registry / Credential exfiltration / @livx.cc/agentx / 0.99.30

@livx.cc/agentx@0.99.30

Edge-native AI agent runtime — drives a virtual filesystem via any LLM (ai.libx.js). Same bytes run in node, browser, or edge.

AI Security Review

scanned 14d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

The source confirms conditional credential forwarding to an unrestricted environment-configured endpoint, which warrants a warning under the credential-forwarding policy. No inspected source establishes covert theft or a separate block-level attack.

Static reason

No blocking static signals were detected.

Trigger

Running the CLI with BODIFY_API_KEY and BODIFY_APP_ID set.

Impact

A URL configured to an untrusted host could receive the Bodify API key.

Mechanism

The CLI uses BODIFY_URL without a destination allowlist and sends the API key as a bearer token in a request for app environment values.

AI rationale

Evidence

dist/cli.js

Network endpoints1

bodify.bod.ee

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Suspicious at 91.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.

Evidence for warning

At CLI startup, the package reads BODIFY_API_KEY and sends it as a bearer token to a URL controlled by BODIFY_URL, defaulting to bodify.bod.ee; no destination restriction is shown.
The manifest has no npm install hook; prepare only configures a Git hook path, while prepublishOnly builds the package.
The inspected agent integration locations describe Claude-style worktrees, typed subagents, and loading project instruction files.

Evidence against

The Bodify credential forwarding runs only when both BODIFY_API_KEY and BODIFY_APP_ID are present.
Agent instruction loading reads repository files into the runtime; the cited integration locations do not show automatic plugin installation or broad agent configuration mutation.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsEvalFilesystemNetworkShellWebSocket

Supply chain

Source & flagged code

6 flagged

dist/index.jsView file

Lines 4848-4888javascript

4848 ["setImmediate", /\bsetImmediate\b/],

4849 ["Atomics", /\bAtomics\b/],

4850 ["SharedArrayBuffer", /\bSharedArrayBuffer\b/],

4851 ["WebAssembly", /\bWebAssembly\b/],

4852 ["Reflect", /\bReflect\b/],

4853 ["Proxy", /\bProxy\b/],

4854 ["Buffer", /\bBuffer\b/],

4855 ["while(true)", /while\s*$\s*true\s*$/],

4856 ["for(;;)", /for\s*$\s*;\s*;\s*$/],

4857 // escape sequences can smuggle a denied identifier past the substring check

4858 // (e.g. `process` parses as `process`), so forbid them outright.

4859 ["\\u escape", /\\u/],

4860 ["\\x escape", /\\x/]

4861 ];

4862 const violations = DENY.filter(([, re]) => re.test(code)).map(([name]) => name);

4863 return { ok: violations.length === 0, violations };

4864}

4865function compileSynthesizedTool(spec) {

4866 const v = validateToolCode(spec.code);

4867 if (!v.ok) throw new Error(`unsafe synthesized tool '${spec.name}': blocked tokens [${v.violations.join(", ")}]`);

4868 if (!/^[A-Za-z_]\w{0,39}$/.test(spec.name)) throw new Error(`invalid tool name '${spec.name}'`);

4869 const fn = new Function("args", "ctx", `"use strict"; return (async (args, ctx) => { ${spec.code} })(args, ctx);`);

4870 return {

Low

Eval

Package source references a known benign dynamic code generation pattern.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L4868

4871 name: spec.name,

4872 description: spec.description,

4873 parameters: spec.parameters ?? { type: "object", properties: {} },

4874 async run(args, ctx) {

4875 const r = await fn(args, ctx);

4876 return typeof r === "string" ? r : JSON.stringify(r ?? "");

4877 }

4878 };

4879}

4880

4881// src/FakeAIClient.ts

4882var FakeAIClient = class {

4883 seen = [];

4884 script;

4885 constructor(script) {

4886 this.script = [...script];

4887 }

4888 async chat(options) {

dist/cli.jsView file

•Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration. dist/cli.js: await ctx.fs.writeFile(path, body); await ctx.fs.writeFile(path, current); await ctx.fs.writeFile(p, content); headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${opts.key}`, "content-type": "application/json" }, async writeFile(path, content) { for (const [p, c] of this.st.writes) await this.base.writeFile(p, c); await ctx.fs.writeFile(path, next); return join2(repoRoot, ".claude", "worktrees");

High

Credential Redirect Persistence

Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection.

dist/cli.jsView on unpkg

35Trigger-reachable persistence chain: manifest.bin -> dist/cli.js L35: if (content == null || typeof content === "string") return false; L36: return content.some((p) => p.type === "image_url" && (p.image_url?.url ?? "").startsWith("data:")); L37: } ... L156: try { L157: return parseImageRef(JSON.parse(content).imageRef); L158: } catch (e) { ... L287: CONFIG_FILE_RE = /(^|\/)\.(agent|claude)\/(settings(\.[\w-]+)?\.json|config\.(json|js|mjs|cjs|ts))$/i; L288: SECRET_PAIR = /((?:^|[\s,{[])(?:export\s+)?["']?[\w.\-]*(?:KEY|TOKEN|SECRET|PASSWORD|PASSWD|CREDENTIAL|PRIVATE_KEY|ACCESS_?KEY|AUTH(?:_?TOKEN)?|BEARER)[\w.\-]*["']?\s*[:=]\s*)(["']... L289: SECRET_TOKEN = /\b(sk-ant-[\w-]{12,}|sk-[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}|ghp_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}|gho_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}|github_pat_[\w]{20,}|xox[baprs]-[\w-]{10,}|AKIA[0-

High

Trigger Reachable Persistence

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches persistence behavior.

dist/cli.jsView on unpkg · L35

762try { L763: _dnsLookup = (await import("dns/promises")).lookup; L764: } catch {

package.jsonView file

Lines 43-83json

43 "runtime",

44 "tools",

45 "mcp",

46 "claude",

47 "sandbox"

48 ],

49 "engines": {

Source & flagged code

6 flagged · loading source

dist/index.jsView file

4868if (!/^[A-Za-z_]\w{0,39}$/.test(spec.name)) throw new Error(`invalid tool name '${spec.name}'`); L4869: const fn = new Function("args", "ctx", `"use strict"; return (async (args, ctx) => { ${spec.code} })(args, ctx);`); L4870: return {

Low

Eval

Package source references a known benign dynamic code generation pattern.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L4868

dist/cli.jsView file

High

Credential Redirect Persistence

Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection.

dist/cli.jsView on unpkg

Findings

2 High7 Medium6 Low

HighCredential Redirect Persistencedist/cli.js

HighTrigger Reachable Persistencedist/cli.js

MediumDynamic Requiredist/cli.js

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumInstall Persistencedist/cli.js

MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review

MediumRemote Tarball Dependencypackage.json

MediumWildcard Dependency

LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts

LowScripts Present

LowEvaldist/index.js

LowFilesystem

LowHigh Entropy Strings

LowUrl Strings

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @livx.cc/agentx@0.99.30.

See all versions of @livx.cc/agentx for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of @livx.cc/agentx@0.99.30 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-10-08 20:53:13.317Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.

AI Security Review

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Source & flagged code

Findings

Affected versions and remediation

Runtime surface

Behavioral surface

Source & flagged code