--- canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@linzumi/cli/v/1.0.246" markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@linzumi/cli/v/1.0.246.md" package: "@linzumi/cli" report_status: "published" title: "@linzumi/cli@1.0.246 npm security report" verdict: "suspicious" version: "1.0.246" --- # @linzumi/cli@1.0.246 npm security report > **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document. ## Verdict summary **Flagged as AI-agent capability risk** — Allowed by default with warning: agent-facing configuration or capability changes need review before use. - **Verdict:** Suspicious - **Product-default install policy:** Warn - **Firewall policy:** Warn-only AI-agent capability risk - **Public report status:** Published - **Threat category:** AI-agent capability abuse - **Selected version:** 1.0.246 - **Selected version is latest:** No - **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai) This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions. AI assessment: suspicious; recommendation: downgrade to warn. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy. The scanner's remote-decode claim was not confirmed: the inspected dynamic evaluation is bundled dependency code and the tunnel is an explicit feature. The package remains a risky agent-control tool because authenticated remote sessions can drive broad local actions. ## Latest scan - **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1 - **Recorded final verdict:** Suspicious - **Recorded analysis confidence:** 84.0% - **Started:** 2026-09-08T20:27:08.599Z - **Finished:** 2026-09-08T20:28:42.448Z - **Download time:** 763 ms - **Static scan time:** 8526 ms - **AI review time:** 84558 ms - **Total time:** 93849 ms The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs. ## Security analysis ### Published attack-surface review - **Summary:** This is an authenticated remote-agent and TCP-forwarding CLI with substantial local execution capabilities. No automatic install-time attack was found. - **Trigger:** A user runs the CLI, authenticates it, and starts an agent runner or connect command. - **Impact:** A compromised or overly trusted Linzumi account or service could direct powerful local agent actions and expose an approved TCP forward. - **Evidence paths:** package.json, bin/linzumi.js, dist/impl-ts/index.js, dist/impl-ts/tcp-tunnel-cli.mjs - **Review source:** ai\_review - **Reviewed:** 2026-09-08T20:28:42.448Z ### AI review details - **Review stage:** source\_first\_review - **Mechanism:** Authenticated remote agent control and loopback TCP forwarding. - **Rationale:** The scanner's remote-decode claim was not confirmed: the inspected dynamic evaluation is bundled dependency code and the tunnel is an explicit feature. The package remains a risky agent-control tool because authenticated remote sessions can drive broad local actions. - **Files touched:** ~/.linzumi/user-auth.json - **Network endpoints:** serve.linzumi.com, linzumi.link ### Review decision - **Verdict:** Suspicious - **Confidence:** 84.0% - **Recommended action:** downgrade\_to\_warn - **Intent class:** Dangerous Capability - **False-positive risk:** Low - **Evidence for warning:** The package ships an executable CLI that loads its bundled runtime., The bundled CLI exposes authenticated TCP forwarding to a Linzumi service., The runtime is an agent runner with broad local command and service-management capabilities. - **Evidence against:** package.json has no preinstall, install, or postinstall lifecycle hook., The forwarding feature is activated only through an explicit CLI command and supports a loopback listener., The observed Function calls are bundled schema-validator internals; no remote payload-to-eval chain was confirmed. ## Affected versions and remediation This report applies to @linzumi/cli@1.0.246. - Review the evidence and your use of @linzumi/cli@1.0.246 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report. - Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe. ## Public findings ### 1. Low: Scripts Present - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 100.0% Package declares npm scripts. ### 2. High: Child Process - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** scripts/vendor-codex-app-server-protocol.ts - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references child process execution. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```typescript L13: import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url'; L14: import { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; L15: ``` ### 3. High: Shell - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% Package source references shell execution. ### 4. High: Eval - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 80.0% - **Path:** dist/impl-ts/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references dynamic code evaluation. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L1559: `),g=p.path,y=` L1560: - `+(g===""?"":"At "+g+": ")+f;u[y]||(u[y]=1,s=s+y)}}let d={code:"invalid_input",path:t,reason:s,expected:e,received:n,unionErrors:i};return o&&(d.input=r),d}function Fk(e,n,t,r){r... L1561: `);else throw new Error(`the codex engine bundled with @linzumi/cli is missing from this install and the \`codex\` on PATH is version ${d.pathVersion}, but this CLI release pins en... ``` ### 5. Medium: Dynamic Require - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** scripts/golden-scale-test.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references dynamic require/import behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L29: const rtDir = '/tmp/smol-rt-132'; L30: const require = createRequire(join(rtDir, 'package.json')); L31: const { Machine } = require('smolmachines'); ``` ### 6. Medium: Network - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references network APIs. ### 7. Medium: Environment Vars - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references environment variables. ### 8. Medium: Install Persistence - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** dist/impl-ts/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source writes installer persistence such as shell profile or service configuration. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L2: const require = __linzumiBundleCreateRequire(import.meta.url); L3: var m_e=Object.create;var _R=Object.defineProperty;var h_e=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var g_e=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var y_e=Object.getPrototypeOf,__e=Object.prototype.has... L4: const { workerData, parentPort } = require('node:worker_threads'); ... L19: if (parentPort) parentPort.postMessage(result); L20: `});var u5={};yo(u5,{[redacted]:()=>B_e,discoverCurrentGitProject:()=>U_e});import{spawnSync as q_e}from"node:child_process";import{homedir as $_e}from"n... L21: `).flatMap(t=>t.startsWith("worktree ")?[t.slice(9)]:[])}function abe(e){let n=["README.md","README.markdown","readme.md"].map(t=>zp(e,t)).find(t=>t5(t));if(n!==void 0)try{let r=L_... L22: `).map(o=>o.trim()).find(o=>o.startsWith("# "))?.replace(/^#+ ``` ### 9. Low: Filesystem - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references filesystem APIs. ### 10. Critical: Same File Env Network Execution - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** dist/impl-ts/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution with blocking evidence. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L27: ${u}`.split(` L28: `).filter(c=>c.trim()!=="")}catch{return[]}finally{n!==void 0&&dbe(n)}}function Pbe(e){return e.filter(n=>n.type==="response_item").map(n=>M(n.payload)).filter(n=>n!==void 0).filte... L29: `,"utf8");let r=new Map,o=0,i={runDir:t,contentMode:e.contentMode,record:(a,s,d={})=>{let u=Vbe(r,t,a);o+=1,u.write(`${JSON.stringify({ts:new Date().toISOString(),mono_ms:Zbe(),seq... ... L41: `),d)},notices:()=>Array.from(n.values()),reset:()=>n.clear()}}function Bxe(e){switch(e){case"warning":return"WARNING: ";case"error":return"ERROR: ";case"info":return""}}function v... L42: `)}function P8(e){return e.flatMap(n=>n.isImage?[{type:"localImage",path:n.path}]:[])}async function rE(e,n){let t=await nE(e,n),r=tE(n.body,t,{uploadInstructionMode:"footer"}),o=t... L43: `)}function ave( ``` ### 11. High: Credential Redirect Persistence - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** dist/impl-ts/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration. dist/impl-ts/index.js: `).map(o=>o.trim()).find(o=>o.startsWith("# "))?.replace(/^#+\s+/u,"").trim();return r===void 0||r===""?void 0:r}catch{return}}function sbe(e){return Object.fromEntries(Object.entr... `).filter(c=>c.trim()!=="")}catch{return[]}finally{n!==void 0&&dbe(n)}}function Pbe(e){return e.filter(n=>n.type==="response_item").map(n=>M(n.payload)).filter(n=>n!==void 0).filte... `,"utf8")},close:async()=>{await Promise.all(Array.from(r.values(),Xbe))}};return i.record("commander","debug_trace.started",{run_dir:t,content_mode:e.contentMode}),i}function F5(e... `," ")}function Iv(e){if(!te(e))return;let n=M(e.payload)??{},t=M(e. ``` ### 12. High: Command Output Exfiltration - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 82.0% - **Path:** dist/impl-ts/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L27: ${u}`.split(` L28: `).filter(c=>c.trim()!=="")}catch{return[]}finally{n!==void 0&&dbe(n)}}function Pbe(e){return e.filter(n=>n.type==="response_item").map(n=>M(n.payload)).filter(n=>n!==void 0).filte... L29: `,"utf8");let r=new Map,o=0,i={runDir:t,contentMode:e.contentMode,record:(a,s,d={})=>{let u=Vbe(r,t,a);o+=1,u.write(`${JSON.stringify({ts:new Date().toISOString(),mono_ms:Zbe(),seq... ... L41: `),d)},notices:()=>Array.from(n.values()),reset:()=>n.clear()}}function Bxe(e){switch(e){case"warning":return"WARNING: ";case"error":return"ERROR: ";case"info":return""}}function v... L42: `)}function P8(e){return e.flatMap(n=>n.isImage?[{type:"localImage",path:n.path}]:[])}async function rE(e,n){let t=await nE(e,n),r=tE(n.body,t,{uploadInstructionMode:"footer"}),o=t... L43: `)}function ave( ``` ### 13. High: Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 84.0% - **Path:** dist/impl-ts/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L2: const require = __linzumiBundleCreateRequire(import.meta.url); L3: var m_e=Object.create;var _R=Object.defineProperty;var h_e=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var g_e=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var y_e=Object.getPrototypeOf,__e=Object.prototype.has... L4: const { workerData, parentPort } = require('node:worker_threads'); ... L19: if (parentPort) parentPort.postMessage(result); L20: `});var u5={};yo(u5,{[redacted]:()=>B_e,discoverCurrentGitProject:()=>U_e});import{spawnSync as q_e}from"node:child_process";import{homedir as $_e}from"n... L21: `).flatMap(t=>t.startsWith("worktree ")?[t.slice(9)]:[])}function abe(e){let n=["README.md","README.markdown","readme.md"].map(t=>zp(e,t)).find(t=>t5(t));if(n!==void 0)try{let r=L_... L22: `).map(o=>o.trim()).find(o=>o.startsWith("# "))?.replace(/^#+ ``` ### 14. Critical: Remote Asset Decode Execute - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** dist/tcp-tunnel-cli.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Source fetches a remote non-code asset, decodes its contents, and dynamically executes the decoded payload. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L2: const require = __linzumiBundleCreateRequire(import.meta.url); L3: var Dh=Object.create;var xg=Object.defineProperty;var mh=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var kh=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var Fh=Object.getPrototypeOf,Rh=Object.prototype.hasOwnPr... L4: `)||e.includes("\r")||e.includes("\0"))===!1}function Ay(e,A){let{headersList:t}=A,r=(t.get("referrer-policy",!0)??"").split(","),n="";if(r.length>0)for(let o=r.length;o!==0;o--){l... ... L41: `,"latin1"),t!==null&&n!==t){if(r[ki])throw new Pe;process.emitWarning(new Pe)}A[j].timeout&&A[j].timeoutType===Ut&&A[j].timeout.refresh&&A[j].timeout.refresh(),r[De]()}}destroy(A)... L42: `,this[vp]=a??3e5,this[xp]=n??3e5,this[Hp]=u??!0,this[Vp]=p,this[Gi]=L,this[be]=null,this[_p]=$>-1?$:-1,this[Zp]=ye??100,this[eA]=null,this[WA]=[],this[Ie]=0,t ``` ### 15. High: Cross File Remote Execution Context - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 72.0% - **Path:** dist/impl-res/cloud-supervisor.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Source spawns a local helper that also contains network and dynamic execution context; review data flow before blocking. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Cross-file remote execution chain: dist/impl-res/cloud-supervisor.mjs spawns dist/impl-res/mcp-server.mjs; helper contains network access plus dynamic code execution. L2: const require = __linzumiBundleCreateRequire(import.meta.url); L3: var KE=Object.create;var tc=Object.defineProperty;var JE=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var WE=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var HE=Object.getPrototypeOf,GE=Object.prototype.hasOwnPr... L4: `).join(`\r ... L8: \r L9: `+n)}function jr(e,t,n,i,r,o){if(e.listenerCount("wsClientError")){let a=new Error(r);Error.captureStackTrace(a,jr),e.emit("wsClientError",a,n,t)}else Lo(n,i,r,o)}});var sE={};ZE(s... L10: `," ").trim();if(!a)continue;let s=kj.exec(a);if(s){t.commandFallback||(t.commandFallback=s[1]);continue}let d=/([\s\S]*?)<\/bash-input>/.exec(a); ``` ### 16. Critical: Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** dist/impl-ts/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.bin -> bin/linzumi.js -> dist/index.js -> dist/impl-ts/index.js L27: ${u}`.split(` L28: `).filter(c=>c.trim()!=="")}catch{return[]}finally{n!==void 0&&dbe(n)}}function Pbe(e){return e.filter(n=>n.type==="response_item").map(n=>M(n.payload)).filter(n=>n!==void 0).filte... L29: `,"utf8");let r=new Map,o=0,i={runDir:t,contentMode:e.contentMode,record:(a,s,d={})=>{let u=Vbe(r,t,a);o+=1,u.write(`${JSON.stringify({ts:new Date().toISOString(),mono_ms:Zbe(),seq... ... L41: `),d)},notices:()=>Array.from(n.values()),reset:()=>n.clear()}}function Bxe(e){switch(e){case"warning":return"WARNING: ";case"error":return"ERROR: ";case"info":return""}}function v... L42: `)}function P8(e){return e.flatMap(n=>n.isImage?[{type:"localImage",path:n.path}]:[])}async function rE(e,n ``` ### 17. High: Trigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltration - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** dist/impl-ts/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches command-output exfiltration behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Trigger-reachable command-output exfiltration chain: manifest.bin -> bin/linzumi.js -> dist/index.js -> dist/impl-ts/index.js L27: ${u}`.split(` L28: `).filter(c=>c.trim()!=="")}catch{return[]}finally{n!==void 0&&dbe(n)}}function Pbe(e){return e.filter(n=>n.type==="response_item").map(n=>M(n.payload)).filter(n=>n!==void 0).filte... L29: `,"utf8");let r=new Map,o=0,i={runDir:t,contentMode:e.contentMode,record:(a,s,d={})=>{let u=Vbe(r,t,a);o+=1,u.write(`${JSON.stringify({ts:new Date().toISOString(),mono_ms:Zbe(),seq... ... L41: `),d)},notices:()=>Array.from(n.values()),reset:()=>n.clear()}}function Bxe(e){switch(e){case"warning":return"WARNING: ";case"error":return"ERROR: ";case"info":return""}}function v... L42: `)}function P8(e){return e.flatMap(n=>n.isImage?[{type:"localImage",path:n.path ``` ### 18. High: Trigger Reachable Persistence - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** dist/impl-ts/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches persistence behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Trigger-reachable persistence chain: manifest.bin -> bin/linzumi.js -> dist/index.js -> dist/impl-ts/index.js L2: const require = __linzumiBundleCreateRequire(import.meta.url); L3: var m_e=Object.create;var _R=Object.defineProperty;var h_e=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var g_e=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var y_e=Object.getPrototypeOf,__e=Object.prototype.has... L4: const { workerData, parentPort } = require('node:worker_threads'); ... L19: if (parentPort) parentPort.postMessage(result); L20: `});var u5={};yo(u5,{[redacted]:()=>B_e,discoverCurrentGitProject:()=>U_e});import{spawnSync as q_e}from"node:child_process";import{homedir as $_e}from"n... L21: `).flatMap(t=>t.startsWith("worktree ")?[t.slice(9)]:[])}function abe(e){let n=["README.md","README.markdown","readme.md"].map(t=>zp(e,t)).f ``` ### 19. High: Runtime Package Install - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 86.0% - **Path:** dist/impl-ts/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source invokes a package manager install command at runtime. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L571: `)){if(o.trim()==="")continue;let i=ewe(o);if(i===void 0)continue;let a=nwe(i),s=_(i.type),d=_(a?.type),u=s==="turn_context"?_(a?.turn_id):d==="task_started"?_(a?.turn_id):void 0;u... L572: `,"utf8")}function xB(){let e=process.env.LINZUMI_AGENT_REPLAY_RECORD_FILE?.trim();return e===void 0||e===""?void 0:e}function ywe(e){return wg!==void 0&&wg.path===e||(fwe(hwe(e),{... L573: ${e.body}`).digest("hex").slice(0,16),uw=e=>{switch(e){case"stale_epoch":case"post_settle":case"post_terminal":case"frame_index_reuse":return e;default:return"unknown"}},Hwe=(e,n)=... ... L584: L585: `)}function gJ(e){switch(_(e.type)){case"reasoning":return"reasoning";case"agentMessage":return"assistant";case"message":return _(e.role)==="assistant"?"assistant":void 0;case"exit... L586: `);let Q={kind:"snapsho ``` ### 20. Low: High Entropy Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 55.0% Package source contains high-entropy string patterns. ### 21. Low: Url Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 65.0% Package source contains URL literals. ### 22. Medium: Ships Native Binary - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** dist/impl-res/native/darwin/preview-process-identity - **Public source:** [View source]() Package ships native binary artifacts. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```text path = dist/impl-res/native/darwin/preview-process-identity kind = native_binary sizeBytes = 83224 magicHex = [redacted] ``` ### 23. Medium: Ships Build Helper - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 70.0% - **Path:** scripts/codex-wire-canary.sh - **Public source:** [View source]() Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```shell path = scripts/codex-wire-canary.sh kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 2427 magicHex = [redacted] ``` ### 24. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 100.0% Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean. ### 25. High: Semantic Analysis Limited - **Category:** Scanner Coverage - **Confidence:** 100.0% - **Path:** dist/impl-ts/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_path_work_budget_exceeded; limitedFiles = 7 ``` ## Dependencies and install lifecycle - **Lifecycle scripts present:** No - **Dependencies:** 9 - **Optional dependencies:** 0 - **Peer dependencies:** 0 - **Development dependencies:** 10 - **Published dependency-graph edges:** 9 ### Published dependency entries - @anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk 0.3.199 (Dependency) - @inquirer/prompts ^7.8.6 (Dependency) - @modelcontextprotocol/sdk ^1.29.0 (Dependency) - @openai/codex 0.153.2 (Dependency) - blessed ^0.1.81 (Dependency) - proper-lockfile 3.2.0 (Dependency) - undici ^6.25.0 (Dependency) - ws ^8.18.0 (Dependency) - zod ^3.25.76 (Dependency) ## Package metadata - **Package:** @linzumi/cli - **Ecosystem:** npm - **Version:** 1.0.246 - **License:** MIT - **Version published:** 2026-09-08T08:25:31.384Z - **Package first seen:** 2026-06-30T22:28:39.251Z - **Package last seen:** 2026-11-04T11:55:36.727Z - **Known versions:** 149 - **Latest version:** 1.0.328 - **Appeal under review:** No - **Description:** Linzumi CLI — point a Codex agent at the real code on your laptop, with your team watching and steering from shared threads. - **Maintainers:** sgrove, \_zth - **Keywords:** linzumi, kandan, codex, local-runner - **Runtime engines:** node: \>=20 - **Artifact files:** 93 - **Artifact unpacked size:** 11,365,503 bytes - **Artifact signatures:** 2 - **Attestations:** No ## References - [HTML security report]()