registry / @livx.cc/agentx / 0.99.42

@livx.cc/agentx@0.99.42

Edge-native AI agent runtime — drives a virtual filesystem via any LLM (ai.libx.js). Same bytes run in node, browser, or edge.

AI Security Review

scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

The source implements a user-invoked AI-agent CLI with powerful but package-aligned capabilities. Its configured Bodify credential request is conditional and not persisted as a provider redirect, while no install-time execution or concrete exfiltration chain was found.

Static reason

No blocking static signals were detected.; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source

Trigger

A user runs the agentx CLI or invokes its tools with configured credentials.

Impact

The CLI can use configured service credentials and run requested commands; no automatic install-time abuse was found.

Mechanism

User-invoked agent runtime, web requests, and shell execution.

AI rationale

Network endpoints1

bodify.bod.ee

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Clean at 86.0% confidence as Benign with medium false-positive risk.

Evidence for AI clean decision

The CLI can send an explicitly configured BODIFY_API_KEY to bodify.bod.ee to retrieve an app environment.
The shell tool can launch commands, although its default child environment removes common secret variables.

Evidence against

The manifest has no preinstall, install, or postinstall hook; prepare only sets a local Git hook path.
The CLI runs only behind an import.meta.main guard.
The Bodify request requires both BODIFY_API_KEY and BODIFY_APP_ID and does not persist a gateway redirect.
No self-dependency, opaque payload loading, automatic credential harvesting, or unconsented AI-agent control-surface mutation was found.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsEvalFilesystemNetworkShellWebSocket

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsPossibleObfuscationUrlStrings

Source & flagged code

7 flagged

dist/index.jsView file

Lines 5335-5375javascript

5335 ["setImmediate", /\bsetImmediate\b/],

5336 ["Atomics", /\bAtomics\b/],

5337 ["SharedArrayBuffer", /\bSharedArrayBuffer\b/],

5338 ["WebAssembly", /\bWebAssembly\b/],

5339 ["Reflect", /\bReflect\b/],

5340 ["Proxy", /\bProxy\b/],

5341 ["Buffer", /\bBuffer\b/],

5342 ["while(true)", /while\s*$\s*true\s*$/],

5343 ["for(;;)", /for\s*$\s*;\s*;\s*$/],

5344 // escape sequences can smuggle a denied identifier past the substring check

5345 // (e.g. `process` parses as `process`), so forbid them outright.

5346 ["\\u escape", /\\u/],

5347 ["\\x escape", /\\x/]

5348 ];

5349 const violations = DENY.filter(([, re]) => re.test(code)).map(([name]) => name);

5350 return { ok: violations.length === 0, violations };

5351}

5352function compileSynthesizedTool(spec) {

5353 const v = validateToolCode(spec.code);

5354 if (!v.ok) throw new Error(`unsafe synthesized tool '${spec.name}': blocked tokens [${v.violations.join(", ")}]`);

5355 if (!/^[A-Za-z_]\w{0,39}$/.test(spec.name)) throw new Error(`invalid tool name '${spec.name}'`);

5356 const fn = new Function("args", "ctx", `"use strict"; return (async (args, ctx) => { ${spec.code} })(args, ctx);`);

5357 return {

Low

Eval

Package source references a known benign dynamic code generation pattern.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L5355

5358 name: spec.name,

5359 description: spec.description,

5360 parameters: spec.parameters ?? { type: "object", properties: {} },

5361 async run(args, ctx) {

5362 const r = await fn(args, ctx);

5363 return typeof r === "string" ? r : JSON.stringify(r ?? "");

5364 }

5365 };

5366}

5367

5368// src/FakeAIClient.ts

5369var FakeAIClient = class {

5370 seen = [];

5371 script;

5372 constructor(script) {

5373 this.script = [...script];

5374 }

5375 async chat(options) {

dist/cli.jsView file

•Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration. dist/cli.js: await ctx.fs.writeFile(path, body); await ctx.fs.writeFile(path, current); await ctx.fs.writeFile(p, content); headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${opts.key}`, "content-type": "application/json" }, async writeFile(path, content) { for (const [p, c] of this.st.writes) await this.base.writeFile(p, c); await ctx.fs.writeFile(path, next); return join2(repoRoot, ".claude", "worktrees");

High

Credential Redirect Persistence

Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection.

dist/cli.jsView on unpkg

35Trigger-reachable persistence chain: manifest.bin -> dist/cli.js L35: if (content == null || typeof content === "string") return false; L36: return content.some((p) => p.type === "image_url" && (p.image_url?.url ?? "").startsWith("data:")); L37: } ... L156: try { L157: return parseImageRef(JSON.parse(content).imageRef); L158: } catch (e) { ... L301: CONFIG_FILE_RE = /(^|\/)\.(agent|claude)\/(settings(\.[\w-]+)?\.json|config\.(json|js|mjs|cjs|ts))$/i; L302: SECRET_PAIR = /((?:^|[\s,{[])(?:export\s+)?["']?[\w.\-]*(?:KEY|TOKEN|SECRET|PASSWORD|PASSWD|CREDENTIAL|PRIVATE_KEY|ACCESS_?KEY|AUTH(?:_?TOKEN)?|BEARER)[\w.\-]*["']?\s*[:=]\s*)(["']... L303: SECRET_TOKEN = /\b(sk-ant-[\w-]{12,}|sk-[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}|ghp_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}|gho_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}|github_pat_[\w]{20,}|xox[baprs]-[\w-]{10,}|AKIA[0-

High

Trigger Reachable Persistence

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches persistence behavior.

dist/cli.jsView on unpkg · L35

857try { L858: _dnsLookup = (await import("dns/promises")).lookup; L859: } catch {

package.jsonView file

Lines 43-83json

43 "runtime",

44 "tools",

45 "mcp",

46 "claude",

47 "sandbox"

48 ],

49 "engines": {

dist/tools.shell.jsView file

•matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta matchedPackage = @livx.cc/agentx@0.99.40 matchedIdentity = npm:QGxpdnguY2MvYWdlbnR4:0.99.40 similarity = 0.444 summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file

High

Previous Version Dangerous Delta

This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review.

dist/tools.shell.jsView on unpkg

Source & flagged code

7 flagged · loading source

dist/index.jsView file

5355if (!/^[A-Za-z_]\w{0,39}$/.test(spec.name)) throw new Error(`invalid tool name '${spec.name}'`); L5356: const fn = new Function("args", "ctx", `"use strict"; return (async (args, ctx) => { ${spec.code} })(args, ctx);`); L5357: return {

Low

Eval

Package source references a known benign dynamic code generation pattern.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L5355

dist/cli.jsView file

High

Credential Redirect Persistence

Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection.

dist/cli.jsView on unpkg

Findings

3 High7 Medium6 Low

HighCredential Redirect Persistencedist/cli.js

HighTrigger Reachable Persistencedist/cli.js

HighPrevious Version Dangerous Deltadist/tools.shell.js

MediumDynamic Requiredist/cli.js

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumInstall Persistencedist/cli.js

MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review

MediumRemote Tarball Dependencypackage.json

MediumWildcard Dependency

LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts

LowScripts Present

LowEvaldist/index.js

LowFilesystem

LowHigh Entropy Strings

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @livx.cc/agentx@0.99.42.

See all versions of @livx.cc/agentx for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of @livx.cc/agentx@0.99.42 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-09-05 01:34:29.599Z (UTC).

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