@lizard-build/lizard-studio-host@1.0.46: Suspicious npm security | LPM Firewall

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@lizard-build/lizard-studio-host@1.0.46: Suspicious npm security | LPM Firewall

Source & flagged code

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src/host/codex-spawn.mjsView file

2// Hosts and Codex use separate shims, tokens and launchd job labels. L3: import { spawn, execFile } from "node:child_process"; L4: import { EventEmitter } from "node:events";

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

src/host/codex-spawn.mjsView on unpkg · L2

2// Hosts and Codex use separate shims, tokens and launchd job labels. L3: import { spawn, execFile } from "node:child_process"; L4: import { EventEmitter } from "node:events"; ... L8: import { join } from "node:path"; L9: import net from "node:net"; L10: ... L25: L26: // launchctl submit restarts jobs that exit nonzero — always leave with 0. L27: const bail = () => process.exit(0); ... L34: sock.setNoDelay(true); L35: sock.write(JSON.stringify({ token: token, spawnId: spawnId, chan: chan }) + "\\n", () => cb(sock)); L36: });

Medium

Install Persistence

Source writes installer persistence such as shell profile or service configuration.

src/host/codex-spawn.mjsView on unpkg · L2

src/host/claude-host.mjsView file

5// Chrome native messaging (4-byte little-endian length prefix + JSON body) over L6: // this process's stdin/stdout. We spawn `claude` in headless stream-json mode L7: // (`claude -p --input-format stream-json --output-format stream-json`), keep it ... L46: // instead) (→ openPath reply) L47: // { type:"stashFile", id, reqId, name, data } write an attached file (base64) to a L48: // temp dir so claude can Read it by path ... L98: L99: import { spawn, execFile, execSync } from "node:child_process"; L100: import { randomBytes, createHash } from "node:crypto"; ... L107: import { PassThrough } from "node:stream"; L108: import net from "node:n

Critical

Download Execute

Source downloads or fetches remote code and executes it.

src/host/claude-host.mjsView on unpkg · L5

•matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta matchedPackage = @lizard-build/lizard-studio-host@1.0.44 matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:1.0.44 similarity = 0.857 summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file

Critical

Previous Version Dangerous Delta

This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review.

src/host/claude-host.mjsView on unpkg

598// JSON-bearing args (--mcp-config, --settings, --append-system-prompt) through L599: // cmd.exe, which mangles the embedded quotes. So instead we find the CLI's own L600: // cli.js (the .cmd shim is just a node launcher) and run it with node directly —

High

Shell

Package source references shell execution.

src/host/claude-host.mjsView on unpkg · L598

src/host/hostkit.mjsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @lizard-build/lizard-studio-host@1.0.30 matchedPath = src/host/hostkit.mjs matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:1.0.30 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

src/host/hostkit.mjsView on unpkg

Lines 578-618javascript

578 join(home, ".local/bin/claude"),

579 join(home, ".claude/local/claude"),

580 "/usr/bin/claude",

581 ]) {

582 if (existsSync(c)) return c;

583 }

584 return "claude";

585}

586const CLAUDE = resolveClaude();

587log("claude resolved to", CLAUDE, "exists=", existsSync(CLAUDE));

588

589// The node that runs this host also runs the MCP relay we hand to claude.

590const NODE = (CONFIG.nodePath && existsSync(CONFIG.nodePath)) ? CONFIG.nodePath : process.execPath;

591

592// How every claude spawn is actually invoked: `cmd` + `prefix` ++ our args.

593//

594// On Windows the global npm install exposes claude as claude.cmd, and Node

595// (≥18.20 / ≥20.12) throws `spawn EINVAL` when a .cmd/.bat is spawned without a

596// shell — the CVE-2024-27980 mitigation. That's the "Failed to start claude:

597// spawn EINVAL" users hit on Windows. Setting `shell:true` would route our

598// JSON-bearing args (--mcp-config, --settings, --append-system-prompt) through

599// cmd.exe, which mangles the embedded quotes. So instead we find the CLI's own

600// cli.js (the .cmd shim is just a node launcher) and run it with node directly —

High

Shell

Package source references shell execution.

src/host/claude-host.mjsView on unpkg · L598

601// an .exe, spawned verbatim with the args array untouched. Non-Windows and the

602// standalone .exe installer are unaffected and spawn CLAUDE as-is.

603function winClaudeJs(cmdPath) {

604 // npm's shim embeds the entry path relative to the shim's own dir, e.g.

605 // "%dp0%\node_modules\@anthropic-ai\claude-code\cli.js" (modern npm)

606 // "%~dp0\node_modules\@anthropic-ai\claude-code\cli.js" (older npm)

607 try {

608 const m = readFileSync(cmdPath, "utf8").match(/%~?dp0%?\\?([^"\r\n]+\.js)/i);

609 if (m) {

610 const abs = join(dirname(cmdPath), m[1]);

611 if (existsSync(abs)) return abs;

612 }

613 } catch {

614 /* unreadable shim — fall through to the well-known layout */

615 }

616 const guess = join(dirname(cmdPath), "node_modules", "@anthropic-ai", "claude-code", "cli.js");

617 return existsSync(guess) ? guess : null;

618}