registry / AI-agent capability abuse / @luckydraw/cumulus / 1.0.41

@luckydraw/cumulus@1.0.41

RLM-based CLI chat wrapper for Claude with external history context management

AI Security Review

scanned 3d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

Source inspection confirms that the package launches Claude with permission prompts bypassed, including in the TUI, while gateway restrictions depend on operator configuration. This supports a warning for dangerous agent capability, but does not establish a separate malicious attack or install-time behavior.

Static reason

One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source

Trigger

A user starts a TUI turn or a configured gateway input delivers a turn.

Impact

A turn can invoke local agent tools without Claude's usual per-action approval. The inspected source does not establish a separate payload, credential transfer, or unrequested account action.

Mechanism

The package starts Claude with bypassPermissions; gateway restrictions rely on configured allowed or denied tools, and an absent allowlist does not add deny-by-default restrictions.

AI rationale

Evidence

dist/tui/hooks/useClaudeProcess.jsdist/lib/gateway.jsdist/lib/tool-inventory.jsdist/lib/config.js

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Suspicious at 83.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.

Evidence for warning

The package exposes a Claude wrapper and gateway; both gateway and TUI launch Claude with permission prompts bypassed.
Gateway deny-by-default restrictions depend on an allowlist being configured; without one, the existing denylist is retained, and tool access is otherwise available.
The gateway also accepts turns through configured chat, webhook, scheduled, and API paths. API routes include key and thread-scope checks; these controls do not restore per-action Claude approval.
Inspected flagged runtime locations concern formatting, file summaries, task handling, and configured agent messaging; they do not establish unrelated account actions or another attack.

Evidence against

The manifest identifies the package as a Claude wrapper and uses build and Husky setup lifecycle scripts; no install-time attack was established.
Gateway tool restrictions can be configured through allowed and disallowed tool settings.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystem

Source & flagged code

8 flagged

dist/tui/hooks/useClaudeProcess.jsView file

Lines 1-23javascript

1/**

2 * Hook for managing Claude subprocess and streaming.

3 */

4import { spawn } from 'child_process';

5import { useCallback, useRef } from 'react';

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/tui/hooks/useClaudeProcess.jsView on unpkg · L3

6import { ContextBudget } from '../../lib/context-budget.js';

7import { StreamProcessor } from '../../lib/stream-processor.js';

8import { extractTextFromStreamLine } from '../utils/streamParser.js';

9export function useClaudeProcess(options) {

10 const { mcpConfigPath, contentStore, onText, onComplete, onError, onExternalize, onTTFT } = options;

11 const processRef = useRef(null);

12 const responseRef = useRef('');

13 const bufferRef = useRef('');

14 const completedRef = useRef(false);

15 const spawnTimeRef = useRef(0);

16 const ttftFiredRef = useRef(false);

17 const kill = useCallback(() => {

18 const partial = responseRef.current;

19 if (processRef.current) {

20 processRef.current.kill('SIGTERM');

21 processRef.current = null;

22 }

23 return partial;

dist/lib/gateway.jsView file

Lines 2113-2153javascript

2113 // under --permission-mode bypassPermissions it is a guaranteed no-op — so deny-by-default

2114 // has to be expressed as a denylist. Gated on the field being present so an unconstrained

2115 // thread never pays for the inventory probe (a subprocess spawn) at all.

2116 const effectiveDisallowedTools = mergedConfig.allowedTools

2117 ? compileDisallowedTools(mergedConfig.allowedTools, await

dist/gateway/server.jsView file

Lines 1-36javascript

1/**

2 * Gateway HTTP server — exposes the cumulus message pipeline as a REST API

3 * with SSE streaming. Channel adapters and remote clients connect here.

4 *

5 * Endpoints:

6 * POST /api/thread/:name/message — submit message, SSE stream response

7 * POST /api/thread/:name/sync — sync messages from local mode (store only, no Claude)

8 * GET /api/thread/:name/history — recent messages

9 * GET /api/thread/:name/status — thread info + adaptive state

10 * GET /api/threads — list all threads

dist/gateway/setup.jsView file

Lines 1-27javascript

1/**

2 * cumulus-gateway setup wizard and config management.

3 *

4 * Phase 1: `cumulus-gateway setup --project-root <path>` — instant non-interactive setup

5 * Phase 2: `cumulus-gateway setup` — interactive prompts with auto-detection

6 * Phase 4: `cumulus-gateway config set/get/list` — post-install config changes

7 */

8import { execSync } from 'child_process';

9import

dist/lib/version-check.jsView file

Lines 159-199javascript

159export function saveUpdateState(from, to) {

160 const state = {

161 previousVersion: from,

162 updatedAt: new Date().toISOString

dist/gateway/daemon.js#virtual:normalized:round1View file

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 8

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

dist/gateway/daemon.js#virtual:normalized:round1View on unpkg

Source & flagged code

8 flagged · loading source

dist/tui/hooks/useClaudeProcess.jsView file

3*/ L4: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; L5: import { useCallback, useRef } from 'react';

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/tui/hooks/useClaudeProcess.jsView on unpkg · L3

dist/lib/gateway.jsView file

•matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta matchedPackage = @luckydraw/cumulus@1.0.4 matchedIdentity = npm:QGx1Y2t5ZHJhdy9jdW11bHVz:1.0.4 similarity = 0.663 summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file

Critical

Previous Version Dangerous Delta

This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review.

dist/lib/gateway.jsView on unpkg

2133// Windows: spawn() can't directly exec .cmd/.bat shims (CVE-2024-27980). L2134: // Routing through cmd.exe is required for the npm-installed `claude.cmd`. L2135: const isWindowsShim = process.platform === 'win32' && /\.(cmd|bat|ps1)$/i.test(resolvedClaudePath);

Findings

1 Critical5 High4 Medium8 Low

CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltadist/lib/gateway.js

HighChild Processdist/tui/hooks/useClaudeProcess.js

HighShelldist/lib/gateway.js

HighTrigger Reachable Persistencedist/gateway/setup.js

HighRuntime Package Installdist/lib/version-check.js

HighSemantic Analysis Limiteddist/gateway/daemon.js#virtual:normalized:round1

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumInstall Persistencedist/gateway/setup.js

MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review

LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts

LowScripts Present

LowWeak Cryptodist/gateway/server.js

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @luckydraw/cumulus@1.0.41.

See all versions of @luckydraw/cumulus for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of @luckydraw/cumulus@1.0.41 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-10-20 10:51:54.247Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.