@metaphi-ai/hum@0.1.11

Hum (हम): a self-improving coding agent for your terminal.

AI Security Review

scanned 14d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

The automatic postinstall performs network-backed setup, but it provisions the matching first-party engine and its uv installer endpoint is explicit. The inspected CLI process behavior supports local engine operation; the scanner's browser credential and malware labels are not supported by the inspected source.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review

Trigger

The postinstall hook runs during package installation; the CLI engine starts when the hum command is invoked.

Impact

The hook modifies the user's Hum data directory and may install uv; inspected source does not establish credential theft or a malicious attack surface.

Mechanism

The hook uses uv to create a Python environment and install hum-cli at the package version. The CLI launches the engine and uses a local socket connection.

AI rationale

Evidence

package.jsonscripts/postinstall.jsdist/cli.mjs

Network endpoints2

astral.sh/uv/install.ps1astral.sh/uv/install.sh

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Clean at 86.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.

Evidence for AI clean decision

The postinstall hook creates a Python environment under HUM_HOME or the user's .hum directory and installs the matching hum-cli release.
If uv is absent, the installer runs its install script from astral.sh; this is an install-time network and execution behavior.
The CLI starts the Hum engine as a child process and connects to it on localhost; inspected source shows no browser credential collection or unrelated credential destination.

Evidence against

The install hook sets up the package's matching first-party engine and removes an older hum-cli tool installation when detected.
The CLI's inspected process and socket behavior is tied to starting and communicating with the local engine.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetwork

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsTelemetryUrlStrings

Source & flagged code

9 flagged

package.jsonView file

•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.js

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg

•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.js

Medium

Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

package.jsonView on unpkg

dist/cli.mjsView file

317"use strict"; L318: if (process.env.NODE_ENV !== "production") { L319: (function() { ... L545: isMounted: ["isMounted", "Instead, make sure to clean up subscriptions and pending requests in componentWillUnmount to prevent memory leaks."], L546: replaceState: ["replaceState", "Refactor your code to use setState instead (see https://github.com/facebook/react/issues/3236)."] L547: }; ... L2209: ]; L2210: if (process.platform !== "win32") { L2211: module.exports.push( ... L2357: } L2358: process13.exitCode = code || /* istanbul ignore next */ L2359: 0;

Critical

Browser Credential Phishing

Source appears to collect browser login credentials for exfiltration.

dist/cli.mjsView on unpkg · L317

31298/** @param {string} s */ L31299: exec(s) { L31300: this.matcherRe.lastIndex = this.lastIndex;

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/cli.mjsView on unpkg · L31298

84522import fs3 from "node:fs"; L84523: import net from "node:net"; L84524: import os4 from "node:os"; ... L84526: import crypto from "node:crypto"; L84527: import { spawn, spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; L84528: var runDir = () => path2.join(process.env.HUM_HOME || path2.join(os4.homedir(), ".hum"), "run"); L84529: var readRun = (id) => {

High

Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

dist/cli.mjsView on unpkg · L84522

57423/* metaparameters */ L57424: "alias audit before loglevel noop require subscribe tag owner ensure group mode name|0 changes context force incl lens load_path onlyif provider returns root show_diff type_check e... L57425: ), ... L80422: if (filePath && origin?.line && fs.existsSync(filePath)) { L80423: const sourceCode = fs.readFileSync(filePath, "utf8"); L80424: excerpt = dist_default3(sourceCode, origin.line); ... L84526: import crypto from "node:crypto"; L84527: import { spawn, spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; L84528: var runDir = () => path2.join(process.env.HUM_HOME || path2.join(os4.homedir(), ".hum"), "run");

High

Remote Agent Bridge

Source exposes local file and command tools to a remote model endpoint.

dist/cli.mjsView on unpkg · L57423

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @metaphi-ai/hum@0.1.61 matchedPath = dist/cli.mjs matchedIdentity = npm:QG1ldGFwaGktYWkvaHVt:0.1.61 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/cli.mjsView on unpkg

bin/hum.jsView file

8// a URL, not a path: on Windows `C:\…` is not something the ESM loader will import L9: await import(pathToFileURL(path.join(here, '..', 'dist', 'cli.mjs')).href);

Medium

Dynamic Require

Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.

bin/hum.jsView on unpkg · L8

scripts/postinstall.jsView file

1// The engine, installed beside the person's Hum data: ~/.hum/engine (HUM_HOME/engine), a plain L2: // Python environment holding hum-cli at this package's version. No launcher shims are written ... L6: // when missing. Quiet when the engine is already at this version; never fails the npm install. L7: import { execFileSync, spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; L8: import fs from 'node:fs'; ... L12: L13: const win = process.platform === 'win32'; L14: const here = path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)); L15: const version = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(path.join(here, '..', 'package.json'), 'utf8')).version; L16: const home = process.env.HUM_HOME || path.join(os.homedir(), '.hum'); L17: const env = path.join(home, 'engine'); ... L27: const r = run(python, ['-c', 'import hum; print

High

Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability

Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.

scripts/postinstall.jsView on unpkg · L1

Source & flagged code

9 flagged · loading source

package.jsonView file

•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.js

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg

•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.js

Medium

Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

package.jsonView on unpkg

dist/cli.mjsView file

Findings

1 Critical6 High5 Medium6 Low

CriticalBrowser Credential Phishingdist/cli.mjs

HighInstall Time Lifecycle Scriptspackage.json

HighChild Processdist/cli.mjs

HighSame File Env Network Executiondist/cli.mjs

HighSandbox Evasion Gated Capabilityscripts/postinstall.js

HighRemote Agent Bridgedist/cli.mjs

HighKnown Malware Source Similaritydist/cli.mjs

MediumAmbiguous Install Lifecycle Scriptpackage.json

MediumDynamic Requirebin/hum.js

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review

LowScripts Present

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @metaphi-ai/hum@0.1.11.

See all versions of @metaphi-ai/hum for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of @metaphi-ai/hum@0.1.11 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-10-09 06:55:15.289Z (UTC).

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