@linzumi/cli@1.0.247
Linzumi CLI — point a Codex agent at the real code on your laptop, with your team watching and steering from shared threads.
AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiNo installation-time attack or opaque remote code execution was confirmed. The package nevertheless provides concrete authenticated agent-control and secret-access capabilities, so it should be warned pending trust review of the service and intended deployment.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
A user runs the Linzumi CLI with an authenticated Linzumi account or configured agent session.
Impact
A compromised or over-permissioned service could direct agent actions and access authorized workspace secrets or data.
Mechanism
Bearer-token API client, cloud supervisor, and WebSocket TCP tunnel.
AI rationale
No installation-time attack or opaque remote code execution was confirmed. The package nevertheless provides concrete authenticated agent-control and secret-access capabilities, so it should be warned pending trust review of the service and intended deployment.
Evidence
dist/impl-ts/index.jsdist/impl-res/cloud-supervisor.mjsdist/tcp-tunnel-cli.mjs.linzumi/auth.json.linzumi/user-auth.json
Network endpoints2
linzumi.linkserve.linzumi.com
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 88.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- Runtime code sends bearer-authenticated requests to Linzumi personal-agent or local-runner APIs.
- The API client exposes vault-secret retrieval and agent child-job operations.
- The cloud supervisor reads a local Linzumi authentication cache and uses its access token.
- The TCP tunnel command uses Linzumi-hosted WebSocket and service endpoints.
Evidence against
- package.json has no preinstall, install, or postinstall hook.
- The risky capabilities are reached through the user-invoked CLI, not package installation.
- The development vendoring script runs only through an explicit npm script and invokes git with argument arrays.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsEvalFilesystemNetworkShellWebSocket
HighEntropyStringsMinifiedPossibleObfuscation
Source & flagged code
17 flaggedscripts/vendor-codex-app-server-protocol.tsView file
13import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
L14: import { spawn } from 'node:child_process';
L15:
High
Child Process
Package source references child process execution.
scripts/vendor-codex-app-server-protocol.tsView on unpkg · L13dist/impl-ts/index.jsView file
27${u}`.split(`
L28: `).filter(c=>c.trim()!=="")}catch{return[]}finally{n!==void 0&&dbe(n)}}function Pbe(e){return e.filter(n=>n.type==="response_item").map(n=>M(n.payload)).filter(n=>n!==void 0).filte...
L29: `,"utf8");let r=new Map,o=0,i={runDir:t,contentMode:e.contentMode,record:(a,s,d={})=>{let u=Vbe(r,t,a);o+=1,u.write(`${JSON.stringify({ts:new Date().toISOString(),mono_ms:Zbe(),seq...
...
L41: `),d)},notices:()=>Array.from(n.values()),reset:()=>n.clear()}}function Bxe(e){switch(e){case"warning":return"WARNING: ";case"error":return"ERROR: ";case"info":return""}}function w...
L42: `)}function R8(e){return e.flatMap(n=>n.isImage?[{type:"localImage",path:n.path}]:[])}async function rE(e,n){let t=await nE(e,n),r=tE(n.body,t,{uploadInstructionMode:"footer"}),o=t...
L43: `)}function ave(
Critical
Same File Env Network Execution
A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution with blocking evidence.
Findings
3 Critical11 High7 Medium4 Low
CriticalSame File Env Network Executiondist/impl-ts/index.js
CriticalRemote Asset Decode Executedist/tcp-tunnel-cli.mjs
CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitydist/impl-ts/index.js
HighChild Processscripts/vendor-codex-app-server-protocol.ts
HighShell
HighEvaldist/impl-ts/index.js
HighCredential Redirect Persistencedist/impl-ts/index.js
HighCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/impl-ts/index.js
HighSandbox Evasion Gated Capabilitydist/impl-ts/index.js
HighCross File Remote Execution Contextdist/impl-res/cloud-supervisor.mjs
HighTrigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltrationdist/impl-ts/index.js
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @linzumi/cli@1.0.247.
See all versions of @linzumi/cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @linzumi/cli@1.0.247 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.