registry / @livx.cc/agentx / 0.99.38

@livx.cc/agentx@0.99.38

Edge-native AI agent runtime — drives a virtual filesystem via any LLM (ai.libx.js). Same bytes run in node, browser, or edge.

AI Security Review

scanned 1mo ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

This is a powerful agent runtime, but the risky primitives are explicit runtime functionality rather than install-time or covert behavior. The inspected source does not substantiate the scanner's claimed credential redirection or persistence.

Static reason

No blocking static signals were detected.

Trigger

A user runs the agent CLI and enables or supplies a tool request or Bodify credentials.

Impact

Commands can affect the selected runtime workspace, but the inspected source does not establish covert or automatic abuse.

Mechanism

User-invoked agent command execution and optional configured API request.

AI rationale

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Clean at 90.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.

Evidence for AI clean decision

The CLI exposes a Shell tool capable of executing supplied commands.
The CLI can send a supplied Bodify credential to its configured service when both Bodify environment variables are set.
The manifest has a prepare hook that changes the local Git hooks path.

Evidence against

There is no preinstall, install, or postinstall lifecycle hook.
The Bodify request is gated on two explicitly configured environment variables.
No source evidence shows secret harvesting, covert exfiltration, or automatic foreign agent-control-surface changes.
Shell output and child environments apply secret redaction/filtering.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsEvalFilesystemNetworkShellWebSocket

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsPossibleObfuscationUrlStrings

Source & flagged code

6 flagged

dist/index.jsView file

Lines 5037-5077javascript

5037 ["setImmediate", /\bsetImmediate\b/],

5038 ["Atomics", /\bAtomics\b/],

5039 ["SharedArrayBuffer", /\bSharedArrayBuffer\b/],

5040 ["WebAssembly", /\bWebAssembly\b/],

5041 ["Reflect", /\bReflect\b/],

5042 ["Proxy", /\bProxy\b/],

5043 ["Buffer", /\bBuffer\b/],

5044 ["while(true)", /while\s*$\s*true\s*$/],

5045 ["for(;;)", /for\s*$\s*;\s*;\s*$/],

5046 // escape sequences can smuggle a denied identifier past the substring check

5047 // (e.g. `process` parses as `process`), so forbid them outright.

5048 ["\\u escape", /\\u/],

5049 ["\\x escape", /\\x/]

5050 ];

5051 const violations = DENY.filter(([, re]) => re.test(code)).map(([name]) => name);

5052 return { ok: violations.length === 0, violations };

5053}

5054function compileSynthesizedTool(spec) {

5055 const v = validateToolCode(spec.code);

5056 if (!v.ok) throw new Error(`unsafe synthesized tool '${spec.name}': blocked tokens [${v.violations.join(", ")}]`);

5057 if (!/^[A-Za-z_]\w{0,39}$/.test(spec.name)) throw new Error(`invalid tool name '${spec.name}'`);

5058 const fn = new Function("args", "ctx", `"use strict"; return (async (args, ctx) => { ${spec.code} })(args, ctx);`);

5059 return {

Low

Eval

Package source references a known benign dynamic code generation pattern.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L5057

5060 name: spec.name,

5061 description: spec.description,

5062 parameters: spec.parameters ?? { type: "object", properties: {} },

5063 async run(args, ctx) {

5064 const r = await fn(args, ctx);

5065 return typeof r === "string" ? r : JSON.stringify(r ?? "");

5066 }

5067 };

5068}

5069

5070// src/FakeAIClient.ts

5071var FakeAIClient = class {

5072 seen = [];

5073 script;

5074 constructor(script) {

5075 this.script = [...script];

5076 }

5077 async chat(options) {

dist/cli.jsView file

•Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration. dist/cli.js: await ctx.fs.writeFile(path, body); await ctx.fs.writeFile(path, current); await ctx.fs.writeFile(p, content); headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${opts.key}`, "content-type": "application/json" }, async writeFile(path, content) { for (const [p, c] of this.st.writes) await this.base.writeFile(p, c); await ctx.fs.writeFile(path, next); return join2(repoRoot, ".claude", "worktrees");

High

Credential Redirect Persistence

Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection.

dist/cli.jsView on unpkg

35Trigger-reachable persistence chain: manifest.bin -> dist/cli.js L35: if (content == null || typeof content === "string") return false; L36: return content.some((p) => p.type === "image_url" && (p.image_url?.url ?? "").startsWith("data:")); L37: } ... L156: try { L157: return parseImageRef(JSON.parse(content).imageRef); L158: } catch (e) { ... L296: CONFIG_FILE_RE = /(^|\/)\.(agent|claude)\/(settings(\.[\w-]+)?\.json|config\.(json|js|mjs|cjs|ts))$/i; L297: SECRET_PAIR = /((?:^|[\s,{[])(?:export\s+)?["']?[\w.\-]*(?:KEY|TOKEN|SECRET|PASSWORD|PASSWD|CREDENTIAL|PRIVATE_KEY|ACCESS_?KEY|AUTH(?:_?TOKEN)?|BEARER)[\w.\-]*["']?\s*[:=]\s*)(["']... L298: SECRET_TOKEN = /\b(sk-ant-[\w-]{12,}|sk-[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}|ghp_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}|gho_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}|github_pat_[\w]{20,}|xox[baprs]-[\w-]{10,}|AKIA[0-

High

Trigger Reachable Persistence

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches persistence behavior.

dist/cli.jsView on unpkg · L35

852try { L853: _dnsLookup = (await import("dns/promises")).lookup; L854: } catch {

package.jsonView file

Lines 43-83json

43 "runtime",

44 "tools",

45 "mcp",

46 "claude",

47 "sandbox"

48 ],

49 "engines": {

Source & flagged code

6 flagged · loading source

dist/index.jsView file

5057if (!/^[A-Za-z_]\w{0,39}$/.test(spec.name)) throw new Error(`invalid tool name '${spec.name}'`); L5058: const fn = new Function("args", "ctx", `"use strict"; return (async (args, ctx) => { ${spec.code} })(args, ctx);`); L5059: return {

Low

Eval

Package source references a known benign dynamic code generation pattern.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L5057

dist/cli.jsView file

High

Credential Redirect Persistence

Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection.

dist/cli.jsView on unpkg

Findings

2 High7 Medium6 Low

HighCredential Redirect Persistencedist/cli.js

HighTrigger Reachable Persistencedist/cli.js

MediumDynamic Requiredist/cli.js

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumInstall Persistencedist/cli.js

MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review

MediumRemote Tarball Dependencypackage.json

MediumWildcard Dependency

LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts

LowScripts Present

LowEvaldist/index.js

LowFilesystem

LowHigh Entropy Strings

LowUrl Strings

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @livx.cc/agentx@0.99.38.

See all versions of @livx.cc/agentx for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of @livx.cc/agentx@0.99.38 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-09-14 13:13:07.573Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.