registry / Remote code execution / @metaphi-ai/hum / 0.1.10

@metaphi-ai/hum@0.1.10

Hum (हम): a self-improving coding agent for your terminal.

AI Security Review

scanned 14d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

The source confirms an automatic postinstall that may execute remotely fetched installer code and install the agent engine. Since this behavior is package-aligned and no concrete malicious action was found, classify it as a warning for conditional install-time code execution rather than malware.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review

Trigger

npm install when uv is not already available and the matching engine is not installed.

Impact

The fetched installer and engine code run with the installing user's privileges and can modify the user's Hum directory.

Mechanism

Runs Astral's installer script through PowerShell or a shell pipeline, then uses uv to create a Python environment and install hum-cli.

AI rationale

Evidence

scripts/postinstall.js

Network endpoints2

astral.sh/uv/install.ps1astral.sh/uv/install.sh

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Suspicious at 83.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.

Evidence for warning

The manifest runs scripts/postinstall.js automatically during installation.
The postinstall hook downloads and runs Astral's installer through a shell when uv is missing.
The hook installs the matching hum-cli engine into the user's Hum home directory.
The launcher imports its bundled CLI, which starts the engine as the terminal agent.

Evidence against

The hook's engine installation matches the package's terminal coding-agent purpose.
The inspected source showed no browser credential collection or unrelated data exfiltration.
The bundle's network and environment matches were not evidence of credential theft; its active engine communication uses localhost.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetwork

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsTelemetryUrlStrings

Source & flagged code

9 flagged

package.jsonView file

•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.js

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg

•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.js

Medium

Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

package.jsonView on unpkg

dist/cli.mjsView file

317"use strict"; L318: if (process.env.NODE_ENV !== "production") { L319: (function() { ... L545: isMounted: ["isMounted", "Instead, make sure to clean up subscriptions and pending requests in componentWillUnmount to prevent memory leaks."], L546: replaceState: ["replaceState", "Refactor your code to use setState instead (see https://github.com/facebook/react/issues/3236)."] L547: }; ... L2209: ]; L2210: if (process.platform !== "win32") { L2211: module.exports.push( ... L2357: } L2358: process13.exitCode = code || /* istanbul ignore next */ L2359: 0;

Critical

Browser Credential Phishing

Source appears to collect browser login credentials for exfiltration.

dist/cli.mjsView on unpkg · L317

31298/** @param {string} s */ L31299: exec(s) { L31300: this.matcherRe.lastIndex = this.lastIndex;

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/cli.mjsView on unpkg · L31298

84522import fs3 from "node:fs"; L84523: import net from "node:net"; L84524: import os4 from "node:os"; ... L84526: import crypto from "node:crypto"; L84527: import { spawn, spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; L84528: var runDir = () => path2.join(process.env.HUM_HOME || path2.join(os4.homedir(), ".hum"), "run"); L84529: var readRun = (id) => {

High

Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

dist/cli.mjsView on unpkg · L84522

57423/* metaparameters */ L57424: "alias audit before loglevel noop require subscribe tag owner ensure group mode name|0 changes context force incl lens load_path onlyif provider returns root show_diff type_check e... L57425: ), ... L80422: if (filePath && origin?.line && fs.existsSync(filePath)) { L80423: const sourceCode = fs.readFileSync(filePath, "utf8"); L80424: excerpt = dist_default3(sourceCode, origin.line); ... L84526: import crypto from "node:crypto"; L84527: import { spawn, spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; L84528: var runDir = () => path2.join(process.env.HUM_HOME || path2.join(os4.homedir(), ".hum"), "run");

High

Remote Agent Bridge

Source exposes local file and command tools to a remote model endpoint.

dist/cli.mjsView on unpkg · L57423

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @metaphi-ai/hum@0.1.61 matchedPath = dist/cli.mjs matchedIdentity = npm:QG1ldGFwaGktYWkvaHVt:0.1.61 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/cli.mjsView on unpkg

bin/hum.jsView file

8// a URL, not a path: on Windows `C:\…` is not something the ESM loader will import L9: await import(pathToFileURL(path.join(here, '..', 'dist', 'cli.mjs')).href);

Medium

Dynamic Require

Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.

bin/hum.jsView on unpkg · L8

scripts/postinstall.jsView file

1// The engine, installed beside the person's Hum data: ~/.hum/engine (HUM_HOME/engine), a plain L2: // Python environment holding hum-cli at this package's version. No launcher shims are written ... L6: // when missing. Quiet when the engine is already at this version; never fails the npm install. L7: import { execFileSync, spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; L8: import fs from 'node:fs'; ... L12: L13: const win = process.platform === 'win32'; L14: const here = path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)); L15: const version = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(path.join(here, '..', 'package.json'), 'utf8')).version; L16: const home = process.env.HUM_HOME || path.join(os.homedir(), '.hum'); L17: const env = path.join(home, 'engine'); ... L27: const r = run(python, ['-c', 'import hum; print

High

Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability

Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.

scripts/postinstall.jsView on unpkg · L1

Source & flagged code

9 flagged · loading source

package.jsonView file

•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.js

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg

•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.js

Medium

Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

package.jsonView on unpkg

dist/cli.mjsView file

Findings

1 Critical6 High5 Medium6 Low

CriticalBrowser Credential Phishingdist/cli.mjs

HighInstall Time Lifecycle Scriptspackage.json

HighChild Processdist/cli.mjs

HighSame File Env Network Executiondist/cli.mjs

HighSandbox Evasion Gated Capabilityscripts/postinstall.js

HighRemote Agent Bridgedist/cli.mjs

HighKnown Malware Source Similaritydist/cli.mjs

MediumAmbiguous Install Lifecycle Scriptpackage.json

MediumDynamic Requirebin/hum.js

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review

LowScripts Present

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @metaphi-ai/hum@0.1.10.

See all versions of @metaphi-ai/hum for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of @metaphi-ai/hum@0.1.10 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-10-09 06:55:36.434Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.