@linzumi/cli@1.0.257
Linzumi CLI — point a Codex agent at the real code on your laptop, with your team watching and steering from shared threads.
AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiNo concrete malicious install hook, exfiltration path, or stealth persistence was found. The shipped remote-agent execution and code-upload capability is sufficiently powerful to warrant a warning until its operational trust boundary is accepted.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The CLI entrypoint reaches a large runtime that supports remote agent execution.
- The runtime provisions a remote machine, uploads supervisor code, and invokes commands in that machine.
- Remote cloud execution is enabled by environment or configuration credentials and can carry agent-provided input.
- package.json has no preinstall, install, or postinstall hook.
- The TCP tunnel code implements an authenticated loopback forwarding feature; the reported decoding primitives are bundled protocol dependencies, not payload execution.
- The observed endpoints and token handling are aligned with the stated remote-agent product.
Source & flagged code
18 flaggedPackage source references child process execution.
scripts/vendor-codex-app-server-protocol.tsView on unpkg · L13A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution with blocking evidence.
Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @linzumi/cli@1.0.257.
See all versions of @linzumi/cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @linzumi/cli@1.0.257 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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