AI Security Review
scanned 2d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiInstall-time code fetches a platform-specific executable archive from GitHub Releases, extracts it into the package, and later executes it through the `wipe` CLI. The inspected JavaScript contains no direct malicious action, but the remote binary is unchecked.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- `package.json` runs `node ./install.js` in `postinstall`.
- `binary.js` constructs release URLs from the GitHub artifact base.
- `binary-install.js` downloads a streamed archive and extracts it with `tar`/`unzip`.
- Downloaded contents are placed in `node_modules/.bin_real` without a checksum or signature check.
- `run-wipe.js` invokes the downloaded `wipe` executable.
- No credential, home-directory, SSH, or environment harvesting beyond Windows `SystemRoot` for `tar.exe`.
- No evidence of exfiltration, hidden persistence, destructive file targeting, eval, or AI-agent configuration writes.
- Network destination is package-aligned GitHub Releases and the installer behavior matches a native CLI bootstrapper.
Source & flagged code
4 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgInstall-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgA single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.
binary-install.jsView on unpkg · L92