registry / @livx.cc/agentx / 0.99.40

@livx.cc/agentx@0.99.40

Edge-native AI agent runtime — drives a virtual filesystem via any LLM (ai.libx.js). Same bytes run in node, browser, or edge.

AI Security Review

scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

The observed network credential use is gated by explicit configuration, while shell execution is the stated runtime capability of a user-invoked coding agent. The package has no registry install lifecycle hook or concrete malicious chain.

Static reason

No blocking static signals were detected.

Trigger

A user runs the CLI and supplies its own task or optional Bodify configuration.

Impact

The tool has powerful expected coding-agent capabilities, but no unconsented install-time or covert attack behavior was found.

Mechanism

User-invoked agent execution and optional secret retrieval.

AI rationale

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Clean at 84.0% confidence as Benign with medium false-positive risk.

Evidence for AI clean decision

The CLI can retrieve configured Bodify secrets using a bearer credential.
The coding-agent shell tool can execute user-directed commands.
The manifest prepare hook changes the checkout Git hook path.

Evidence against

There are no preinstall, install, or postinstall hooks.
The Bodify request requires both user-supplied environment variables and allows its base URL to be overridden.
No self-dependency, hidden payload, automatic credential harvesting, or automatic external control-surface mutation was found.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsEvalFilesystemNetworkShellWebSocket

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsPossibleObfuscationUrlStrings

Manifest

WildcardDependency

Source & flagged code

6 flagged

dist/index.jsView file

Lines 5214-5254javascript

5214 ["setImmediate", /\bsetImmediate\b/],

5215 ["Atomics", /\bAtomics\b/],

5216 ["SharedArrayBuffer", /\bSharedArrayBuffer\b/],

5217 ["WebAssembly", /\bWebAssembly\b/],

5218 ["Reflect", /\bReflect\b/],

5219 ["Proxy", /\bProxy\b/],

5220 ["Buffer", /\bBuffer\b/],

5221 ["while(true)", /while\s*$\s*true\s*$/],

5222 ["for(;;)", /for\s*$\s*;\s*;\s*$/],

5223 // escape sequences can smuggle a denied identifier past the substring check

5224 // (e.g. `process` parses as `process`), so forbid them outright.

5225 ["\\u escape", /\\u/],

5226 ["\\x escape", /\\x/]

5227 ];

5228 const violations = DENY.filter(([, re]) => re.test(code)).map(([name]) => name);

5229 return { ok: violations.length === 0, violations };

5230}

5231function compileSynthesizedTool(spec) {

5232 const v = validateToolCode(spec.code);

5233 if (!v.ok) throw new Error(`unsafe synthesized tool '${spec.name}': blocked tokens [${v.violations.join(", ")}]`);

5234 if (!/^[A-Za-z_]\w{0,39}$/.test(spec.name)) throw new Error(`invalid tool name '${spec.name}'`);

5235 const fn = new Function("args", "ctx", `"use strict"; return (async (args, ctx) => { ${spec.code} })(args, ctx);`);

5236 return {

Low

Eval

Package source references a known benign dynamic code generation pattern.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L5234

5237 name: spec.name,

5238 description: spec.description,

5239 parameters: spec.parameters ?? { type: "object", properties: {} },

5240 async run(args, ctx) {

5241 const r = await fn(args, ctx);

5242 return typeof r === "string" ? r : JSON.stringify(r ?? "");

5243 }

5244 };

5245}

5246

5247// src/FakeAIClient.ts

5248var FakeAIClient = class {

5249 seen = [];

5250 script;

5251 constructor(script) {

5252 this.script = [...script];

5253 }

5254 async chat(options) {

dist/cli.jsView file

•Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration. dist/cli.js: await ctx.fs.writeFile(path, body); await ctx.fs.writeFile(path, current); await ctx.fs.writeFile(p, content); headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${opts.key}`, "content-type": "application/json" }, async writeFile(path, content) { for (const [p, c] of this.st.writes) await this.base.writeFile(p, c); await ctx.fs.writeFile(path, next); return join2(repoRoot, ".claude", "worktrees");

High

Credential Redirect Persistence

Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection.

dist/cli.jsView on unpkg

35Trigger-reachable persistence chain: manifest.bin -> dist/cli.js L35: if (content == null || typeof content === "string") return false; L36: return content.some((p) => p.type === "image_url" && (p.image_url?.url ?? "").startsWith("data:")); L37: } ... L156: try { L157: return parseImageRef(JSON.parse(content).imageRef); L158: } catch (e) { ... L301: CONFIG_FILE_RE = /(^|\/)\.(agent|claude)\/(settings(\.[\w-]+)?\.json|config\.(json|js|mjs|cjs|ts))$/i; L302: SECRET_PAIR = /((?:^|[\s,{[])(?:export\s+)?["']?[\w.\-]*(?:KEY|TOKEN|SECRET|PASSWORD|PASSWD|CREDENTIAL|PRIVATE_KEY|ACCESS_?KEY|AUTH(?:_?TOKEN)?|BEARER)[\w.\-]*["']?\s*[:=]\s*)(["']... L303: SECRET_TOKEN = /\b(sk-ant-[\w-]{12,}|sk-[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}|ghp_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}|gho_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}|github_pat_[\w]{20,}|xox[baprs]-[\w-]{10,}|AKIA[0-

High

Trigger Reachable Persistence

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches persistence behavior.

dist/cli.jsView on unpkg · L35

857try { L858: _dnsLookup = (await import("dns/promises")).lookup; L859: } catch {

package.jsonView file

Lines 43-83json

43 "runtime",

44 "tools",

45 "mcp",

46 "claude",

47 "sandbox"

48 ],

49 "engines": {

Source & flagged code

6 flagged · loading source

dist/index.jsView file

5234if (!/^[A-Za-z_]\w{0,39}$/.test(spec.name)) throw new Error(`invalid tool name '${spec.name}'`); L5235: const fn = new Function("args", "ctx", `"use strict"; return (async (args, ctx) => { ${spec.code} })(args, ctx);`); L5236: return {

Low

Eval

Package source references a known benign dynamic code generation pattern.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L5234

dist/cli.jsView file

High

Credential Redirect Persistence

Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection.

dist/cli.jsView on unpkg

Findings

2 High7 Medium6 Low

HighCredential Redirect Persistencedist/cli.js

HighTrigger Reachable Persistencedist/cli.js

MediumDynamic Requiredist/cli.js

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumInstall Persistencedist/cli.js

MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review

MediumRemote Tarball Dependencypackage.json

MediumWildcard Dependency

LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts

LowScripts Present

LowEvaldist/index.js

LowFilesystem

LowHigh Entropy Strings

LowUrl Strings

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @livx.cc/agentx@0.99.40.

See all versions of @livx.cc/agentx for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of @livx.cc/agentx@0.99.40 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-09-03 19:25:02.506Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.