registry / Credential exfiltration / @m8t-stack/cli / 0.2.166

@m8t-stack/cli@0.2.166

CLI for managing m8t deployments on Azure / Microsoft Agent Foundry

AI Security Review

scanned 17d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

Source confirms credential forwarding to an unrestricted configurable recipient through an active CLI command. This warrants a credential exposure warning, while the inspected behavior does not justify blocking publication as malicious.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.

Trigger

Run m8t telemetry enroll while authenticated through the Azure CLI; an endpoint override changes the recipient.

Impact

The selected recipient receives a potentially usable Azure Management token.

Mechanism

Acquire an Azure Management access token, include it in the enrollment proof, and POST the JSON to the ingest endpoint without binding the destination to the credential's intended service.

AI rationale

Evidence

dist/cli.js

Network endpoints2

management.azure.com/m8t-admin.wonderfuldesert-721e332f.eastus2.azurecontainerapps.io

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Suspicious at 94.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.

Evidence for warning

The manifest has no npm installation hooks; its publishing hook builds the CLI.
Telemetry enrollment obtains an existing Azure Management access token through the Azure CLI.
The enrollment recipient defaults to an m8t host but can be overridden through M8T_INGEST_BASE_URL without destination restrictions.
Enrollment places that token in a JSON proof and posts it to the selected recipient.
The explicit telemetry enroll command invokes enrollment without overriding automatic token acquisition.
The flagged agent integration location discovers installed skill sidecars for a read-only drift check.

Evidence against

Enrollment is an explicit user command with a package-aligned default recipient and an identity verification purpose.
The inspected source does not establish covert credential theft or malicious intent.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell

Supply chain

Source & flagged code

7 flagged

dist/cli.jsView file

130Source sends the broad process environment to a literal external destination. L130: try { L131: const obj2 = JSON.parse(raw); L132: if (!obj2 || typeof obj2.repo !== "string" || obj2.repo.length === 0) ... L343: // ../../packages/github-app-auth/dist/esm/jwt.js L344: import { createSign, createPrivateKey } from "crypto"; L345: function signAppJwt(args) { ... L356: sign.update(unsigned); L357: sign.end(); L358: const signature = sign.sign(createPrivateKey(args.privateKeyPem)).toString("base64url"); ... L461: const appJwt = signAppJwt({ appId, privateKeyPem }); L462: const url = `https://api.github.com/app/installations/${args.installationId}/access_tokens`; L463: const repoName = args.repository.includes("/") ? args.repository.split("/", 2)[1] : args.repository;

Critical

Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration

Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.

dist/cli.jsView on unpkg · L130

12936init_errors(); L12937: import { spawn } from "child_process"; L12938: var SECRET_VALUE_FLAGS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["--secure-environment-variables"]);

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/cli.jsView on unpkg · L12936

•Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration. dist/cli.js: Authorization: `Bearer ${appJwt}`, Authorization: `Bearer ${appJwt}`, Authorization: `Bearer ${appJwt}`, Authorization: `Bearer ${token.token}`, headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${token.token}` } headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${token.token}`, "Content-Type": "application/json", ...args.extraHeaders ?? {} }, headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${token.token}`, "Content-Type": "application/json", ...args.extraHeaders ?? {} }, body: JSON.stringify({ agent_endpoint: { authorization_schemes: [{ type: "Entra", isolation_key_source: { kind: "Entra" } }] } })

High

Credential Redirect Persistence

Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection.

dist/cli.jsView on unpkg

29308); L29309: this.context.stdout.write( L29310: colors.dim("next: run 'm8t doctor' to verify gateway + data-plane access.\n") ... L29316: // src/commands/open.ts L29317: import { spawn as spawn5 } from "child_process"; L29318: import { Command as Command55, Option as Option52 } from "clipanion"; ... L29322: var OPEN_TARGETS = ["webapp", "foundry", "portal"]; L29323: var FOUNDRY_PORTAL_URL = "https://ai.azure.com"; L29324: function azurePortalRgUrl(tenantId, subscriptionId, resourceGroup) {

High

Command Output Exfiltration

Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.

dist/cli.jsView on unpkg · L29308

130try { L131: const obj2 = JSON.parse(raw); L132: if (!obj2 || typeof obj2.repo !== "string" || obj2.repo.length === 0) ... L343: // ../../packages/github-app-auth/dist/esm/jwt.js L344: import { createSign, createPrivateKey } from "crypto"; L345: function signAppJwt(args) { ... L356: sign.update(unsigned); L357: sign.end(); L358: const signature = sign.sign(createPrivateKey(args.privateKeyPem)).toString("base64url"); ... L461: const appJwt = signAppJwt({ appId, privateKeyPem }); L462: const url = `https://api.github.com/app/installations/${args.installationId}/access_tokens`; L463: const repoName = args.repository.includes("/") ? args.repository.split("/", 2)[1] : args.repository;

High

Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability

Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.

dist/cli.jsView on unpkg · L130

2163} L2164: throw new Error("`fetch` is not defined as a global; Either pass `fetch` to the client, `new OpenAI({ fetch })` or polyfill the global, `globalThis.fetch = fetch`"); L2165: } ... L12936: init_errors(); L12937: import { spawn } from "child_process"; L12938: var SECRET_VALUE_FLAGS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["--secure-environment-variables"]); ... L14647: try { L14648: creds = JSON.parse(fs3.readFileSync(credsPath, "utf8")); L14649: } catch { ... L37218: args.stdout( L37219: `${colors.success("\u2705 The platform is live and your local tools are pointed at it.")} L37220: gateway: ${d.gatewayUrl}

High

Remote Agent Bridge

Source exposes local file and command tools to a remote model endpoint.

dist/cli.jsView on unpkg · L2163

29308Trigger-reachable command-output exfiltration chain: manifest.main -> dist/cli.js L29308: ); L29309: this.context.stdout.write( L29310: colors.dim("next: run 'm8t doctor' to verify gateway + data-plane access.\n") ... L29316: // src/commands/open.ts L29317: import { spawn as spawn5 } from "child_process"; L29318: import { Command as Command55, Option as Option52 } from "clipanion"; ... L29322: var OPEN_TARGETS = ["webapp", "foundry", "portal"]; L29323: var FOUNDRY_PORTAL_URL = "https://ai.azure.com"; L29324: function azurePortalRgUrl(tenantId, subscriptionId, resourceGroup) {

High

Trigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltration

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches command-output exfiltration behavior.

dist/cli.jsView on unpkg · L29308

Source & flagged code

7 flagged · loading source

dist/cli.jsView file

Critical

Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration

Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.

dist/cli.jsView on unpkg · L130

12936init_errors(); L12937: import { spawn } from "child_process"; L12938: var SECRET_VALUE_FLAGS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["--secure-environment-variables"]);

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/cli.jsView on unpkg · L12936

Findings

1 Critical7 High3 Medium5 Low

CriticalHardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltrationdist/cli.js

HighChild Processdist/cli.js

HighShell

HighCredential Redirect Persistencedist/cli.js

HighCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/cli.js

HighSandbox Evasion Gated Capabilitydist/cli.js

HighRemote Agent Bridgedist/cli.js

HighTrigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltrationdist/cli.js

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review

LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts

LowScripts Present

LowFilesystem

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @m8t-stack/cli@0.2.166.

See all versions of @m8t-stack/cli for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of @m8t-stack/cli@0.2.166 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-10-06 09:48:52.829Z (UTC).

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