registry / AI-agent control-surface risk / @markjaquith/agency
@markjaquith/agency
Manage agentic work across repositories with durable workbases
This report shows the evidence for @markjaquith/agency@3.5.0. 4 of 90 known versions are blocked or flagged. The newest version, 3.27.2, is flagged. See all versions.
AI Security Review
scanned 1mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe package performs a concrete, automatic postinstall write to a user-wide agent extension location and the installed code modifies agent control inputs. This meets the install-control-surface blocking policy despite no observed exfiltration.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review
Trigger
npm installation runs postinstall.
Impact
A dependency install changes a broad AI-agent control surface without an explicit setup command.
Mechanism
Automatic user-wide Pi extension installation and system-prompt modification.
Policy narrative
The postinstall lifecycle hook invokes an installer that copies the bundled Pi extension into the user's global Pi extensions directory. When Pi starts, that extension augments its system prompt and discovers skills under Claude, Agents, OpenCode, and Pi directories. This is an unconsented install-time mutation of a broad AI-agent control surface.
AI rationale
The package performs a concrete, automatic postinstall write to a user-wide agent extension location and the installed code modifies agent control inputs. This meets the install-control-surface blocking policy despite no observed exfiltration.
Evidence
package.jsonscripts/install-pi-extension.tspi-extensions/agency.ts~/.pi/agent/extensions/agency.ts
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI identified this as a dangerous AI-agent capability at 98.0% confidence with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for policy risk
- The automatic postinstall hook installs a Pi agent extension.
- The installer copies package code into the user-wide Pi agent extensions directory.
- The installed extension injects instructions into Pi's system prompt and discovers skills from several agent-tool directories.
Evidence against
- No credential harvesting or network exfiltration was found in the inspected lifecycle installer or extension.
- The package has no runtime dependency on another release of itself.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
Source & flagged code
10 flagged · loading sourcepackage.jsonView file
•scripts.postinstall = bun scripts/install-pi-extension.ts install
High
Install Time Lifecycle Scripts
Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkg•scripts.postinstall = bun scripts/install-pi-extension.ts install
Medium
Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script
Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgsrc/utils/interactive-loader.tsView file
3const preload = ["@opentui", "solid", "preload"].join("/")
L4: await import(preload)
L5: return import("./interactive")
Medium
Dynamic Require
Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.
src/utils/interactive-loader.tsView on unpkg · L3Findings
8 High5 Medium5 Low
HighInstall Time Lifecycle Scriptspackage.json
HighSemantic Analysis Limitedfixtures/protocol/error.json
HighKnown Malware Source Similaritysrc/services/ReviewService.ts
HighKnown Malware Source Similaritypi-extensions/agency.ts
HighKnown Malware Source Similaritysrc/services/TaskService.ts
HighKnown Malware Source Similaritysrc/services/VersionControlService.ts
HighKnown Malware Source Similaritysrc/utils/chooser.ts
HighKnown Malware Source Similaritysrc/utils/process.ts
MediumAmbiguous Install Lifecycle Scriptpackage.json
MediumDynamic Requiresrc/utils/interactive-loader.ts
MediumNetwork
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @markjaquith/agency@3.5.0.
The versions list below shows the verdict for each recorded version.
- Avoid installing @markjaquith/agency@3.5.0. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.
Evidence last updated: .
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Versions
90 known versions3.27.2latestSuspiciousAgent extension lifecycle riskWarnPublishedOct 19, 2026, 9:14 PM3.27.0SuspiciousAgent extension lifecycle riskWarnPublishedOct 17, 2026, 10:17 PM3.26.0SuspiciousAgent extension lifecycle riskWarnPublishedOct 16, 2026, 10:18 PM3.25.0SuspiciousAgent extension lifecycle riskWarnPublishedOct 16, 2026, 9:51 PM