@melaya/runner@1.1.29
Run Melaya AI pipelines locally with your own LM Studio or Ollama models
AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThis is an explicit but high-risk remote execution agent rather than an install-time malware chain. The code establishes a real service-controlled execution surface and local credential access, but static source does not show automatic installation abuse or unrelated secret exfiltration.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The runner downloads a server-selected Python bundle and writes its files into the user's Melaya cache.
- A socket command writes server-provided Python into a temporary main.py for execution.
- The bundle and run-code signatures use a key derived from the runner token, so they do not establish an independent code-publisher trust boundary.
- On startup it reads local Claude, Codex, and Copilot credential sources; the Copilot token is sent to GitHub.
- package.json has only a prepublish hook, not an install-time lifecycle hook.
- Execution requires an explicit CLI invocation with a required runner token.
- No source evidence shows secret exfiltration to an unrelated host or automatic execution on package installation.
Source & flagged code
8 flaggedPackage source references child process execution.
dist/codeWorker.jsView on unpkg · L51Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @melaya/runner@1.1.29.
See all versions of @melaya/runner for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @melaya/runner@1.1.29 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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