registry / @livx.cc/agentx / 0.99.45

@livx.cc/agentx@0.99.45

Edge-native AI agent runtime — drives a virtual filesystem via any LLM (ai.libx.js). Same bytes run in node, browser, or edge.

AI Security Review

scanned 1mo ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

The credential request is gated on explicitly supplied Bodify credentials and is consistent with an optional secret-management integration. There is no registry-install trigger, forced redirection, or source-confirmed exfiltration beyond that configured request.

Static reason

No blocking static signals were detected.; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source

Trigger

A user runs the agentx CLI; the Bodify request additionally requires both Bodify environment variables.

Impact

The configured Bodify credential is sent to its configured service endpoint to obtain environment values.

Mechanism

User-invoked agent tools and optional configured secret retrieval.

AI rationale

Network endpoints1

bodify.bod.ee/api/apps/${encodeURIComponent(appId)}/env

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Clean at 84.0% confidence as Benign with medium false-positive risk.

Evidence for AI clean decision

The CLI conditionally sends an explicitly configured Bodify API credential to a fixed Bodify endpoint to retrieve environment values.
The package contains a user-invoked coding-agent CLI with filesystem, shell, and network capabilities.

Evidence against

There are no preinstall, install, or postinstall scripts; the only lifecycle hook is a prepare-time Git hook-path setting.
The credential request occurs only when both Bodify environment variables are already set, and the retrieved values remain in process environment.
No source shows a forced provider redirect, automatic credential harvesting, or install-time execution.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsEvalFilesystemNetworkShellWebSocket

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsPossibleObfuscationUrlStrings

Source & flagged code

7 flagged

dist/index.jsView file

Lines 5345-5385javascript

5345 ["setImmediate", /\bsetImmediate\b/],

5346 ["Atomics", /\bAtomics\b/],

5347 ["SharedArrayBuffer", /\bSharedArrayBuffer\b/],

5348 ["WebAssembly", /\bWebAssembly\b/],

5349 ["Reflect", /\bReflect\b/],

5350 ["Proxy", /\bProxy\b/],

5351 ["Buffer", /\bBuffer\b/],

5352 ["while(true)", /while\s*$\s*true\s*$/],

5353 ["for(;;)", /for\s*$\s*;\s*;\s*$/],

5354 // escape sequences can smuggle a denied identifier past the substring check

5355 // (e.g. `process` parses as `process`), so forbid them outright.

5356 ["\\u escape", /\\u/],

5357 ["\\x escape", /\\x/]

5358 ];

5359 const violations = DENY.filter(([, re]) => re.test(code)).map(([name]) => name);

5360 return { ok: violations.length === 0, violations };

5361}

5362function compileSynthesizedTool(spec) {

5363 const v = validateToolCode(spec.code);

5364 if (!v.ok) throw new Error(`unsafe synthesized tool '${spec.name}': blocked tokens [${v.violations.join(", ")}]`);

5365 if (!/^[A-Za-z_]\w{0,39}$/.test(spec.name)) throw new Error(`invalid tool name '${spec.name}'`);

5366 const fn = new Function("args", "ctx", `"use strict"; return (async (args, ctx) => { ${spec.code} })(args, ctx);`);

5367 return {

Low

Eval

Package source references a known benign dynamic code generation pattern.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L5365

5368 name: spec.name,

5369 description: spec.description,

5370 parameters: spec.parameters ?? { type: "object", properties: {} },

5371 async run(args, ctx) {

5372 const r = await fn(args, ctx);

5373 return typeof r === "string" ? r : JSON.stringify(r ?? "");

5374 }

5375 };

5376}

5377

5378// src/FakeAIClient.ts

5379var FakeAIClient = class {

5380 seen = [];

5381 script;

5382 constructor(script) {

5383 this.script = [...script];

5384 }

5385 async chat(options) {

dist/cli.jsView file

•Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration. dist/cli.js: await ctx.fs.writeFile(path, body); await ctx.fs.writeFile(path, current); await ctx.fs.writeFile(p, content); headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${opts.key}`, "content-type": "application/json" }, async writeFile(path, content) { for (const [p, c] of this.st.writes) await this.base.writeFile(p, c); await ctx.fs.writeFile(path, next); return join2(repoRoot, ".claude", "worktrees");

High

Credential Redirect Persistence

Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection.

dist/cli.jsView on unpkg

38Trigger-reachable persistence chain: manifest.bin -> dist/cli.js L38: if (content == null || typeof content === "string") return false; L39: return content.some((p) => p.type === "image_url" && (p.image_url?.url ?? "").startsWith("data:")); L40: } ... L159: try { L160: return parseImageRef(JSON.parse(content).imageRef); L161: } catch (e) { ... L304: CONFIG_FILE_RE = /(^|\/)\.(agent|claude)\/(settings(\.[\w-]+)?\.json|config\.(json|js|mjs|cjs|ts))$/i; L305: SECRET_PAIR = /((?:^|[\s,{[])(?:export\s+)?["']?[\w.\-]*(?:KEY|TOKEN|SECRET|PASSWORD|PASSWD|CREDENTIAL|PRIVATE_KEY|ACCESS_?KEY|AUTH(?:_?TOKEN)?|BEARER)[\w.\-]*["']?\s*[:=]\s*)(["']... L306: SECRET_TOKEN = /\b(sk-ant-[\w-]{12,}|sk-[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}|ghp_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}|gho_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}|github_pat_[\w]{20,}|xox[baprs]-[\w-]{10,}|AKIA[0-

High

Trigger Reachable Persistence

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches persistence behavior.

dist/cli.jsView on unpkg · L38

•matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta matchedPackage = @livx.cc/agentx@0.99.44 matchedIdentity = npm:QGxpdnguY2MvYWdlbnR4:0.99.44 similarity = 0.778 summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file

package.jsonView file

Lines 43-83json

43 "runtime",

44 "tools",

45 "mcp",

46 "claude",

47 "sandbox"

48 ],

49 "engines": {

Source & flagged code

7 flagged · loading source

dist/index.jsView file

5365if (!/^[A-Za-z_]\w{0,39}$/.test(spec.name)) throw new Error(`invalid tool name '${spec.name}'`); L5366: const fn = new Function("args", "ctx", `"use strict"; return (async (args, ctx) => { ${spec.code} })(args, ctx);`); L5367: return {

Low

Eval

Package source references a known benign dynamic code generation pattern.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L5365

dist/cli.jsView file

High

Credential Redirect Persistence

Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection.

dist/cli.jsView on unpkg

Findings

3 High7 Medium6 Low

HighCredential Redirect Persistencedist/cli.js

HighTrigger Reachable Persistencedist/cli.js

HighPrevious Version Dangerous Deltadist/cli.js

MediumDynamic Requiredist/cli.js

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumInstall Persistencedist/cli.js

MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review

MediumRemote Tarball Dependencypackage.json

MediumWildcard Dependency

LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts

LowScripts Present

LowEvaldist/index.js

LowFilesystem

LowHigh Entropy Strings

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @livx.cc/agentx@0.99.45.

See all versions of @livx.cc/agentx for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of @livx.cc/agentx@0.99.45 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-09-14 06:08:08.493Z (UTC).

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