--- canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@metaphi-ai/hum/v/0.1.10" markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@metaphi-ai/hum/v/0.1.10.md" package: "@metaphi-ai/hum" report_status: "published" title: "@metaphi-ai/hum@0.1.10 npm security report" verdict: "suspicious" version: "0.1.10" --- # @metaphi-ai/hum@0.1.10 npm security report > **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document. ## Verdict summary **Flagged — allowed with a warning** — Allowed by default policy, but 18 finding(s) warrant review before installing. - **Verdict:** Suspicious - **Product-default install policy:** Warn - **Firewall policy:** Matched warn-list - **Public report status:** Published - **Threat category:** Remote Code Execution - **Selected version:** 0.1.10 - **Selected version is latest:** No - **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai) This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions. AI assessment: suspicious; recommendation: downgrade to warn. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy. The source confirms an automatic postinstall that may execute remotely fetched installer code and install the agent engine. Since this behavior is package-aligned and no concrete malicious action was found, classify it as a warning for conditional install-time code execution rather than malware. ## Latest scan - **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1 - **Recorded final verdict:** Suspicious - **Recorded analysis confidence:** 83.0% - **Started:** 2026-10-09T06:55:01.972Z - **Finished:** 2026-10-09T06:55:36.434Z - **Download time:** 780 ms - **Static scan time:** 4485 ms - **AI review time:** 29196 ms - **Total time:** 34462 ms The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs. ## Security analysis ### Published attack-surface review - **Summary:** Automatic installation bootstraps uv by executing a shell script fetched from Astral when uv is unavailable, then installs the Hum Python engine in the user's home directory. This creates a conditional install-time remote code execution surface, but inspected behavior is consistent with setting up the package's agent. - **Trigger:** npm install when uv is not already available and the matching engine is not installed. - **Impact:** The fetched installer and engine code run with the installing user's privileges and can modify the user's Hum directory. - **Evidence paths:** scripts/postinstall.js - **Review source:** ai\_review - **Reviewed:** 2026-10-09T06:55:36.434Z ### AI review details - **Review stage:** source\_first\_review - **Mechanism:** Runs Astral's installer script through PowerShell or a shell pipeline, then uses uv to create a Python environment and install hum-cli. - **Rationale:** The source confirms an automatic postinstall that may execute remotely fetched installer code and install the agent engine. Since this behavior is package-aligned and no concrete malicious action was found, classify it as a warning for conditional install-time code execution rather than malware. - **Files touched:** scripts/postinstall.js - **Network endpoints:** https://astral.sh/uv/install.ps1, https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh ### Review decision - **Verdict:** Suspicious - **Confidence:** 83.0% - **Recommended action:** downgrade\_to\_warn - **Intent class:** Dangerous Capability - **False-positive risk:** Medium - **Evidence for warning:** The manifest runs scripts/postinstall.js automatically during installation., The postinstall hook downloads and runs Astral's installer through a shell when uv is missing., The hook installs the matching hum-cli engine into the user's Hum home directory., The launcher imports its bundled CLI, which starts the engine as the terminal agent. - **Evidence against:** The hook's engine installation matches the package's terminal coding-agent purpose., The inspected source showed no browser credential collection or unrelated data exfiltration., The bundle's network and environment matches were not evidence of credential theft; its active engine communication uses localhost. ## Affected versions and remediation This report applies to @metaphi-ai/hum@0.1.10. - Review the evidence and your use of @metaphi-ai/hum@0.1.10 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report. - Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe. ## Public findings ### 1. High: Install Time Lifecycle Scripts - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.js ``` ### 2. Medium: Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.js ``` ### 3. Low: Scripts Present - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 100.0% Package declares npm scripts. ### 4. High: Child Process - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** dist/cli.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references child process execution. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L31298: /** @param {string} s */ L31299: exec(s) { L31300: this.matcherRe.lastIndex = this.lastIndex; ``` ### 5. Medium: Dynamic Require - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** bin/hum.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references dynamic require/import behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L8: // a URL, not a path: on Windows `C:\…` is not something the ESM loader will import L9: await import(pathToFileURL(path.join(here, '..', 'dist', 'cli.mjs')).href); ``` ### 6. Medium: Network - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references network APIs. ### 7. Medium: Environment Vars - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references environment variables. ### 8. Low: Filesystem - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references filesystem APIs. ### 9. High: Same File Env Network Execution - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** dist/cli.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L84522: import fs3 from "node:fs"; L84523: import net from "node:net"; L84524: import os4 from "node:os"; ... L84526: import crypto from "node:crypto"; L84527: import { spawn, spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; L84528: var runDir = () => path2.join(process.env.HUM_HOME || path2.join(os4.homedir(), ".hum"), "run"); L84529: var readRun = (id) => { ``` ### 10. Critical: Browser Credential Phishing - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** dist/cli.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Source appears to collect browser login credentials for exfiltration. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L317: "use strict"; L318: if (process.env.NODE_ENV !== "production") { L319: (function() { ... L545: isMounted: ["isMounted", "Instead, make sure to clean up subscriptions and pending requests in componentWillUnmount to prevent memory leaks."], L546: replaceState: ["replaceState", "Refactor your code to use setState instead (see https://github.com/facebook/react/issues/3236)."] L547: }; ... L2209: ]; L2210: if (process.platform !== "win32") { L2211: module.exports.push( ... L2357: } L2358: process13.exitCode = code || /* istanbul ignore next */ L2359: 0; ``` ### 11. High: Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 84.0% - **Path:** scripts/postinstall.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L1: // The engine, installed beside the person's Hum data: ~/.hum/engine (HUM_HOME/engine), a plain L2: // Python environment holding hum-cli at this package's version. No launcher shims are written ... L6: // when missing. Quiet when the engine is already at this version; never fails the npm install. L7: import { execFileSync, spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; L8: import fs from 'node:fs'; ... L12: L13: const win = process.platform === 'win32'; L14: const here = path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)); L15: const version = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(path.join(here, '..', 'package.json'), 'utf8')).version; L16: const home = process.env.HUM_HOME || path.join(os.homedir(), '.hum'); L17: const env = path.join(home, 'engine'); ... L27: const r = run(python, ['-c', 'import hum; print ``` ### 12. High: Remote Agent Bridge - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 84.0% - **Path:** dist/cli.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Source exposes local file and command tools to a remote model endpoint. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L57423: /* metaparameters */ L57424: "alias audit before loglevel noop require subscribe tag owner ensure group mode name|0 changes context force incl lens load_path onlyif provider returns root show_diff type_check e... L57425: ), ... L80422: if (filePath && origin?.line && fs.existsSync(filePath)) { L80423: const sourceCode = fs.readFileSync(filePath, "utf8"); L80424: excerpt = dist_default3(sourceCode, origin.line); ... L84526: import crypto from "node:crypto"; L84527: import { spawn, spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; L84528: var runDir = () => path2.join(process.env.HUM_HOME || path2.join(os4.homedir(), ".hum"), "run"); ``` ### 13. Low: High Entropy Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 55.0% Package source contains high-entropy string patterns. ### 14. Low: Telemetry - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references telemetry or analytics APIs. ### 15. Low: Url Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 65.0% Package source contains URL literals. ### 16. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 100.0% Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean. ### 17. Low: No License - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 80.0% Package manifest does not declare a clear license. ### 18. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/cli.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @metaphi-ai/hum@0.1.61 matchedPath = dist/cli.mjs matchedIdentity = npm:QG1ldGFwaGktYWkvaHVt:0.1.61 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ## Dependencies and install lifecycle - **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes - **Published lifecycle scripts:** postinstall - **Dependencies:** 0 - **Optional dependencies:** 0 - **Peer dependencies:** 0 - **Development dependencies:** 0 - **Published dependency-graph edges:** 0 ## Package metadata - **Package:** @metaphi-ai/hum - **Ecosystem:** npm - **Version:** 0.1.10 - **License:** UNLICENSED - **Version published:** 2026-08-25T19:29:12.157Z - **Package first seen:** 2026-08-25T02:05:34.392Z - **Package last seen:** 2026-10-15T01:56:26.983Z - **Known versions:** 87 - **Latest version:** 0.2.65 - **Appeal under review:** No - **Description:** Hum (हम): a self-improving coding agent for your terminal. - **Maintainers:** chandwaniac - **Runtime engines:** node: \>=18 - **Artifact files:** 5 - **Artifact unpacked size:** 3,650,483 bytes - **Artifact signatures:** 1 - **Attestations:** No ## References - [HTML security report]() - [Repository]() - [Homepage]() - [Issues]()