-ts/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@linzumi/cli@1.0.205/dist/impl-ts/index.js>)

Source spawns a local helper that also contains network and dynamic execution context; review data flow before blocking.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Cross-file remote execution chain: dist/impl-ts/index.js spawns dist/impl-res/cloud-supervisor.mjs; helper contains network access plus dynamic code execution.
L2: const require = __linzumiBundleCreateRequire(import.meta.url);
L3: var _ce=Object.create;var xC=Object.defineProperty;var xce=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var bce=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var vce=Object.getPrototypeOf,wce=Object.prototype.has...
L4: const { workerData, parentPort } = require('node:worker_threads');
...
L19: if (parentPort) parentPort.postMessage(result);
L20: `});var VL={};uo(VL,{[redacted]:()=>Wce,discoverCurrentGitProject:()=>Vce});import{spawnSync as Fce}from"node:child_process";import{homedir as Nce}from"n...
L21: `).flatMap(t=>t.startsWith("worktree ")?[t.slice(9)]:[])}function cle(e){let n=["README.md
```

### 16. Critical: Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** dist/impl-ts/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@linzumi/cli@1.0.205/dist/impl-ts/index.js>)

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.bin -> bin/linzumi.js -> dist/index.js -> dist/impl-ts/index.js
L27: ${u}`.split(`
L28: `).filter(c=>c.trim()!=="")}catch{return[]}finally{n!==void 0&&ple(n)}}function Mle(e){return e.filter(n=>n.type==="response_item").map(n=>M(n.payload)).filter(n=>n!==void 0).filte...
L29: `,"utf8");let r=new Map,o=0,i={runDir:t,contentMode:e.contentMode,record:(s,a,d={})=>{let u=Zle(r,t,s);o+=1,u.write(`${JSON.stringify({ts:new Date().toISOString(),mono_ms:epe(),seq...
...
L41: `),d)},notices:()=>Array.from(n.values()),reset:()=>n.clear()}}function Wpe(e){switch(e){case"warning":return"WARNING: ";case"error":return"ERROR: ";case"info":return""}}function r...
L42: `)}function cN(e){return e.flatMap(n=>n.isImage?[{type:"localImage",path:n.path}]:[])}async function iT(e,n
```

### 17. High: Trigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltration
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 94.0%
- **Path:** dist/impl-ts/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@linzumi/cli@1.0.205/dist/impl-ts/index.js>)

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches command-output exfiltration behavior.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Trigger-reachable command-output exfiltration chain: manifest.bin -> bin/linzumi.js -> dist/index.js -> dist/impl-ts/index.js
L27: ${u}`.split(`
L28: `).filter(c=>c.trim()!=="")}catch{return[]}finally{n!==void 0&&ple(n)}}function Mle(e){return e.filter(n=>n.type==="response_item").map(n=>M(n.payload)).filter(n=>n!==void 0).filte...
L29: `,"utf8");let r=new Map,o=0,i={runDir:t,contentMode:e.contentMode,record:(s,a,d={})=>{let u=Zle(r,t,s);o+=1,u.write(`${JSON.stringify({ts:new Date().toISOString(),mono_ms:epe(),seq...
...
L41: `),d)},notices:()=>Array.from(n.values()),reset:()=>n.clear()}}function Wpe(e){switch(e){case"warning":return"WARNING: ";case"error":return"ERROR: ";case"info":return""}}function r...
L42: `)}function cN(e){return e.flatMap(n=>n.isImage?[{type:"localImage",path:n.path
```

### 18. High: Trigger Reachable Persistence
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 94.0%
- **Path:** dist/impl-ts/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@linzumi/cli@1.0.205/dist/impl-ts/index.js>)

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches persistence behavior.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Trigger-reachable persistence chain: manifest.bin -> bin/linzumi.js -> dist/index.js -> dist/impl-ts/index.js
L2: const require = __linzumiBundleCreateRequire(import.meta.url);
L3: var _ce=Object.create;var xC=Object.defineProperty;var xce=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var bce=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var vce=Object.getPrototypeOf,wce=Object.prototype.has...
L4: const { workerData, parentPort } = require('node:worker_threads');
...
L19: if (parentPort) parentPort.postMessage(result);
L20: `});var VL={};uo(VL,{[redacted]:()=>Wce,discoverCurrentGitProject:()=>Vce});import{spawnSync as Fce}from"node:child_process";import{homedir as Nce}from"n...
L21: `).flatMap(t=>t.startsWith("worktree ")?[t.slice(9)]:[])}function cle(e){let n=["README.md","README.markdown","readme.md"].map(t=>tl(e,t)).f
```

### 19. Low: High Entropy Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 55.0%

Package source contains high-entropy string patterns.

### 20. Low: Url Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 65.0%

Package source contains URL literals.

### 21. Medium: Ships Build Helper
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 70.0%
- **Path:** scripts/codex-wire-canary.sh
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@linzumi/cli@1.0.205/scripts/codex-wire-canary.sh>)

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```shell
path = scripts/codex-wire-canary.sh
kind = build_helper
sizeBytes = 2427
magicHex = [redacted]
```

### 22. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean.

### 23. High: Semantic Analysis Limited
- **Category:** Scanner Coverage
- **Confidence:** 100.0%
- **Path:** dist/impl-res/cloud-supervisor.mjs
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@linzumi/cli@1.0.205/dist/impl-res/cloud-supervisor.mjs>)

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_alias_growth_limit_exceeded; limitedFiles = 2
```

### 24. Critical: Previous Version Dangerous Delta
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 93.0%
- **Path:** dist/impl-ts/mcp-server.mjs
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@linzumi/cli@1.0.205/dist/impl-ts/mcp-server.mjs>)

This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta
matchedPackage = @linzumi/cli@1.0.204
matchedIdentity = npm:QGxpbnp1bWkvY2xp:1.0.204
similarity = 0.938
summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file
```

## Dependencies and install lifecycle
- **Lifecycle scripts present:** No

- **Dependencies:** 9
- **Optional dependencies:** 0
- **Peer dependencies:** 0
- **Development dependencies:** 10
- **Published dependency-graph edges:** 9

### Published dependency entries
- @anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk 0.3.199 (Dependency)
- @inquirer/prompts ^7.8.6 (Dependency)
- @modelcontextprotocol/sdk ^1.29.0 (Dependency)
- @openai/codex ^0.144.1 (Dependency)
- blessed ^0.1.81 (Dependency)
- proper-lockfile 3.2.0 (Dependency)
- undici ^6.25.0 (Dependency)
- ws ^8.18.0 (Dependency)
- zod ^3.25.76 (Dependency)

## Package metadata
- **Package:** @linzumi/cli
- **Ecosystem:** npm
- **Version:** 1.0.205
- **License:** MIT
- **Version published:** 2026-08-11T00:47:55.528Z
- **Package first seen:** 2026-06-30T22:28:39.251Z
- **Package last seen:** 2026-11-04T11:55:36.727Z
- **Known versions:** 149
- **Latest version:** 1.0.328
- **Appeal under review:** No
- **Description:** Linzumi CLI — point a Codex agent at the real code on your laptop, with your team watching and steering from shared threads.
- **Maintainers:** sgrove, \_zth
- **Keywords:** linzumi, kandan, codex, local-runner
- **Runtime engines:** node: \>=20
- **Artifact files:** 86
- **Artifact unpacked size:** 6,974,135 bytes
- **Artifact signatures:** 1
- **Attestations:** No

## References
- [HTML security report](<https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@linzumi/cli/v/1.0.205>)