@lsproxy/cli@1.1.2
Standalone refactor CLI driving any LSP server: project-wide rename, file-move with importer updates, and code actions.
AI Security Review
scanned 10d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe automatic postinstall writes a package-owned skill into Claude Code's user-level skill directory without consent. This fits the warning category for first-party agent extension setup; the inspected source does not establish a publish-blocking attack.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The package postinstall hook runs skillit-postinstall.cjs automatically.
- That hook copies the package's skill files into the user's ~/.claude/skills directory without checking for consent.
- The copied skill describes the package's LSP refactoring CLI.
- The Claude Code adapter is also available through an explicit config export command.
- The inspected skill content describes CLI use; targeted searches found no reviewer-directed instructions, credential references, or shell download commands.
- The separate Claude Code settings adapter is called by the explicit config export flow.
Source & flagged code
6 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgThe package postinstall hook runs skillit-postinstall.cjs automatically.
package.jsonView on unpkg · L69Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @lsproxy/cli@1.1.2.
See all versions of @lsproxy/cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @lsproxy/cli@1.1.2 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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