@linzumi/cli@1.0.229
Linzumi CLI — point a Codex agent at the real code on your laptop, with your team watching and steering from shared threads.
AI Security Review
scanned 3mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiDirect inspection found an explicit, user-triggered authenticated TCP tunneling feature and no install lifecycle or confirmed stealth/exfiltration chain. Static `eval` claims were not substantiated in the reviewed runtime bundles.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- Explicit `connect` feature exposes an authenticated TCP forward on IPv4 loopback.
- CLI dispatch reaches the tunnel handler only for the user-invoked TCP-connect command.
- No npm preinstall/install/postinstall lifecycle hook is declared.
- Entrypoint only imports and invokes the CLI main function; no runtime `eval(` was found in reviewed bundles.
- Tunnel behavior is documented as a command with a required forward ID and constrained to loopback.
Source & flagged code
18 flaggedPackage source references child process execution.
scripts/vendor-codex-app-server-protocol.tsView on unpkg · L13A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution with blocking evidence.
Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @linzumi/cli@1.0.229.
See all versions of @linzumi/cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @linzumi/cli@1.0.229 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.