@melaya/runner@1.1.44
Run Melaya AI pipelines locally with your own LM Studio or Ollama models
AI Security Review
scanned 12d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe source confirms an interactive Luma login followed by transmission of its session cookie to the configured server, whose default is the package’s Melaya endpoint. The flow does not obtain recipient-specific consent for that transfer, supporting a malicious credential-exfiltration verdict.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The CLI defaults its server destination to api.melaya.org.
- The runner authenticates its socket to the configured server with the runner token.
- The Luma flow opens Luma sign-in and asks the user to sign in.
- After sign-in, the flow reads the Luma session cookie.
- The flow returns that cookie in its login result.
- The connection handler sends the login result to the server over the socket.
- The transfer follows an interactive Luma sign-in request; the inspected flow does not show a prompt naming the server that will receive the cookie.
Source & flagged code
8 flaggedPackage source references child process execution.
dist/uvBootstrap.jsView on unpkg · L20Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @melaya/runner@1.1.44.
See all versions of @melaya/runner for other recorded verdicts.
- Avoid installing @melaya/runner@1.1.44. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.