@maxiaochao/pi-toolkit@0.5.3
Personal pi coding agent toolkit: /todos, /btw, /cache_export extensions, browser automation, and bundled theme/skills.
AI Security Review
scanned 12d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe automatic postinstall mutation of a user’s global AI agent instruction file is an unconsented control-surface change. The source confirms both the lifecycle trigger and the write behavior, supporting a block.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The package runs the agent installer automatically during postinstall.
- The installer targets the user’s global Pi agent directory and replaces its AGENTS.md whenever its contents differ from the bundled file, with no consent check.
- The bundled file contains behavioral instructions intended for an AI coding agent.
- The installer also seeds a default theme and copies the package’s CLI and completion files into user-level locations.
Source & flagged code
9 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage source references child process execution.
extensions/cache-export/tests/e2e-browser.mjsView on unpkg · L12Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @maxiaochao/pi-toolkit@0.5.3.
See all versions of @maxiaochao/pi-toolkit for other recorded verdicts.
- Avoid installing @maxiaochao/pi-toolkit@0.5.3. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.
Evidence last updated: .
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