registry / @lotics/cli / 0.318.14
@lotics/cli@0.318.14
Lotics SDK and CLI for AI agents
AI Security Review
scanned 8d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiInspected the manifest and bundled runtime paths highlighted by the scanner. The lifecycle, telemetry, API-host, and subprocess evidence is consistent with CLI functionality and does not establish credential theft or command-output exfiltration.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.
Trigger
A user invokes the CLI; telemetry additionally requires `LOTICS_TELEMETRY=1`.
Impact
No concrete malicious effect was established.
Mechanism
The CLI sends telemetry events to its configured Lotics API host. The inspected subprocess paths support user-invoked app build and dependency installation operations.
AI rationale
Inspected the manifest and bundled runtime paths highlighted by the scanner. The lifecycle, telemetry, API-host, and subprocess evidence is consistent with CLI functionality and does not establish credential theft or command-output exfiltration.
Evidence
package.jsondist/src/cli.js
Network endpoints1
api.lotics.ai
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Clean at 91.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for AI clean decision
- package.json defines `prepublishOnly` as a build command; it has no install lifecycle hook.
- CLI telemetry is gated on `LOTICS_TELEMETRY=1`.
- Telemetry posts events to the CLI telemetry route using the configured API key.
- The default API host is Lotics, and an operator can configure `LOTICS_API_URL`.
- The app toolchain installs dependencies with `--ignore-scripts`.
Evidence against
- The scanner’s reported credential redirection and command-output exfiltration are not established by the inspected source: the visible network and subprocess paths support Lotics API requests, update checks, and user-invoked app build operations.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsEvalFilesystemNetworkShell
HighEntropyStringsPossibleObfuscationUrlStrings
Source & flagged code
6 flaggeddist/src/cli.jsView file
1791// src/cli_dispatch.ts
L1792: import { spawn as spawn2 } from "node:child_process";
L1793:
High
1824// docs/cli_reference.md
L1825: var cli_reference_default = "# @lotics/cli \u2014 CLI Command Reference\n\nPer-command syntax, flags, contracts, and gotchas for the public `lotics` CLI. Start at [AGENTS.md](../AG...
L1826:
High
9// src/cli.ts
L10: import dns from "node:dns";
L11: import net from "node:net";
...
L111: import path from "node:path";
L112: function telemetryEnabled(env = process.env) {
L113: return env.LOTICS_TELEMETRY === "1";
...
L142: function sessionStorePath() {
L143: return path.join(os.homedir(), ".lotics", "session.json");
L144: }
...
L146: try {
L147: const parsed = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(file2, "utf-8"));
L148: if (typeof parsed !== "object" || parsed === null) return null;
High
Host Fingerprint Exfiltration
Source collects local host identity data and sends it to an external endpoint.
Findings
6 High3 Medium6 Low
HighChild Processdist/src/cli.js
HighShelldist/src/cli.js
HighHost Fingerprint Exfiltrationdist/src/cli.js
HighCredential Redirect Persistencedist/src/cli.js
HighCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/src/cli.js
HighTrigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltrationdist/src/cli.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumWildcard Dependency
LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts
LowScripts Present
LowEval
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @lotics/cli@0.318.14.
See all versions of @lotics/cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @lotics/cli@0.318.14 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.