@m8t-stack/cli@0.2.161

CLI for managing m8t deployments on Azure / Microsoft Agent Foundry

AI Security Review

scanned 24d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

Static inspection found no registry install hook and the required agent-integration path is used by an explicit read-only verification command. No concrete malicious behavior was identified.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.

Trigger

A user explicitly runs the architect-check CLI command.

Impact

No configuration write, credential forwarding, or unconsented install-time action was established.

Mechanism

The command locates existing m8t architect sidecars and reads JSON metadata for comparison with a local source hash.

AI rationale

Static inspection found no registry install hook and the required agent-integration path is used by an explicit read-only verification command. No concrete malicious behavior was identified.

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Clean at 94.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.

Evidence for AI clean decision

The manifest exposes the bundle as a CLI and lists only a publish-time build hook, not an install-time lifecycle hook.
The specified agent-integration location builds paths for existing named m8t architect skill locations.
The drift check reads a resolved sidecar as UTF-8 JSON to compare metadata.
The agent check is registered as the explicit architect-check command.

Evidence against

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings

ManifestNo manifest risk signals triggered.

scanned 1 file(s), 1.51 MB of source, external domains: acc.services.ai.azure.com, ai.azure.com, aka.ms, api.github.com, api.githubcopilot.com, api.openai.com, auth.openai.com, companion.invalid, docs.expo.dev, gateway.example.com, ghcr.io, github.com, graph.microsoft.com, help.openai.com, learn.microsoft.com, m8t-admin.wonderfuldesert-721e332f.eastus2.azurecontainerapps.io, m8t-kv.vault.azure.net, management.azure.com, myaccount.services.ai.azure.com, portal.azure.com, raw.githubusercontent.com, vault.azure.net, www.apple.com

Source & flagged code

7 flagged

dist/cli.jsView file

130Source sends the broad process environment to a literal external destination. L130: try { L131: const obj2 = JSON.parse(raw); L132: if (!obj2 || typeof obj2.repo !== "string" || obj2.repo.length === 0) ... L343: // ../../packages/github-app-auth/dist/esm/jwt.js L344: import { createSign, createPrivateKey } from "crypto"; L345: function signAppJwt(args) { ... L356: sign.update(unsigned); L357: sign.end(); L358: const signature = sign.sign(createPrivateKey(args.privateKeyPem)).toString("base64url"); ... L461: const appJwt = signAppJwt({ appId, privateKeyPem }); L462: const url = `https://api.github.com/app/installations/${args.installationId}/access_tokens`; L463: const repoName = args.repository.includes("/") ? args.repository.split("/", 2)[1] : args.repository;

Critical

Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration

Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.

dist/cli.jsView on unpkg · L130

12936init_errors(); L12937: import { spawn } from "child_process"; L12938: var SECRET_VALUE_FLAGS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["--secure-environment-variables"]);

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/cli.jsView on unpkg · L12936

•Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration. dist/cli.js: Authorization: `Bearer ${appJwt}`, Authorization: `Bearer ${appJwt}`, Authorization: `Bearer ${appJwt}`, Authorization: `Bearer ${token.token}`, headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${token.token}` } headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${token.token}`, "Content-Type": "application/json", ...args.extraHeaders ?? {} }, headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${token.token}`, "Content-Type": "application/json", ...args.extraHeaders ?? {} }, body: JSON.stringify({ agent_endpoint: { authorization_schemes: [{ type: "Entra", isolation_key_source: { kind: "Entra" } }] } })

High

Credential Redirect Persistence

Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection.

dist/cli.jsView on unpkg

29215); L29216: this.context.stdout.write( L29217: colors.dim("next: run 'm8t doctor' to verify gateway + data-plane access.\n") ... L29223: // src/commands/open.ts L29224: import { spawn as spawn5 } from "child_process"; L29225: import { Command as Command55, Option as Option52 } from "clipanion"; ... L29229: var OPEN_TARGETS = ["webapp", "foundry", "portal"]; L29230: var FOUNDRY_PORTAL_URL = "https://ai.azure.com"; L29231: function azurePortalRgUrl(tenantId, subscriptionId, resourceGroup) {

High

Command Output Exfiltration

Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.

dist/cli.jsView on unpkg · L29215

130try { L131: const obj2 = JSON.parse(raw); L132: if (!obj2 || typeof obj2.repo !== "string" || obj2.repo.length === 0) ... L343: // ../../packages/github-app-auth/dist/esm/jwt.js L344: import { createSign, createPrivateKey } from "crypto"; L345: function signAppJwt(args) { ... L356: sign.update(unsigned); L357: sign.end(); L358: const signature = sign.sign(createPrivateKey(args.privateKeyPem)).toString("base64url"); ... L461: const appJwt = signAppJwt({ appId, privateKeyPem }); L462: const url = `https://api.github.com/app/installations/${args.installationId}/access_tokens`; L463: const repoName = args.repository.includes("/") ? args.repository.split("/", 2)[1] : args.repository;

High

Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability

Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.

dist/cli.jsView on unpkg · L130

2163} L2164: throw new Error("`fetch` is not defined as a global; Either pass `fetch` to the client, `new OpenAI({ fetch })` or polyfill the global, `globalThis.fetch = fetch`"); L2165: } ... L12936: init_errors(); L12937: import { spawn } from "child_process"; L12938: var SECRET_VALUE_FLAGS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["--secure-environment-variables"]); ... L14647: try { L14648: creds = JSON.parse(fs3.readFileSync(credsPath, "utf8")); L14649: } catch { ... L37125: args.stdout( L37126: `${colors.success("\u2705 The platform is live and your local tools are pointed at it.")} L37127: gateway: ${d.gatewayUrl}

High

Remote Agent Bridge

Source exposes local file and command tools to a remote model endpoint.

dist/cli.jsView on unpkg · L2163

29215Trigger-reachable command-output exfiltration chain: manifest.main -> dist/cli.js L29215: ); L29216: this.context.stdout.write( L29217: colors.dim("next: run 'm8t doctor' to verify gateway + data-plane access.\n") ... L29223: // src/commands/open.ts L29224: import { spawn as spawn5 } from "child_process"; L29225: import { Command as Command55, Option as Option52 } from "clipanion"; ... L29229: var OPEN_TARGETS = ["webapp", "foundry", "portal"]; L29230: var FOUNDRY_PORTAL_URL = "https://ai.azure.com"; L29231: function azurePortalRgUrl(tenantId, subscriptionId, resourceGroup) {

High

Trigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltration

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches command-output exfiltration behavior.

dist/cli.jsView on unpkg · L29215

Source & flagged code

7 flagged · loading source

dist/cli.jsView file

Critical

Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration

Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.

dist/cli.jsView on unpkg · L130

12936init_errors(); L12937: import { spawn } from "child_process"; L12938: var SECRET_VALUE_FLAGS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["--secure-environment-variables"]);

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/cli.jsView on unpkg · L12936

Findings

1 Critical7 High3 Medium5 Low

CriticalHardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltrationdist/cli.js

HighChild Processdist/cli.js

HighShell

HighCredential Redirect Persistencedist/cli.js

HighCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/cli.js

HighSandbox Evasion Gated Capabilitydist/cli.js

HighRemote Agent Bridgedist/cli.js

HighTrigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltrationdist/cli.js

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review

LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts

LowScripts Present

LowFilesystem

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @m8t-stack/cli@0.2.161.

See all versions of @m8t-stack/cli for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of @m8t-stack/cli@0.2.161 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-09-29 06:22:50.154Z (UTC).

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