---
canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@microi.net/cli/v/5.0.7"
markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@microi.net/cli/v/5.0.7.md"
package: "@microi.net/cli"
report_status: "published"
title: "@microi.net/cli@5.0.7 npm security report"
verdict: "suspicious"
version: "5.0.7"
---

# @microi.net/cli@5.0.7 npm security report

> **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document.

## Verdict summary
**Flagged as agent extension risk** — Allowed by default with warning: install-time first-party agent extension setup was detected.

- **Verdict:** Suspicious
- **Product-default install policy:** Warn
- **Firewall policy:** Warn-only agent extension risk
- **Public report status:** Published
- **Threat category:** Agent extension lifecycle risk
- **Selected version:** 5.0.7
- **Selected version is latest:** No
- **Analysis source:** AI security review (lpm-firewall-ai)

This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions.

AI assessment: suspicious; recommendation: downgrade to warn. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy.

The source establishes an automatic first-party CLI/plugin update on MCP activation, warranting a warning under the extension lifecycle policy. It does not meet the block threshold for malicious npm lifecycle mutation or a confirmed exfiltration chain.

## Latest scan
- **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1
- **Recorded final verdict:** Suspicious
- **Recorded analysis confidence:** 89.0%
- **Started:** 2026-08-15T12:52:29.461Z
- **Finished:** 2026-08-15T12:54:01.588Z
- **Download time:** 510 ms
- **Static scan time:** 2841 ms
- **AI review time:** 88775 ms
- **Total time:** 92127 ms

The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs.

## Security analysis

### Published attack-surface review

- **Summary:** Activating the package's Codex MCP router automatically starts a background self-update. The update can globally install a newer package and run its Codex plugin installation path.

- **Trigger:** Codex plugin/MCP router startup.

- **Impact:** A package activation can mutate the global CLI and package-owned Codex extension state without a fresh user confirmation.

- **Evidence paths:** package.json, scripts/microi-codex-router.js, scripts/microi-cli.js, scripts/microi-codex-broker.js

- **Review source:** ai\_review

- **Reviewed:** 2026-08-15T12:54:01.588Z

### AI review details

- **Review stage:** source\_first\_review

- **Mechanism:** Automatic npm self-update followed by first-party Codex plugin setup.

- **Rationale:** The source establishes an automatic first-party CLI/plugin update on MCP activation, warranting a warning under the extension lifecycle policy. It does not meet the block threshold for malicious npm lifecycle mutation or a confirmed exfiltration chain.

- **Files touched:** scripts/microi-codex-router.js, scripts/microi-cli.js, package.json

- **Network endpoints:** https://registry.npmjs.org/

### Review decision

- **Verdict:** Suspicious

- **Confidence:** 89.0%

- **Recommended action:** downgrade\_to\_warn

- **Intent class:** Dangerous Capability

- **False-positive risk:** Medium

- **Evidence for warning:** The Codex MCP router schedules an automatic update 1.5 seconds after startup., That update launches the bundled CLI in background mode without an MCP-user confirmation., The bundled updater globally installs a newer @microi.net/cli from npm and invokes \`codex install --yes\`., This is first-party agent-extension lifecycle mutation, not an npm lifecycle hook.

- **Evidence against:** package.json defines only build and prepack scripts; it has no install-time lifecycle hook., The updater targets the package-aligned official npm registry., Inspected router/broker sources show workspace-scoped profile/token handling and local broker leases; no credential exfiltration endpoint was confirmed.

## Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @microi.net/cli@5.0.7.

- Review the evidence and your use of @microi.net/cli@5.0.7 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

## Public findings

### 1. Low: Scripts Present
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Package declares npm scripts.

### 2. High: Child Process
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 85.0%
- **Path:** scripts/mcp-codex-stdio-adapter.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@microi.net/cli@5.0.7/scripts/mcp-codex-stdio-adapter.js>)

Package source references child process execution.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L10: 
L11: const childProcess = require('node:child_process');
L12: const path = require('node:path');
```

### 3. High: Eval
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 80.0%
- **Path:** scripts/mcp-server.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@microi.net/cli@5.0.7/scripts/mcp-server.js>)

Package source references dynamic code evaluation.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L4: at `+r[a].toString();return i}return e&&(i+=" at "+eh(e)),i}function Y6(t,e,r){var n="\x1B[36;1m"+this._namespace+"\x1B[22;39m \x1B[33;1mdeprecated\x1B[22;39m \x1B[0m"+t+"\x1B[39m"...
L5: \x1B[36mat `+r[i].toString()+"\x1B[39m";return n}return e&&(n+=" \x1B[36m"+eh(e)+"\x1B[39m"),n}function eh(t){return V6(B6,t[0])+":"+t[1]+":"+t[2]}function Fl(){var t=Error.stackTr...
L6: return function (`+r+`) {log.call(deprecate, message, site)
```

### 4. Medium: Dynamic Require
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%
- **Path:** scripts/mcp-codex-stdio-adapter.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@microi.net/cli@5.0.7/scripts/mcp-codex-stdio-adapter.js>)

Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L10: 
L11: const childProcess = require('node:child_process');
L12: const path = require('node:path');
```

### 5. Low: Weak Crypto
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 64.0%
- **Path:** scripts/mcp-server.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@microi.net/cli@5.0.7/scripts/mcp-server.js>)

Package source references weak cryptographic algorithms.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L1: "use strict";var t2=Object.create;var Ad=Object.defineProperty;var r2=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var n2=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var i2=Object.getPrototypeOf,a2=Object.proto...
L2: at `+t[r].toString();return e}function H6(t){if(!t)throw new TypeError("argument namespace is required");var e=Fl(),r=Sa(e[1]),n=r[0];function i(a){zl.call(i,a)}return i._file=n,i....
L3: `,"utf8")}}}function Sa(t){var e=t.getFileName()||"<anonymous>",r=t.getLineNumber(),n=t.getColumnNumber();t.isEval()&&(e=t.getEvalOrigin()+", "+e);var i=[e,r,n];return i.callSite=t...
L4: at `+r[a].toString();return i}return e&&(i+=" at "+eh(e)),i}function Y6(t,e,r){var n="\x1B[36;1m"+this._namespace+"\x1B[22;39m \x1B[33;1mdeprecated\x1B[22;39m \x1B[0m"+t+"\x1B[39m"...
L5: \x1B[36mat `+r[i].toString()+"\x1B[39m";retu
```

### 6. Medium: Network
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references network APIs.

### 7. Medium: Environment Vars
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references environment variables.

### 8. Low: Filesystem
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 70.0%

Package source references filesystem APIs.

### 9. Critical: Same File Env Network Execution
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** scripts/microi-cli.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@microi.net/cli@5.0.7/scripts/microi-cli.js>)

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution with blocking evidence.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L1767: `);let a=i._Fields||i.Fields;if(a&&a.length>0){r.push("| \u5B57\u6BB5 | \u8BF4\u660E | \u7C7B\u578B |"),r.push("|------|------|------|");for(let c of a){let l=c.Description||c.Labe...
L1768: `)}ensureJsConfig(e,t){let n=_.join(e,"jsconfig.json"),r=e,i=e,o;if(D.existsSync(n))try{o=JSON.parse(D.readFileSync(n,"utf-8"))}catch{o={}}else o={};let a=o.compilerOptions||{};a.t...
L1769: `).trim()}function Or(s,e,t=3e4){let n=$n.spawnSync(s.command,[...s.prefixArgs,...e],{encoding:"utf8",windowsHide:!0,timeout:t,maxBuffer:16777216});return{status:typeof n.status=="...
L1770: `)}}function ni(s){let e=G.extname(s).toLowerCase();return e===".js"||e===".cjs"||e===".mjs"?{command:process.execPath,prefixArgs:[s],displayPath:s}:process.platform==="win32"&&(e=...
L1771: ${xn(n)}`.trim());return n}fu
```

### 10. High: Credential Redirect Persistence
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 94.0%
- **Path:** scripts/microi-cli.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@microi.net/cli@5.0.7/scripts/microi-cli.js>)

Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration.
scripts/microi-cli.js:
"use strict";var Ss=Object.create;var Yn=Object.defineProperty;var Cs=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var ws=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var vs=Object.getPrototypeOf,Ts=Object.proto...
`).forEach((n,r)=>{for(let i of t)if(i.regex.test(n)){e.push({line:r+1,marker:i.label});break}}),e}function Sr(s,e){let n=ee.relative(e,s).split(ee.sep);if(n.length<7||n[2]!==Ze||n...
`,"utf-8"),Q.renameSync(n,e)}finally{try{Q.existsSync(n)&&Q.unlinkSync(n)}catch{}}}async mutateWorkspaceConfig(e){let t=this.getWorkspaceConfigPath();if(!t)throw new Error("\u8BF7\...
`,"utf8"),h=o?this.getTokenForServer(p,o.osClient,o.osClientType,o.o
```

### 11. High: Command Output Exfiltration
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 82.0%
- **Path:** scripts/mcp-server.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@microi.net/cli@5.0.7/scripts/mcp-server.js>)

Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L1: "use strict";var t2=Object.create;var Ad=Object.defineProperty;var r2=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var n2=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var i2=Object.getPrototypeOf,a2=Object.proto...
L2: at `+t[r].toString();return e}function H6(t){if(!t)throw new TypeError("argument namespace is required");var e=Fl(),r=Sa(e[1]),n=r[0];function i(a){zl.call(i,a)}return i._file=n,i....
L3: `,"utf8")}}}function Sa(t){var e=t.getFileName()||"<anonymous>",r=t.getLineNumber(),n=t.getColumnNumber();t.isEval()&&(e=t.getEvalOrigin()+", "+e);var i=[e,r,n];return i.callSite=t...
L4: at `+r[a].toString();return i}return e&&(i+=" at "+eh(e)),i}function Y6(t,e,r){var n="\x1B[36;1m"+this._namespace+"\x1B[22;39m \x1B[33;1mdeprecated\x1B[22;39m \x1B[0m"+t+"\x1B[39m"...
L5: \x1B[36mat `+r[i].toString()+"\x1B[39m";retu
```

### 12. Critical: Download Execute
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** scripts/microi-cli.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@microi.net/cli@5.0.7/scripts/microi-cli.js>)

Source downloads or fetches remote code and executes it.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L1: #!/usr/bin/env node
L2: "use strict";var Ss=Object.create;var Yn=Object.defineProperty;var Cs=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var ws=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var vs=Object.getPrototypeOf,Ts=Object.proto...
L3: */
...
L9: 1DsI9VJ7gTHGL3R7sQIDAQAB
L10: -----END PUBLIC KEY-----`;var Se=L(require("fs")),ee=L(require("path")),In=require("child_process");var lr="# Microi VS Code extension local runtime files";function Ut(s){let e="",...
L11: `;)t++;else if(s[t]==="/"&&s[t+1]==="*"){for(t+=2;t<s.length&&!(s[t]==="*"&&s[t+1]==="/");)t++;t+=2}else e+=s[t],t++;return JSON.parse(e)}function ge(s){Se.existsSync(s)||Se.mkdirS...
...
L383: /** \u83B7\u53D6\u79C1\u6709\u6587\u4EF6\u7684\u4E34\u65F6\u8BBF\u95EEURL */
L384: GetPrivateFileUrl(params: { FilePathName: string; [key: string]: any }): DosR
```

### 13. High: Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 84.0%
- **Path:** scripts/microi-cli.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@microi.net/cli@5.0.7/scripts/microi-cli.js>)

Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L1: #!/usr/bin/env node
L2: "use strict";var Ss=Object.create;var Yn=Object.defineProperty;var Cs=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var ws=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var vs=Object.getPrototypeOf,Ts=Object.proto...
L3: */
...
L9: 1DsI9VJ7gTHGL3R7sQIDAQAB
L10: -----END PUBLIC KEY-----`;var Se=L(require("fs")),ee=L(require("path")),In=require("child_process");var lr="# Microi VS Code extension local runtime files";function Ut(s){let e="",...
L11: `;)t++;else if(s[t]==="/"&&s[t+1]==="*"){for(t+=2;t<s.length&&!(s[t]==="*"&&s[t+1]==="/");)t++;t+=2}else e+=s[t],t++;return JSON.parse(e)}function ge(s){Se.existsSync(s)||Se.mkdirS...
...
L383: /** \u83B7\u53D6\u79C1\u6709\u6587\u4EF6\u7684\u4E34\u65F6\u8BBF\u95EEURL */
L384: GetPrivateFileUrl(params: { FilePathName: string; [key: string]: any }): DosR
```

### 14. High: Cross File Remote Execution Context
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 72.0%
- **Path:** scripts/microi-codex-router.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@microi.net/cli@5.0.7/scripts/microi-codex-router.js>)

Source spawns a local helper that also contains network and dynamic execution context; review data flow before blocking.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Cross-file remote execution chain: scripts/microi-codex-router.js spawns scripts/mcp-server.js; helper contains network access plus dynamic code execution.
L9: 
L10: const childProcess = require('node:child_process');
L11: const crypto = require('node:crypto');
L12: const fs = require('node:fs');
L13: const net = require('node:net');
L14: const os = require('node:os');
...
L20: const PROTOCOL_VERSION = '2024-11-05';
L21: const pluginRoot = path.resolve(__dirname, '..');
L22: const mcpServerPath = path.resolve(process.env.MICROI_MCP_SERVER_PATH || path.join(__dirname, 'mcp-server.js'));
L23: const brokerScriptPath = path.resolve(process.env.MICROI_CODEX_BROKER_SCRIPT || path.join(__dirname, 'microi-codex-broker.js'));
L24: const packagePath = path.join(pluginRoot, 'package.json');
L25: cons
```

### 15. Critical: Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** scripts/microi-cli.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@microi.net/cli@5.0.7/scripts/microi-cli.js>)

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.bin -> scripts/microi-cli.js
L1: #!/usr/bin/env node
L2: "use strict";var Ss=Object.create;var Yn=Object.defineProperty;var Cs=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var ws=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var vs=Object.getPrototypeOf,Ts=Object.proto...
L3: */
...
L9: 1DsI9VJ7gTHGL3R7sQIDAQAB
L10: -----END PUBLIC KEY-----`;var Se=L(require("fs")),ee=L(require("path")),In=require("child_process");var lr="# Microi VS Code extension local runtime files";function Ut(s){let e="",...
L11: `;)t++;else if(s[t]==="/"&&s[t+1]==="*"){for(t+=2;t<s.length&&!(s[t]==="*"&&s[t+1]==="/");)t++;t+=2}else e+=s[t],t++;return JSON.parse(e)}function ge(s){Se.existsSync(s)||Se.mkdirS...
...
L383: /** \u83B7\u53D6\u79C1\u6709\u6587\u4EF6\u7684\u4E34\u65F6\u8BBF\u95EEURL */
L384: GetPrivateFile
```

### 16. High: Trigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltration
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 94.0%
- **Path:** scripts/microi-cli.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@microi.net/cli@5.0.7/scripts/microi-cli.js>)

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches command-output exfiltration behavior.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Trigger-reachable command-output exfiltration chain: manifest.bin -> scripts/microi-cli.js
L1: #!/usr/bin/env node
L2: "use strict";var Ss=Object.create;var Yn=Object.defineProperty;var Cs=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var ws=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var vs=Object.getPrototypeOf,Ts=Object.proto...
L3: */
...
L9: 1DsI9VJ7gTHGL3R7sQIDAQAB
L10: -----END PUBLIC KEY-----`;var Se=L(require("fs")),ee=L(require("path")),In=require("child_process");var lr="# Microi VS Code extension local runtime files";function Ut(s){let e="",...
L11: `;)t++;else if(s[t]==="/"&&s[t+1]==="*"){for(t+=2;t<s.length&&!(s[t]==="*"&&s[t+1]==="/");)t++;t+=2}else e+=s[t],t++;return JSON.parse(e)}function ge(s){Se.existsSync(s)||Se.mkdirS...
```

### 17. Low: High Entropy Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 55.0%

Package source contains high-entropy string patterns.

### 18. Low: Url Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 65.0%

Package source contains URL literals.

### 19. Medium: Ships Build Helper
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 70.0%
- **Path:** scripts/mcp-trae-windows-launcher.cmd
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@microi.net/cli@5.0.7/scripts/mcp-trae-windows-launcher.cmd>)

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```text
path = scripts/mcp-trae-windows-launcher.cmd
kind = build_helper
sizeBytes = 392
magicHex = [redacted]
```

### 20. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean.

### 21. Critical: Previous Version Dangerous Delta
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 93.0%
- **Path:** scripts/microi-cli.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@microi.net/cli@5.0.7/scripts/microi-cli.js>)

This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta
matchedPackage = @microi.net/cli@5.0.6
matchedIdentity = npm:QG1pY3JvaS5uZXQvY2xp:5.0.6
similarity = 0.929
summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file
```

## Dependencies and install lifecycle
- **Lifecycle scripts present:** No

- **Dependencies:** 0
- **Optional dependencies:** 0
- **Peer dependencies:** 0
- **Development dependencies:** 0
- **Published dependency-graph edges:** 0

## Package metadata
- **Package:** @microi.net/cli
- **Ecosystem:** npm
- **Version:** 5.0.7
- **License:** MIT
- **Version published:** 2026-08-15T12:49:32.629Z
- **Package first seen:** 2026-08-05T14:48:35.806Z
- **Package last seen:** 2026-11-22T11:27:32.122Z
- **Known versions:** 117
- **Latest version:** 6.3.9
- **Appeal under review:** No
- **Description:** Microi吾码 AI 开发 CLI 与多宿主 Plugin：服务器连接、Skills、MCP、V8 同步和低代码交付
- **Maintainers:** microi
- **Keywords:** microi, 吾码, cli, codex-plugin, workbuddy-plugin, codebuddy-plugin, deepseek-harness-plugin, dsh-plugin, qoder, comate, mcp, mcp-server
- **Runtime engines:** node: \>=18.18.0
- **Artifact files:** 193
- **Artifact unpacked size:** 4,701,342 bytes
- **Artifact signatures:** 1
- **Attestations:** No

## References
- [HTML security report](<https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@microi.net/cli/v/5.0.7>)
- [Repository](<https://git.itdos.net:88/anderson/microi.vscode>)
- [Homepage](<https://microi.net/doc/v8-engine/vs-code-plugin.html>)
