@melaya/runner@1.1.25
Run Melaya AI pipelines locally with your own LM Studio or Ollama models
AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe package has no install-time execution, but it is an opaque remote-code loader and executor with access to local credentials and browser automation. Static source does not establish covert theft or an install-hook attack, so this is a real unresolved dangerous capability rather than confirmed malware.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- It downloads a server-supplied Python bundle and writes its files into the user's Melaya cache.
- The bundle's signature is an HMAC derived from the runner token, so the server holding that token can authorize replacement code.
- A socket message supplies Python source that the runner writes to a temporary file and executes.
- Startup reads Claude and Codex authentication files; the Claude token is sent to Anthropic to enumerate models.
- package.json has only a prepublish hook, not an install-time lifecycle hook.
- The executable requires a user-supplied runner token and explicitly connects to a configured Melaya server.
- The browser component includes request filtering that blocks private and cloud-metadata addresses.
Source & flagged code
8 flaggedPackage source references child process execution.
dist/codeWorker.jsView on unpkg · L51Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @melaya/runner@1.1.25.
See all versions of @melaya/runner for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @melaya/runner@1.1.25 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.