---
canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@lookover-ai/cli"
markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@lookover-ai/cli/report.md"
package: "@lookover-ai/cli"
report_status: "published"
title: "@lookover-ai/cli@0.5.0 npm security report"
verdict: "policy_finding"
version: "0.5.0"
---

# @lookover-ai/cli@0.5.0 npm security report

> **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document.

## Verdict summary
**Blocked by LPM policy** — The API recipient can access the user’s credentials for the target site.

- **Verdict:** LPM policy finding
- **Product-default install policy:** Block
- **Firewall policy:** LPM policy block
- **Public report status:** Published
- **Threat category:** Policy block: another service's credential sent to the publisher
- **Selected version:** 0.5.0
- **Selected version is latest:** No
- **Analysis source:** AI security review (lpm-firewall-ai)

Another service's credential sent to the publisher. An LPM review rule requires blocking this behavior, but the AI review did not find malware intent; this finding does not say the publisher attacks its users.

AI assessment: malicious; recommendation: publish block. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy.

The documented vault feature collects a password (and optionally a TOTP seed) for another service and sends it to the vendor’s default API. Although this happens in an explicit, interactive command, the credential rules classify this transfer as a block.

## Latest scan
- **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1
- **Recorded final verdict:** Policy block
- **Recorded analysis confidence:** 98.0%
- **Started:** 2026-11-21T21:38:55.922Z
- **Finished:** 2026-11-21T21:42:30.601Z
- **Download time:** 762 ms
- **Static scan time:** 4026 ms
- **AI review time:** 209889 ms
- **Total time:** 214679 ms

The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs.

## Security analysis

### Published attack-surface review

- **Summary:** The login-saving feature sends credentials for another service to the package vendor’s API.

- **Trigger:** A user runs \`lookover vault add\` with a valid single-use code and enters a site password; a TOTP seed may also be entered.

- **Impact:** The API recipient can access the user’s credentials for the target site.

- **Evidence paths:** dist/webagent.cjs, README.md

- **Review source:** ai\_review

- **Reviewed:** 2026-11-21T21:42:30.601Z

### AI review details

- **Review stage:** source\_first\_review

- **Mechanism:** The CLI includes the password and optional TOTP seed in a POST body to the claim endpoint. By default, the API host is \`webagent-staging-in-api.lookover.ai\`.

- **Attack narrative:** When a user invokes \`lookover vault add\`, the CLI collects a site password and optionally a TOTP seed, then sends them to the vendor API’s credential claim endpoint. The feature is documented and interactive, but the recipient is the vendor service rather than the site whose credentials were entered. This is credential exfiltration under the review rules for credentials of another service sent to the publisher’s service.

- **Rationale:** The documented vault feature collects a password (and optionally a TOTP seed) for another service and sends it to the vendor’s default API. Although this happens in an explicit, interactive command, the credential rules classify this transfer as a block.

- **Network endpoints:** webagent-staging-in-api.lookover.ai

### Review decision

- **Verdict:** Block (policy; no malware intent found)

- **Confidence:** 98.0%

- **Recommended action:** publish\_block

- **Intent class:** Dangerous Capability

- **False-positive risk:** Low

- **Evidence for block:** The \`vault add\` command reads a website password from hidden terminal input and can also read a TOTP seed., It puts the password and optional TOTP seed in a request body sent to \`/v1/credentials/add-codes/claim\`., The default API destination is \`webagent-staging-in-api.lookover.ai\`, and the vault command uses the configured API URL or that default., The README describes the feature as saving a site login for an AI agent.

- **Evidence against:** The credential transfer requires the user to run \`lookover vault add\` with a single-use code and enter the password., The command displays and checks which site the code will create a login for; the README describes the transfer.

## Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @lookover-ai/cli@0.5.0.

- Avoid installing @lookover-ai/cli@0.5.0. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, rotate the credentials this report says it sends to the publisher's service. This finding does not establish malware intent.

## Public findings

### 1. Low: Scripts Present
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Package declares npm scripts.

### 2. High: Eval
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 80.0%

Package source references dynamic code evaluation.

### 3. Medium: Network
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references network APIs.

### 4. Medium: Environment Vars
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references environment variables.

### 5. Low: Filesystem
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 70.0%

Package source references filesystem APIs.

### 6. Critical: Remote Response Code Execution
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 98.0%
- **Path:** dist/webagent.cjs
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@lookover-ai/cli@0.5.0/dist/webagent.cjs>)

Source passes code obtained from a remote response into a dynamic execution sink.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L2605: if (typeof node_buffer.Buffer === "function") {
L2606: return node_buffer.Buffer.from(src, "base64");
L2607: } else if (typeof atob === "function") {
...
L5219: yield* this.next(token);
L5220: yield* this.end(forceDoc, endOffset);
L5221: }
...
L5223: *next(token) {
L5224: if (node_process.env.LOG_STREAM)
L5225: console.dir(token, { depth: null });
...
L10321: return false;
L10322: return canParseURL(`http://[${value}]`);
L10323: }
```

### 7. Low: High Entropy Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 55.0%

Package source contains high-entropy string patterns.

### 8. Low: Url Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 65.0%

Package source contains URL literals.

### 9. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 95.0%

Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean.

### 10. High: Ai Review Evidence
- **Category:** Ai Review
- **Confidence:** 98.0%
- **Path:** dist/webagent.cjs
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@lookover-ai/cli@0.5.0/dist/webagent.cjs>)

The \`vault add\` command reads a website password from hidden terminal input and can also read a TOTP seed.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
if (username === "") throw new Refused("A username is needed.");
      }
      password = await readTtyLine(d2.stdin, d2.write, "Password: ", false);
      if (password ===
```

### 11. High: Ai Review Evidence
- **Category:** Ai Review
- **Confidence:** 98.0%
- **Path:** dist/webagent.cjs
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@lookover-ai/cli@0.5.0/dist/webagent.cjs>)

The \`vault add\` command reads a website password from hidden terminal input and can also read a TOTP seed.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
p) {
        const t = (await readTtyLine(d2.stdin, d2.write, "TOTP seed (leave empty for none): ", false)).trim();
        totpSecret = t === ""
```

### 12. High: Ai Review Evidence
- **Category:** Ai Review
- **Confidence:** 98.0%
- **Path:** dist/webagent.cjs
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@lookover-ai/cli@0.5.0/dist/webagent.cjs>)

It puts the password and optional TOTP seed in a request body sent to \`/v1/credentials/add-codes/claim\`.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
const body = {
      code: opts.code,
      password,
      ...username ? { username } : {},
      ...totpSecret ? { totpSecret } : {}
    };
    const claim2 = await post(d2, base
```

## Dependencies and install lifecycle
- **Lifecycle scripts present:** No

- **Dependencies:** 0
- **Optional dependencies:** 0
- **Peer dependencies:** 0
- **Development dependencies:** 8
- **Published dependency-graph edges:** 0

## Package metadata
- **Package:** @lookover-ai/cli
- **Ecosystem:** npm
- **Version:** 0.5.0
- **License:** Apache-2.0
- **Version published:** 2026-11-20T18:32:08.139Z
- **Package first seen:** 2026-11-20T21:06:30.954Z
- **Package last seen:** 2026-11-21T21:42:30.601Z
- **Known versions:** 3
- **Latest version:** 0.6.0
- **Appeal under review:** No
- **Description:** Lookover command line: run your .webagent/tests.yaml against a preview URL in CI, and save site logins for your AI agent without passing passwords through the chat.
- **Keywords:** lookover, webagent, qa, cli
- **Runtime engines:** node: \>=22
- **Artifact files:** 3
- **Artifact unpacked size:** 1,549,586 bytes
- **Artifact signatures:** 2
- **Attestations:** No

## References
- [HTML security report](<https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@lookover-ai/cli>)
- [Repository](<https://github.com/lookover-ai/webagent-contracts.git>)
- [Homepage](<https://github.com/lookover-ai/webagent-contracts#readme>)
- [Issues](<https://github.com/lookover-ai/webagent-contracts/issues>)
