---
canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@microi.net/cli/v/5.2.4"
markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@microi.net/cli/v/5.2.4.md"
package: "@microi.net/cli"
report_status: "published"
title: "@microi.net/cli@5.2.4 npm security report"
verdict: "suspicious"
version: "5.2.4"
---

# @microi.net/cli@5.2.4 npm security report

> **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document.

## Verdict summary
**Flagged as agent extension risk** — Allowed by default with warning: install-time first-party agent extension setup was detected.

- **Verdict:** Suspicious
- **Product-default install policy:** Warn
- **Firewall policy:** Warn-only agent extension risk
- **Public report status:** Published
- **Threat category:** Agent extension lifecycle risk
- **Selected version:** 5.2.4
- **Selected version is latest:** No
- **Analysis source:** AI security review (lpm-firewall-ai)

This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions.

AI assessment: suspicious; recommendation: downgrade to warn. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy.

The automatic global update plus Codex configuration mutation warrants a warning, but the manifest has no install lifecycle hook and the behavior is tied to the package's own CLI/plugin runtime.

## Latest scan
- **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1
- **Recorded final verdict:** Suspicious
- **Recorded analysis confidence:** 87.0%
- **Started:** 2026-08-23T04:44:58.897Z
- **Finished:** 2026-08-23T04:46:10.424Z
- **Download time:** 509 ms
- **Static scan time:** 2680 ms
- **AI review time:** 68337 ms
- **Total time:** 71527 ms

The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs.

## Security analysis

### Published attack-surface review

- **Summary:** Running the CLI can schedule a background self-update that globally installs the package and configures Codex. This is a package-owned AI-extension lifecycle capability, not an npm lifecycle payload.

- **Trigger:** CLI or bundled MCP runtime execution with automatic updates enabled.

- **Impact:** May modify global and workspace AI-agent configuration after user invokes the package.

- **Evidence paths:** package.json, scripts/microi-cli.js, scripts/microi-codex-router.js

- **Review source:** ai\_review

- **Reviewed:** 2026-08-23T04:46:10.424Z

### AI review details

- **Review stage:** source\_first\_review

- **Mechanism:** background npm self-update and Codex configuration writes

- **Rationale:** The automatic global update plus Codex configuration mutation warrants a warning, but the manifest has no install lifecycle hook and the behavior is tied to the package's own CLI/plugin runtime.

- **Files touched:** scripts/microi-cli.js, .codex/config.toml, config.toml

- **Network endpoints:** https://registry.npmjs.org/

### Review decision

- **Verdict:** Suspicious

- **Confidence:** 87.0%

- **Recommended action:** downgrade\_to\_warn

- **Intent class:** Dangerous Capability

- **False-positive risk:** Low

- **Evidence for warning:** CLI runtime enables automatic background updates unless disabled., AI initialization writes both global Codex and workspace Codex configuration., Updater invokes npm global installation of the same package.

- **Evidence against:** package.json has no preinstall, install, or postinstall lifecycle hook., The package exposes the behavior through its CLI/plugin entrypoints; no hidden install-time execution was found., No fixed third-party credential-exfiltration endpoint or remote code-evaluation chain was confirmed.

## Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @microi.net/cli@5.2.4.

- Review the evidence and your use of @microi.net/cli@5.2.4 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

## Public findings

### 1. Low: Scripts Present
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Package declares npm scripts.

### 2. High: Child Process
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 85.0%
- **Path:** scripts/mcp-codex-stdio-adapter.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@microi.net/cli@5.2.4/scripts/mcp-codex-stdio-adapter.js>)

Package source references child process execution.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L10: 
L11: const childProcess = require('node:child_process');
L12: const path = require('node:path');
```

### 3. High: Eval
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 80.0%
- **Path:** scripts/mcp-server.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@microi.net/cli@5.2.4/scripts/mcp-server.js>)

Package source references dynamic code evaluation.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L4: at `+r[a].toString();return i}return e&&(i+=" at "+sh(e)),i}function lN(t,e,r){var n="\x1B[36;1m"+this._namespace+"\x1B[22;39m \x1B[33;1mdeprecated\x1B[22;39m \x1B[0m"+t+"\x1B[39m"...
L5: \x1B[36mat `+r[i].toString()+"\x1B[39m";return n}return e&&(n+=" \x1B[36m"+sh(e)+"\x1B[39m"),n}function sh(t){return Q6(eN,t[0])+":"+t[1]+":"+t[2]}function Vl(){var t=Error.stackTr...
L6: return function (`+r+`) {log.call(deprecate, message, site)
```

### 4. Medium: Dynamic Require
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%
- **Path:** scripts/mcp-codex-stdio-adapter.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@microi.net/cli@5.2.4/scripts/mcp-codex-stdio-adapter.js>)

Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L10: 
L11: const childProcess = require('node:child_process');
L12: const path = require('node:path');
```

### 5. Low: Weak Crypto
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 64.0%
- **Path:** scripts/mcp-server.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@microi.net/cli@5.2.4/scripts/mcp-server.js>)

Package source references weak cryptographic algorithms.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L1: "use strict";var d$=Object.create;var Dd=Object.defineProperty;var f$=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var m$=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var h$=Object.getPrototypeOf,g$=Object.proto...
L2: at `+t[r].toString();return e}function iN(t){if(!t)throw new TypeError("argument namespace is required");var e=Vl(),r=Ea(e[1]),n=r[0];function i(a){jl.call(i,a)}return i._file=n,i....
L3: `,"utf8")}}}function Ea(t){var e=t.getFileName()||"<anonymous>",r=t.getLineNumber(),n=t.getColumnNumber();t.isEval()&&(e=t.getEvalOrigin()+", "+e);var i=[e,r,n];return i.callSite=t...
L4: at `+r[a].toString();return i}return e&&(i+=" at "+sh(e)),i}function lN(t,e,r){var n="\x1B[36;1m"+this._namespace+"\x1B[22;39m \x1B[33;1mdeprecated\x1B[22;39m \x1B[0m"+t+"\x1B[39m"...
L5: \x1B[36mat `+r[i].toString()+"\x1B[39m";retu
```

### 6. Medium: Network
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references network APIs.

### 7. Medium: Environment Vars
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references environment variables.

### 8. Low: Filesystem
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 70.0%

Package source references filesystem APIs.

### 9. Critical: Same File Env Network Execution
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** scripts/microi-cli.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@microi.net/cli@5.2.4/scripts/microi-cli.js>)

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution with blocking evidence.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L1860: `);let a=i._Fields||i.Fields;if(a&&a.length>0){r.push("| \u5B57\u6BB5 | \u8BF4\u660E | \u7C7B\u578B |"),r.push("|------|------|------|");for(let c of a){let l=c.Description||c.Labe...
L1861: `)}ensureJsConfig(e,t){let n=_.join(e,"jsconfig.json"),r=e,i=e,o;if(P.existsSync(n))try{o=JSON.parse(P.readFileSync(n,"utf-8"))}catch{o={}}else o={};let a=o.compilerOptions||{};a.t...
L1862: `).trim()}function Or(s,e,t=3e4){let n=$n.spawnSync(s.command,[...s.prefixArgs,...e],{encoding:"utf8",windowsHide:!0,timeout:t,maxBuffer:16777216});return{status:typeof n.status=="...
L1863: `)}}function ni(s){let e=G.extname(s).toLowerCase();return e===".js"||e===".cjs"||e===".mjs"?{command:process.execPath,prefixArgs:[s],displayPath:s}:process.platform==="win32"&&(e=...
L1864: ${xn(n)}`.trim());return n}fu
```

### 10. High: Credential Redirect Persistence
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 94.0%
- **Path:** scripts/microi-cli.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@microi.net/cli@5.2.4/scripts/microi-cli.js>)

Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration.
scripts/microi-cli.js:
"use strict";var Ss=Object.create;var Yn=Object.defineProperty;var Cs=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var ws=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var vs=Object.getPrototypeOf,Ts=Object.proto...
`).forEach((n,r)=>{for(let i of t)if(i.regex.test(n)){e.push({line:r+1,marker:i.label});break}}),e}function Sr(s,e){let n=ee.relative(e,s).split(ee.sep);if(n.length<7||n[2]!==Ze||n...
`,"utf-8"),Q.renameSync(n,e)}finally{try{Q.existsSync(n)&&Q.unlinkSync(n)}catch{}}}async mutateWorkspaceConfig(e){let t=this.getWorkspaceConfigPath();if(!t)throw new Error("\u8BF7\...
`,"utf8"),h=o?this.getTokenForServer(p,o.osClient,o.osClientType,o.o
```

### 11. High: Command Output Exfiltration
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 82.0%
- **Path:** scripts/mcp-server.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@microi.net/cli@5.2.4/scripts/mcp-server.js>)

Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L1: "use strict";var d$=Object.create;var Dd=Object.defineProperty;var f$=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var m$=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var h$=Object.getPrototypeOf,g$=Object.proto...
L2: at `+t[r].toString();return e}function iN(t){if(!t)throw new TypeError("argument namespace is required");var e=Vl(),r=Ea(e[1]),n=r[0];function i(a){jl.call(i,a)}return i._file=n,i....
L3: `,"utf8")}}}function Ea(t){var e=t.getFileName()||"<anonymous>",r=t.getLineNumber(),n=t.getColumnNumber();t.isEval()&&(e=t.getEvalOrigin()+", "+e);var i=[e,r,n];return i.callSite=t...
L4: at `+r[a].toString();return i}return e&&(i+=" at "+sh(e)),i}function lN(t,e,r){var n="\x1B[36;1m"+this._namespace+"\x1B[22;39m \x1B[33;1mdeprecated\x1B[22;39m \x1B[0m"+t+"\x1B[39m"...
L5: \x1B[36mat `+r[i].toString()+"\x1B[39m";retu
```

### 12. Critical: Download Execute
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** scripts/microi-cli.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@microi.net/cli@5.2.4/scripts/microi-cli.js>)

Source downloads or fetches remote code and executes it.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L1: #!/usr/bin/env node
L2: "use strict";var Ss=Object.create;var Yn=Object.defineProperty;var Cs=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var ws=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var vs=Object.getPrototypeOf,Ts=Object.proto...
L3: */
...
L9: 1DsI9VJ7gTHGL3R7sQIDAQAB
L10: -----END PUBLIC KEY-----`;var Se=L(require("fs")),ee=L(require("path")),Rn=require("child_process");var lr="# Microi VS Code extension local runtime files";function Ut(s){let e="",...
L11: `;)t++;else if(s[t]==="/"&&s[t+1]==="*"){for(t+=2;t<s.length&&!(s[t]==="*"&&s[t+1]==="/");)t++;t+=2}else e+=s[t],t++;return JSON.parse(e)}function ge(s){Se.existsSync(s)||Se.mkdirS...
...
L446: /** \u83B7\u53D6\u79C1\u6709\u6587\u4EF6\u7684\u4E34\u65F6\u8BBF\u95EEURL */
L447: GetPrivateFileUrl(params: { FilePathName: string; [key: string]: any }): DosR
```

### 13. High: Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 84.0%
- **Path:** scripts/microi-cli.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@microi.net/cli@5.2.4/scripts/microi-cli.js>)

Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L1: #!/usr/bin/env node
L2: "use strict";var Ss=Object.create;var Yn=Object.defineProperty;var Cs=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var ws=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var vs=Object.getPrototypeOf,Ts=Object.proto...
L3: */
...
L9: 1DsI9VJ7gTHGL3R7sQIDAQAB
L10: -----END PUBLIC KEY-----`;var Se=L(require("fs")),ee=L(require("path")),Rn=require("child_process");var lr="# Microi VS Code extension local runtime files";function Ut(s){let e="",...
L11: `;)t++;else if(s[t]==="/"&&s[t+1]==="*"){for(t+=2;t<s.length&&!(s[t]==="*"&&s[t+1]==="/");)t++;t+=2}else e+=s[t],t++;return JSON.parse(e)}function ge(s){Se.existsSync(s)||Se.mkdirS...
...
L446: /** \u83B7\u53D6\u79C1\u6709\u6587\u4EF6\u7684\u4E34\u65F6\u8BBF\u95EEURL */
L447: GetPrivateFileUrl(params: { FilePathName: string; [key: string]: any }): DosR
```

### 14. High: Cross File Remote Execution Context
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 72.0%
- **Path:** scripts/microi-codex-router.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@microi.net/cli@5.2.4/scripts/microi-codex-router.js>)

Source spawns a local helper that also contains network and dynamic execution context; review data flow before blocking.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Cross-file remote execution chain: scripts/microi-codex-router.js spawns scripts/mcp-server.js; helper contains network access plus dynamic code execution.
L9: 
L10: const childProcess = require('node:child_process');
L11: const crypto = require('node:crypto');
L12: const fs = require('node:fs');
L13: const net = require('node:net');
L14: const os = require('node:os');
...
L20: const PROTOCOL_VERSION = '2024-11-05';
L21: const pluginRoot = path.resolve(__dirname, '..');
L22: const mcpServerPath = path.resolve(process.env.MICROI_MCP_SERVER_PATH || path.join(__dirname, 'mcp-server.js'));
L23: const brokerScriptPath = path.resolve(process.env.MICROI_CODEX_BROKER_SCRIPT || path.join(__dirname, 'microi-codex-broker.js'));
L24: const packagePath = path.join(pluginRoot, 'package.json');
L25: cons
```

### 15. Critical: Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** scripts/microi-cli.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@microi.net/cli@5.2.4/scripts/microi-cli.js>)

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.bin -> scripts/microi-cli.js
L1: #!/usr/bin/env node
L2: "use strict";var Ss=Object.create;var Yn=Object.defineProperty;var Cs=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var ws=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var vs=Object.getPrototypeOf,Ts=Object.proto...
L3: */
...
L9: 1DsI9VJ7gTHGL3R7sQIDAQAB
L10: -----END PUBLIC KEY-----`;var Se=L(require("fs")),ee=L(require("path")),Rn=require("child_process");var lr="# Microi VS Code extension local runtime files";function Ut(s){let e="",...
L11: `;)t++;else if(s[t]==="/"&&s[t+1]==="*"){for(t+=2;t<s.length&&!(s[t]==="*"&&s[t+1]==="/");)t++;t+=2}else e+=s[t],t++;return JSON.parse(e)}function ge(s){Se.existsSync(s)||Se.mkdirS...
...
L446: /** \u83B7\u53D6\u79C1\u6709\u6587\u4EF6\u7684\u4E34\u65F6\u8BBF\u95EEURL */
L447: GetPrivateFile
```

### 16. High: Trigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltration
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 94.0%
- **Path:** scripts/microi-cli.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@microi.net/cli@5.2.4/scripts/microi-cli.js>)

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches command-output exfiltration behavior.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Trigger-reachable command-output exfiltration chain: manifest.bin -> scripts/microi-cli.js
L1: #!/usr/bin/env node
L2: "use strict";var Ss=Object.create;var Yn=Object.defineProperty;var Cs=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var ws=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var vs=Object.getPrototypeOf,Ts=Object.proto...
L3: */
...
L9: 1DsI9VJ7gTHGL3R7sQIDAQAB
L10: -----END PUBLIC KEY-----`;var Se=L(require("fs")),ee=L(require("path")),Rn=require("child_process");var lr="# Microi VS Code extension local runtime files";function Ut(s){let e="",...
L11: `;)t++;else if(s[t]==="/"&&s[t+1]==="*"){for(t+=2;t<s.length&&!(s[t]==="*"&&s[t+1]==="/");)t++;t+=2}else e+=s[t],t++;return JSON.parse(e)}function ge(s){Se.existsSync(s)||Se.mkdirS...
```

### 17. Low: High Entropy Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 55.0%

Package source contains high-entropy string patterns.

### 18. Low: Url Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 65.0%

Package source contains URL literals.

### 19. Medium: Ships Build Helper
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 70.0%
- **Path:** scripts/mcp-trae-windows-launcher.cmd
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@microi.net/cli@5.2.4/scripts/mcp-trae-windows-launcher.cmd>)

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```text
path = scripts/mcp-trae-windows-launcher.cmd
kind = build_helper
sizeBytes = 392
magicHex = [redacted]
```

### 20. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean.

## Dependencies and install lifecycle
- **Lifecycle scripts present:** No

- **Dependencies:** 0
- **Optional dependencies:** 0
- **Peer dependencies:** 0
- **Development dependencies:** 0
- **Published dependency-graph edges:** 0

## Package metadata
- **Package:** @microi.net/cli
- **Ecosystem:** npm
- **Version:** 5.2.4
- **License:** MIT
- **Version published:** 2026-08-23T04:42:13.577Z
- **Package first seen:** 2026-08-05T14:48:35.806Z
- **Package last seen:** 2026-11-22T11:27:32.122Z
- **Known versions:** 117
- **Latest version:** 6.3.9
- **Appeal under review:** No
- **Description:** Microi吾码 AI 开发 CLI 与多宿主 Plugin：服务器连接、Skills、MCP、V8 同步和低代码交付
- **Maintainers:** microi
- **Keywords:** microi, 吾码, cli, codex-plugin, workbuddy-plugin, codebuddy-plugin, deepseek-harness-plugin, dsh-plugin, qoder, comate, mcp, mcp-server
- **Runtime engines:** node: \>=18.18.0
- **Artifact files:** 200
- **Artifact unpacked size:** 4,851,014 bytes
- **Artifact signatures:** 1
- **Attestations:** No

## References
- [HTML security report](<https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@microi.net/cli/v/5.2.4>)
- [Repository](<https://git.itdos.net:88/anderson/microi.vscode>)
- [Homepage](<https://microi.net/doc/v8-engine/vs-code-plugin.html>)
