registry / @lion1ou/skill-ctl / 1.0.0
@lion1ou/skill-ctl@1.0.0
Configuration-driven Agent Skill catalog installer.
AI Security Review
scanned 1mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe flagged execution and network primitives are consistent with the explicit skill installer workflow. Inspected source shows no automatic install attack, credential exfiltration, or concealed payload execution.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.
Trigger
Explicit CLI commands or authenticated local manager actions activate the relevant behavior.
Impact
Selected skill files and package configuration can change; inspected source did not establish covert credential exposure or malicious installation behavior.
Mechanism
The CLI searches for skills, invokes the external skills tool, and copies or links selected skills into chosen targets.
AI rationale
The flagged execution and network primitives are consistent with the explicit skill installer workflow. Inspected source shows no automatic install attack, credential exfiltration, or concealed payload execution.
Evidence
.cursor/skills.claude/skills.kiro/skills.agents/skills.codex/skills.openclaw/skills.hermes/skills
Network endpoints2
skills.sh127.0.0.1
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Clean at 92.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for AI clean decision
- package.json has publishing checks but no automatic install hook or runtime self-dependency.
- dist/dev-session.js restores the package's global CLI link when the explicit development session ends.
- dist/core/skills-source.js invokes the skills CLI with separate arguments to list a selected package's skills.
- The search request sends a query to skills.sh; no credential forwarding was identified.
- Installation uses user-selected skills, targets, mode, and overwrite flag, writing into target skill directories.
- The local manager binds to loopback and requires a random token for API access.
Evidence against
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetwork
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
Source & flagged code
4 flaggeddist/dev-session.jsView file
1import { execFileSync, spawn } from 'node:child_process';
L2: import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
High
Child Process
Package source references child process execution.
dist/dev-session.jsView on unpkg · L126finally {
restoreGlobalSkillctl(link, developmentEntry);
console.log(link.owned ? `
Low
Ai Review Evidence
dist/dev-session.js restores the package's global CLI link when the explicit development session ends.
dist/dev-session.jsView on unpkg · L26dist/core/skills-source.jsView file
21export function inspectPackageSkills(packageId) {
L22: const result = spawnSync('npx', ['-y', 'skills', 'add', packageId, '-l'], {
L23: encoding: 'utf8',
High
Runtime Package Install
Package source invokes a package manager install command at runtime.
Findings
2 High3 Medium7 Low
HighChild Processdist/dev-session.js
HighRuntime Package Installdist/core/skills-source.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
LowSuspicious Lifecycle Evidencepackage.json
LowAi Review Evidencedist/dev-session.js
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @lion1ou/skill-ctl@1.0.0.
See all versions of @lion1ou/skill-ctl for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @lion1ou/skill-ctl@1.0.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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