registry / @livx.cc/agentx / 0.99.29

@livx.cc/agentx@0.99.29

Edge-native AI agent runtime — drives a virtual filesystem via any LLM (ai.libx.js). Same bytes run in node, browser, or edge.

AI Security Review

scanned 14d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

Inspected source shows no install-time attack: the prepare hook only configures a Git hooks path. The credential and agent integration findings are consistent with caller-configured Bodify access and project-local agent features, so the package is clean.

Static reason

No blocking static signals were detected.

Trigger

Using the CLI; fetching Bodify secrets additionally requires both Bodify credentials to be configured.

Impact

No confirmed malicious effect or credential redirection was established.

Mechanism

The package requests secrets from the Bodify service and reads project instructions through its virtual filesystem. The inspected agent-related code does not mutate external agent configuration.

AI rationale

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Clean at 94.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.

Evidence for AI clean decision

package.json defines only a prepare hook that configures a Git hooks path; it has no preinstall, install, or postinstall hook.
The CLI worktree code uses a .claude/worktrees directory; this is not an agent configuration write.
The type declaration describes subagent definitions loaded from files through the package filesystem abstraction.
The library reads project instruction files from its virtual filesystem; this code does not persist or modify agent settings.
Bodify credential retrieval requires both caller-provided Bodify credentials and requests secrets from the Bodify endpoint.
CLI startup loads Bodify secrets before collecting provider keys; it does not prompt for and redirect an existing provider key.

Evidence against

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsEvalFilesystemNetworkShellWebSocket

Supply chain

Source & flagged code

6 flagged

dist/index.jsView file

Lines 4843-4883javascript

4843 ["setImmediate", /\bsetImmediate\b/],

4844 ["Atomics", /\bAtomics\b/],

4845 ["SharedArrayBuffer", /\bSharedArrayBuffer\b/],

4846 ["WebAssembly", /\bWebAssembly\b/],

4847 ["Reflect", /\bReflect\b/],

4848 ["Proxy", /\bProxy\b/],

4849 ["Buffer", /\bBuffer\b/],

4850 ["while(true)", /while\s*$\s*true\s*$/],

4851 ["for(;;)", /for\s*$\s*;\s*;\s*$/],

4852 // escape sequences can smuggle a denied identifier past the substring check

4853 // (e.g. `process` parses as `process`), so forbid them outright.

4854 ["\\u escape", /\\u/],

4855 ["\\x escape", /\\x/]

4856 ];

4857 const violations = DENY.filter(([, re]) => re.test(code)).map(([name]) => name);

4858 return { ok: violations.length === 0, violations };

4859}

4860function compileSynthesizedTool(spec) {

4861 const v = validateToolCode(spec.code);

4862 if (!v.ok) throw new Error(`unsafe synthesized tool '${spec.name}': blocked tokens [${v.violations.join(", ")}]`);

4863 if (!/^[A-Za-z_]\w{0,39}$/.test(spec.name)) throw new Error(`invalid tool name '${spec.name}'`);

4864 const fn = new Function("args", "ctx", `"use strict"; return (async (args, ctx) => { ${spec.code} })(args, ctx);`);

4865 return {

Low

Eval

Package source references a known benign dynamic code generation pattern.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L4863

4866 name: spec.name,

4867 description: spec.description,

4868 parameters: spec.parameters ?? { type: "object", properties: {} },

4869 async run(args, ctx) {

4870 const r = await fn(args, ctx);

4871 return typeof r === "string" ? r : JSON.stringify(r ?? "");

4872 }

4873 };

4874}

4875

4876// src/FakeAIClient.ts

4877var FakeAIClient = class {

4878 seen = [];

4879 script;

4880 constructor(script) {

4881 this.script = [...script];

4882 }

4883 async chat(options) {

dist/cli.jsView file

•Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration. dist/cli.js: await ctx.fs.writeFile(path, body); await ctx.fs.writeFile(path, current); await ctx.fs.writeFile(p, content); headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${opts.key}`, "content-type": "application/json" }, async writeFile(path, content) { for (const [p, c] of this.st.writes) await this.base.writeFile(p, c); await ctx.fs.writeFile(path, next); return join2(repoRoot, ".claude", "worktrees");

High

Credential Redirect Persistence

Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection.

dist/cli.jsView on unpkg

35Trigger-reachable persistence chain: manifest.bin -> dist/cli.js L35: if (content == null || typeof content === "string") return false; L36: return content.some((p) => p.type === "image_url" && (p.image_url?.url ?? "").startsWith("data:")); L37: } ... L156: try { L157: return parseImageRef(JSON.parse(content).imageRef); L158: } catch (e) { ... L287: CONFIG_FILE_RE = /(^|\/)\.(agent|claude)\/(settings(\.[\w-]+)?\.json|config\.(json|js|mjs|cjs|ts))$/i; L288: SECRET_PAIR = /((?:^|[\s,{[])(?:export\s+)?["']?[\w.\-]*(?:KEY|TOKEN|SECRET|PASSWORD|PASSWD|CREDENTIAL|PRIVATE_KEY|ACCESS_?KEY|AUTH(?:_?TOKEN)?|BEARER)[\w.\-]*["']?\s*[:=]\s*)(["']... L289: SECRET_TOKEN = /\b(sk-ant-[\w-]{12,}|sk-[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}|ghp_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}|gho_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}|github_pat_[\w]{20,}|xox[baprs]-[\w-]{10,}|AKIA[0-

High

Trigger Reachable Persistence

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches persistence behavior.

dist/cli.jsView on unpkg · L35

762try { L763: _dnsLookup = (await import("dns/promises")).lookup; L764: } catch {

package.jsonView file

Lines 43-83json

43 "runtime",

44 "tools",

45 "mcp",

46 "claude",

47 "sandbox"

48 ],

49 "engines": {

Source & flagged code

6 flagged · loading source

dist/index.jsView file

4863if (!/^[A-Za-z_]\w{0,39}$/.test(spec.name)) throw new Error(`invalid tool name '${spec.name}'`); L4864: const fn = new Function("args", "ctx", `"use strict"; return (async (args, ctx) => { ${spec.code} })(args, ctx);`); L4865: return {

Low

Eval

Package source references a known benign dynamic code generation pattern.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L4863

dist/cli.jsView file

High

Credential Redirect Persistence

Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection.

dist/cli.jsView on unpkg

Findings

2 High7 Medium6 Low

HighCredential Redirect Persistencedist/cli.js

HighTrigger Reachable Persistencedist/cli.js

MediumDynamic Requiredist/cli.js

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumInstall Persistencedist/cli.js

MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review

MediumRemote Tarball Dependencypackage.json

MediumWildcard Dependency

LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts

LowScripts Present

LowEvaldist/index.js

LowFilesystem

LowHigh Entropy Strings

LowUrl Strings

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @livx.cc/agentx@0.99.29.

See all versions of @livx.cc/agentx for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of @livx.cc/agentx@0.99.29 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-10-08 20:53:22.197Z (UTC).

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