registry / @livx.cc/agentx / 0.99.47

@livx.cc/agentx@0.99.47

Edge-native AI agent runtime — drives a virtual filesystem via any LLM (ai.libx.js). Same bytes run in node, browser, or edge.

AI Security Review

scanned 14d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

Inspected the manifest and flagged bundle locations. The lifecycle hooks, conditional Bodify credential retrieval, and explicit subagent setup do not establish malicious behavior.

Static reason

No blocking static signals were detected.

Trigger

Running the CLI with Bodify credentials, or explicitly invoking `/agents new <name>`.

Impact

These behaviors support normal service configuration and user-directed agent setup; no unconsented install-time agent mutation or credential theft was established.

Mechanism

The CLI requests app environment values from the configured Bodify service; the agent command writes a subagent definition under the configured agent directory.

AI rationale

Inspected the manifest and flagged bundle locations. The lifecycle hooks, conditional Bodify credential retrieval, and explicit subagent setup do not establish malicious behavior.

Evidence

package.jsondist/cli.js

Network endpoints1

bodify.bod.ee

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Clean at 90.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.

Evidence for AI clean decision

`package.json` has no preinstall, install, or postinstall hook; `prepare` only configures the repository hook path.
The CLI sends a Bodify key only when `BODIFY_API_KEY` and `BODIFY_APP_ID` are set, using `BODIFY_URL` or the Bodify default.
The CLI creates subagent files through the explicit `/agents new <name>` command; agent definitions are used as delegated prompts.
The bundle loads project instruction files from the agent’s virtual filesystem; no install-time write to agent configuration was identified.

Evidence against

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsEvalFilesystemNetworkShellWebSocket

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsPossibleObfuscationUrlStrings

Manifest

WildcardDependency

Source & flagged code

6 flagged

dist/index.jsView file

Lines 5416-5456javascript

5416 ["setImmediate", /\bsetImmediate\b/],

5417 ["Atomics", /\bAtomics\b/],

5418 ["SharedArrayBuffer", /\bSharedArrayBuffer\b/],

5419 ["WebAssembly", /\bWebAssembly\b/],

5420 ["Reflect", /\bReflect\b/],

5421 ["Proxy", /\bProxy\b/],

5422 ["Buffer", /\bBuffer\b/],

5423 ["while(true)", /while\s*$\s*true\s*$/],

5424 ["for(;;)", /for\s*$\s*;\s*;\s*$/],

5425 // escape sequences can smuggle a denied identifier past the substring check

5426 // (e.g. `process` parses as `process`), so forbid them outright.

5427 ["\\u escape", /\\u/],

5428 ["\\x escape", /\\x/]

5429 ];

5430 const violations = DENY.filter(([, re]) => re.test(code)).map(([name]) => name);

5431 return { ok: violations.length === 0, violations };

5432}

5433function compileSynthesizedTool(spec) {

5434 const v = validateToolCode(spec.code);

5435 if (!v.ok) throw new Error(`unsafe synthesized tool '${spec.name}': blocked tokens [${v.violations.join(", ")}]`);

5436 if (!/^[A-Za-z_]\w{0,39}$/.test(spec.name)) throw new Error(`invalid tool name '${spec.name}'`);

5437 const fn = new Function("args", "ctx", `"use strict"; return (async (args, ctx) => { ${spec.code} })(args, ctx);`);

5438 return {

Low

Eval

Package source references a known benign dynamic code generation pattern.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L5436

5439 name: spec.name,

5440 description: spec.description,

5441 parameters: spec.parameters ?? { type: "object", properties: {} },

5442 async run(args, ctx) {

5443 const r = await fn(args, ctx);

5444 return typeof r === "string" ? r : JSON.stringify(r ?? "");

5445 }

5446 };

5447}

5448

5449// src/FakeAIClient.ts

5450var FakeAIClient = class {

5451 seen = [];

5452 script;

5453 constructor(script) {

5454 this.script = [...script];

5455 }

5456 async chat(options) {

dist/cli.jsView file

•Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration. dist/cli.js: await ctx.fs.writeFile(path, body); await ctx.fs.writeFile(path, current); await ctx.fs.writeFile(p, content); headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${opts.key}`, "content-type": "application/json" }, async writeFile(path, content) { for (const [p, c] of this.st.writes) await this.base.writeFile(p, c); await ctx.fs.writeFile(path, next); return join2(repoRoot, ".claude", "worktrees");

High

Credential Redirect Persistence

Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection.

dist/cli.jsView on unpkg

38Trigger-reachable persistence chain: manifest.bin -> dist/cli.js L38: if (content == null || typeof content === "string") return false; L39: return content.some((p) => p.type === "image_url" && (p.image_url?.url ?? "").startsWith("data:")); L40: } ... L159: try { L160: return parseImageRef(JSON.parse(content).imageRef); L161: } catch (e) { ... L304: CONFIG_FILE_RE = /(^|\/)\.(agent|claude)\/(settings(\.[\w-]+)?\.json|config\.(json|js|mjs|cjs|ts))$/i; L305: SECRET_PAIR = /((?:^|[\s,{[])(?:export\s+)?["']?[\w.\-]*(?:KEY|TOKEN|SECRET|PASSWORD|PASSWD|CREDENTIAL|PRIVATE_KEY|ACCESS_?KEY|AUTH(?:_?TOKEN)?|BEARER)[\w.\-]*["']?\s*[:=]\s*)(["']... L306: SECRET_TOKEN = /\b(sk-ant-[\w-]{12,}|sk-[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}|ghp_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}|gho_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}|github_pat_[\w]{20,}|xox[baprs]-[\w-]{10,}|AKIA[0-

High

Trigger Reachable Persistence

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches persistence behavior.

dist/cli.jsView on unpkg · L38

860try { L861: _dnsLookup = (await import("dns/promises")).lookup; L862: } catch {

package.jsonView file

Lines 43-83json

43 "runtime",

44 "tools",

45 "mcp",

46 "claude",

47 "sandbox"

48 ],

49 "engines": {

Source & flagged code

6 flagged · loading source

dist/index.jsView file

5436if (!/^[A-Za-z_]\w{0,39}$/.test(spec.name)) throw new Error(`invalid tool name '${spec.name}'`); L5437: const fn = new Function("args", "ctx", `"use strict"; return (async (args, ctx) => { ${spec.code} })(args, ctx);`); L5438: return {

Low

Eval

Package source references a known benign dynamic code generation pattern.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L5436

dist/cli.jsView file

High

Credential Redirect Persistence

Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection.

dist/cli.jsView on unpkg

Findings

2 High7 Medium6 Low

HighCredential Redirect Persistencedist/cli.js

HighTrigger Reachable Persistencedist/cli.js

MediumDynamic Requiredist/cli.js

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumInstall Persistencedist/cli.js

MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review

MediumRemote Tarball Dependencypackage.json

MediumWildcard Dependency

LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts

LowScripts Present

LowEvaldist/index.js

LowFilesystem

LowHigh Entropy Strings

LowUrl Strings

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @livx.cc/agentx@0.99.47.

See all versions of @livx.cc/agentx for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of @livx.cc/agentx@0.99.47 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-10-08 20:53:02.982Z (UTC).

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