@lsproxy/cli@1.1.1
Standalone refactor CLI driving any LSP server: project-wide rename, file-move with importer updates, and code actions.
AI Security Review
scanned 10d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe automatic install-time addition of a package-owned Claude Code skill is a guarded agent extension lifecycle risk under the review policy. The inspected code supports a warning, but not a publish block.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- package.json runs skillit-postinstall.cjs as an automatic postinstall hook.
- The hook copies bundled skill directories into the user’s ~/.claude/skills directory during installation, with no consent check.
- The installed skill is named lsproxy-cli and describes this package’s refactoring CLI.
- The separate Claude Code settings adapter is reached through the explicit config export command; it only writes settings when it has matching installed plugins.
- The automatic hook installs this package’s own skill files; the inspected behavior does not show a remote payload or broad rewrite of Claude Code settings.
Source & flagged code
6 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgpackage.json runs skillit-postinstall.cjs as an automatic postinstall hook.
package.jsonView on unpkg · L69Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @lsproxy/cli@1.1.1.
See all versions of @lsproxy/cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @lsproxy/cli@1.1.1 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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