--- canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@m8t-stack/cli/v/0.2.91" markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@m8t-stack/cli/v/0.2.91.md" package: "@m8t-stack/cli" report_status: "published" title: "@m8t-stack/cli@0.2.91 npm security report" verdict: "suspicious" version: "0.2.91" --- # @m8t-stack/cli@0.2.91 npm security report > **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document. ## Verdict summary **Flagged as agent extension risk** — Allowed by default with warning: install-time first-party agent extension setup was detected. - **Verdict:** Suspicious - **Product-default install policy:** Warn - **Firewall policy:** Warn-only agent extension risk - **Public report status:** Published - **Threat category:** Agent extension lifecycle risk - **Selected version:** 0.2.91 - **Selected version is latest:** No - **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai) LPM treats this as warn-only first-party agent extension lifecycle risk. The CLI can enroll telemetry with a fixed m8t endpoint and install a persistent m8t desktop companion. Both capabilities require explicit CLI commands; no install-time trigger was found. ## Latest scan - **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1 - **Verdict:** Suspicious - **Confidence:** 91.0% - **Started:** 2026-08-11T12:36:52.356Z - **Finished:** 2026-08-11T12:37:47.457Z - **Download time:** 506 ms - **Static scan time:** 6984 ms - **AI review time:** 47610 ms - **Total time:** 55101 ms ## Security analysis ### Published attack-surface review - **Summary:** The CLI can enroll telemetry with a fixed m8t endpoint and install a persistent m8t desktop companion. Both capabilities require explicit CLI commands; no install-time trigger was found. - **Trigger:** User runs \`m8t telemetry enroll\`, \`m8t companion install\`, or \`m8t companion repair\`. - **Impact:** An operator may send an Azure token proof during enrollment or install a vendor companion configured to start at login. - **Evidence paths:** package.json, dist/cli.js - **Review source:** ai\_review - **Reviewed:** 2026-08-11T12:37:47.457Z ### AI review details - **Review stage:** source\_first\_review - **Mechanism:** Explicit telemetry enrollment and signed companion installation with per-user login persistence. - **Rationale:** Source inspection disproves the scanner's install-time/foreign-overwrite claims, but confirms explicit telemetry credential transfer and companion persistence. This warrants a warning for dangerous lifecycle capability, not a malicious block. - **Files touched:** dist/cli.js, ~/.m8t/companion, ~/Applications/m8t Companion.app, ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.m8t.companion.plist, HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run - **Network endpoints:** https://m8t-admin.wonderfuldesert-721e332f.eastus2.azurecontainerapps.io/api/ingest/enroll, https://github.com/m8t-labs/m8t-releases/releases/latest/download/manifest.json ### Review decision - **Verdict:** Suspicious - **Confidence:** 91.0% - **Recommended action:** downgrade\_to\_warn - **Intent class:** Dangerous Capability - **False-positive risk:** Low - **Evidence for:** dist/cli.js:35191 posts an Azure access token proof to a fixed m8t telemetry endpoint when \`telemetry enroll\` is invoked., dist/cli.js:34064 exposes \`m8t companion install\`, which downloads a release artifact, installs it, launches it, and enables per-user start-at-login., dist/cli.js:33310 writes only the named \`com.m8t.companion\` LaunchAgent or Windows Run value. - **Evidence against:** package.json has only \`prepublishOnly\`; no install, postinstall, or preinstall hook., Telemetry enrollment is an explicit command and only adds contact/company fields when flags are supplied., Companion persistence is reached only through explicit companion install/repair commands and validates owned paths/artifact hashes., dist/cli.js:1467 import-time DNS shim only changes Azure Foundry hostname resolution; no network request or file write occurs at import., No source evidence of shell payload execution, foreign package overwrite, or broad AI-agent configuration mutation. ## Public findings ### 1. Low: Non Install Lifecycle Scripts - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 80.0% Package declares lifecycle scripts that are not normally run for registry tarball installs. ### 2. Low: Scripts Present - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 100.0% Package declares npm scripts. ### 3. High: Child Process - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** dist/cli.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references child process execution. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L12950: init_errors(); L12951: import { spawn } from "child_process"; L12952: var SECRET_VALUE_FLAGS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["--secure-environment-variables"]); ``` ### 4. High: Shell - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% Package source references shell execution. ### 5. Medium: Network - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references network APIs. ### 6. Medium: Environment Vars - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references environment variables. ### 7. Low: Filesystem - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references filesystem APIs. ### 8. Critical: Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** dist/cli.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Source sends the broad process environment to a literal external destination. L130: try { L131: const obj = JSON.parse(raw); L132: if (!obj || typeof obj.repo !== "string" || obj.repo.length === 0) ... L332: // ../../packages/github-app-auth/dist/esm/jwt.js L333: import { createSign, createPrivateKey } from "crypto"; L334: function signAppJwt(args) { ... L345: sign.update(unsigned); L346: sign.end(); L347: const signature = sign.sign(createPrivateKey(args.privateKeyPem)).toString("base64url"); ... L441: const appJwt = signAppJwt({ appId, privateKeyPem }); L442: const url = `https://api.github.com/app/installations/${args.installationId}/access_tokens`; L443: const repoName = args.repository.includes("/") ? args.repository.split("/", 2)[1] : args.repository; ``` ### 9. High: Credential Redirect Persistence - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** dist/cli.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration. dist/cli.js: Authorization: `Bearer ${appJwt}`, Authorization: `Bearer ${armTokenResp.token}`, credentials: { keys: { Authorization: `Bearer ${minted.token}` } } Authorization: `Bearer ${appJwt}`, Authorization: `Bearer ${appJwt}`, Authorization: `Bearer ${token.token}`, headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${token.token}` } headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${token.token}`, "Content-Type": "application/json", ...args.extraHeaders ?? {} }, ``` ### 10. High: Entrypoint Foreign Package Code Overwrite - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** dist/cli.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Manifest-reachable source overwrites another installed package with package-defined remote behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Manifest-reachable source resolves another installed package, overwrites its runtime code, and injects package-defined remote behavior. dist/cli.js: const url = `https://api.github.com/app/installations/${args.installationId}/access_tokens`; const url = `https://management.azure.com${args.projectArmId}/connections/${args.connectionName}?api-version=${FOUNDRY_API}`; ARM_SCOPE = "https://management.azure.com/.default"; const res = await fetch("https://api.github.com/app", { const res = await fetch("https://api.github.com/app/installations", { message: "Could not acquire Foundry data-plane token (scope: https://ai.azure.com/.default)." FOUNDRY_SCOPE = "https://ai.azure.com/.default"; FOUNDRY_DATA_SCOPE = "https://ai.azure.com/.default"; ``` ### 11. High: Command Output Exfiltration - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 82.0% - **Path:** dist/cli.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L27610: ); L27611: this.context.stdout.write( L27612: colors.dim("next: run 'm8t doctor' to verify gateway + data-plane access.\n") ... L27618: // src/commands/open.ts L27619: import { spawn as spawn5 } from "child_process"; L27620: import { Command as Command53, Option as Option50 } from "clipanion"; ... L27624: var OPEN_TARGETS = ["webapp", "foundry", "portal"]; L27625: var FOUNDRY_PORTAL_URL = "https://ai.azure.com"; L27626: function azurePortalRgUrl(tenantId, subscriptionId, resourceGroup) { ``` ### 12. High: Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 84.0% - **Path:** dist/cli.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L130: try { L131: const obj = JSON.parse(raw); L132: if (!obj || typeof obj.repo !== "string" || obj.repo.length === 0) ... L332: // ../../packages/github-app-auth/dist/esm/jwt.js L333: import { createSign, createPrivateKey } from "crypto"; L334: function signAppJwt(args) { ... L345: sign.update(unsigned); L346: sign.end(); L347: const signature = sign.sign(createPrivateKey(args.privateKeyPem)).toString("base64url"); ... L441: const appJwt = signAppJwt({ appId, privateKeyPem }); L442: const url = `https://api.github.com/app/installations/${args.installationId}/access_tokens`; L443: const repoName = args.repository.includes("/") ? args.repository.split("/", 2)[1] : args.repository; ``` ### 13. High: Trigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltration - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** dist/cli.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches command-output exfiltration behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Trigger-reachable command-output exfiltration chain: manifest.main -> dist/cli.js L27610: ); L27611: this.context.stdout.write( L27612: colors.dim("next: run 'm8t doctor' to verify gateway + data-plane access.\n") ... L27618: // src/commands/open.ts L27619: import { spawn as spawn5 } from "child_process"; L27620: import { Command as Command53, Option as Option50 } from "clipanion"; ... L27624: var OPEN_TARGETS = ["webapp", "foundry", "portal"]; L27625: var FOUNDRY_PORTAL_URL = "https://ai.azure.com"; L27626: function azurePortalRgUrl(tenantId, subscriptionId, resourceGroup) { ``` ### 14. Low: High Entropy Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 55.0% Package source contains high-entropy string patterns. ### 15. Low: Url Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 65.0% Package source contains URL literals. ### 16. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 100.0% Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean. ## Dependencies and install lifecycle - **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes - **Published lifecycle scripts:** prepublishOnly - **Dependencies:** 14 - **Optional dependencies:** 0 - **Peer dependencies:** 0 - **Development dependencies:** 0 - **Published dependency-graph edges:** 14 ### Published dependency entries - @azure/ai-projects 2.1.1 (Dependency) - @azure/arm-appcontainers 2.2.0 (Dependency) - @azure/arm-communication 4.2.0 (Dependency) - @azure/core-rest-pipeline 1.25.0 (Dependency) - @azure/data-tables 13.3.2 (Dependency) - @azure/identity 4.13.1 (Dependency) - @azure/keyvault-secrets 4.11.2 (Dependency) - @azure/monitor-query 1.3.3 (Dependency) - @inquirer/prompts ^7.0.0 (Dependency) - clipanion ^4.0.0-rc.4 (Dependency) - picocolors ^1.1.0 (Dependency) - semver ^7.8.5 (Dependency) - typanion ^3.14.0 (Dependency) - yaml ^2.9.0 (Dependency) ## Package metadata - **Package:** @m8t-stack/cli - **Ecosystem:** npm - **Version:** 0.2.91 - **License:** MIT - **Version published:** 2026-08-11T12:35:17.787Z - **Package first seen:** 2026-07-01T04:11:18.191Z - **Package last seen:** 2026-09-01T00:22:10.844Z - **Known versions:** 40 - **Latest version:** 0.2.158 - **Appeal under review:** No - **Description:** CLI for managing m8t deployments on Azure / Microsoft Agent Foundry - **Maintainers:** okeren21 - **Artifact files:** 5 - **Artifact unpacked size:** 6,779,065 bytes - **Artifact signatures:** 1 - **Attestations:** No ## References - [HTML security report]() - [Repository]() - [Homepage]() - [Issues]()