registry / @memnexus-ai/mx-agent-cli / 0.1.302
@memnexus-ai/mx-agent-cli@0.1.302
CLI for creating and managing AI agent teams
AI Security Review
scanned 3d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe flagged execution and configuration behavior fits this CLI's documented build, setup, and agent-management functions. The reviewed credential flows send the configured observability token to the configured observability API during command-driven sync operations; no malicious behavior was established.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source
Trigger
The user runs the relevant mx-agent command; the reviewed sync and setup behavior is not triggered merely by importing the CLI.
Impact
These actions match the CLI's stated purpose; no unauthorized collection, unrelated credential transfer, or concealed execution was established.
Mechanism
Setup copies configuration into the project, while sync commands send session or PR records with an observability token to the configured API.
AI rationale
The flagged execution and configuration behavior fits this CLI's documented build, setup, and agent-management functions. The reviewed credential flows send the configured observability token to the configured observability API during command-driven sync operations; no malicious behavior was established.
Evidence
<project>/.claude/settings.json
Network endpoints1
localhost:3100
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Clean at 88.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for AI clean decision
- The package exposes an AI team management CLI; its binary is dist/index.js.
- The flagged child-process helper runs a command with explicit working-directory, environment, timeout, and output limits; the inspected code did not show concealed execution.
- The init command copies project agent settings into .claude when the user runs project setup.
- The sync commands use an observability token for the configured observability API and send session or PR data as their documented purpose.
- The entry point parses CLI arguments to dispatch commands; the reviewed credential-bearing operations are command-driven.
Evidence against
- The manifest declares a prepare lifecycle script, but its referenced script file was not present in the package snapshot for inspection.
- The package includes commands that read local agent session data and can send it to an observability API when invoked.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsFilesystem
Source & flagged code
8 flaggeddist/index.jsView file
70const __dirname = dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url));
L71: const require = createRequire(import.meta.url);
L72: const pkg = require(join(__dirname, '../package.json'));
Medium
Dynamic Require
Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.
dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L70dist/lib/cli-build.jsView file
24*/
L25: import { spawnSync } from 'child_process';
L26: import { accessSync, constants, lstatSync, realpathSync, statSync } from 'fs';
...
L74: * Everything absent from this list is dropped, which removes every `GIT_*` (the
L75: * `testing-tools/git-env.cjs:5-20` reason), every `npm_config_*`, `NODE_ENV`,
L76: * `NODE_OPTIONS`, `NODE_PATH`, `MX_*`, `ANTHROPIC_*`, `AZURE_*`, `GH_TOKEN` and
...
L150: *
L151: * npm's stderr can carry registry-supplied strings. Printing them unfiltered
L152: * into a terminal is escape-sequence injection (CWE-150): an escape run can
...
L186: * leaks the secret rather than the marker. The truncation keeps the tail, so it
L187: * removes a pattern's fixed literal prefix first: `https://`, `ghp_`,
L188: * `github_pat_`, `sk-ant-` and `Authorization:` are al
Critical
Encoded Package Runner Execution
Source decodes numeric character arrays into a child-process package-runner command and executes it.
Findings
4 Critical2 High5 Medium6 Low
CriticalEncoded Package Runner Executiondist/lib/cli-build.js
CriticalTrojan Source Unicodedist/lib/behavioral-injection.js#virtual:normalized:round1
CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitydist/lib/behavioral-injection.js
CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltadist/commands/new.js
HighTrigger Reachable External Ai Agent Control Surface Mutationdist/commands/init.js
HighSemantic Analysis Limiteddist/commands/codex-prove-guards.js#virtual:normalized:round1
MediumDynamic Requiredist/index.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumShips Build Helperdist/agent-config/hooks/git-mutation-guard.sh
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @memnexus-ai/mx-agent-cli@0.1.302.
See all versions of @memnexus-ai/mx-agent-cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @memnexus-ai/mx-agent-cli@0.1.302 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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