registry / @lotics/cli / 0.318.8
@lotics/cli@0.318.8
Lotics SDK and CLI for AI agents
AI Security Review
scanned 8d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiInspected the manifest and bundled CLI entrypoint. The static indicators are explained by opt-in telemetry and project-tooling subprocesses; no concrete attack surface was established.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.
Trigger
Telemetry requires LOTICS_TELEMETRY=1; event upload occurs when an authenticated CLI command flushes the spool.
Impact
No confirmed malicious effect was established; telemetry is opt-in and the default API host is api.lotics.ai.
Mechanism
The CLI records invocation metadata and posts events to the configured API endpoint using its API key for authorization.
AI rationale
Inspected the manifest and bundled CLI entrypoint. The static indicators are explained by opt-in telemetry and project-tooling subprocesses; no concrete attack surface was established.
Network endpoints1
api.lotics.ai/v1/cli/telemetry
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Clean at 92.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for AI clean decision
- The manifest’s prepublish hook runs the build command.
- CLI telemetry is disabled unless LOTICS_TELEMETRY is set to 1.
- Telemetry records CLI invocation metadata, then sends events to the configured API endpoint; the default endpoint is api.lotics.ai.
- The CLI uses a child process to archive project files with tar.
Evidence against
- The observed telemetry and subprocess behavior is opt-in or tied to CLI project tooling; inspection found no confirmed attack behavior.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsEvalFilesystemNetworkShell
HighEntropyStringsPossibleObfuscationUrlStrings
WildcardDependency
Source & flagged code
6 flaggeddist/src/cli.jsView file
1791// src/cli_dispatch.ts
L1792: import { spawn as spawn2 } from "node:child_process";
L1793:
High
1824// docs/cli_reference.md
L1825: var cli_reference_default = "# @lotics/cli \u2014 CLI Command Reference\n\nPer-command syntax, flags, contracts, and gotchas for the public `lotics` CLI. Start at [AGENTS.md](../AG...
L1826:
High
9// src/cli.ts
L10: import dns from "node:dns";
L11: import net from "node:net";
...
L111: import path from "node:path";
L112: function telemetryEnabled(env = process.env) {
L113: return env.LOTICS_TELEMETRY === "1";
...
L142: function sessionStorePath() {
L143: return path.join(os.homedir(), ".lotics", "session.json");
L144: }
...
L146: try {
L147: const parsed = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(file2, "utf-8"));
L148: if (typeof parsed !== "object" || parsed === null) return null;
High
Host Fingerprint Exfiltration
Source collects local host identity data and sends it to an external endpoint.
Findings
6 High3 Medium6 Low
HighChild Processdist/src/cli.js
HighShelldist/src/cli.js
HighHost Fingerprint Exfiltrationdist/src/cli.js
HighCredential Redirect Persistencedist/src/cli.js
HighCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/src/cli.js
HighTrigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltrationdist/src/cli.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumWildcard Dependency
LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts
LowScripts Present
LowEval
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @lotics/cli@0.318.8.
See all versions of @lotics/cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @lotics/cli@0.318.8 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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