--- canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@mrrlin-dev/mcp/v/0.4.72" markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@mrrlin-dev/mcp/v/0.4.72.md" package: "@mrrlin-dev/mcp" report_status: "published" title: "@mrrlin-dev/mcp@0.4.72 npm security report" verdict: "policy_finding" version: "0.4.72" --- # @mrrlin-dev/mcp@0.4.72 npm security report > **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document. ## Verdict summary **Soft block: AI-agent control surface** — Warn by default; block when configured. Running agent bridge processes can be interrupted or forced into their restart path without an explicit operator command. - **Verdict:** AI-agent control-surface policy finding - **Product-default install policy:** Warn by default; block when configured - **Firewall policy:** Warn by default - **Public report status:** Published - **Threat category:** Soft block: AI-agent control surface - **Selected version:** 0.4.72 - **Selected version is latest:** No - **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai) This finding concerns changes to an AI agent's instructions or configuration without explicit user action. It does not by itself establish malware intent. The CLI warns by default and blocks when configured for this policy. AI assessment: malicious; recommendation: publish block. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy. LPM flags this version as an AI-agent control-surface risk. A global installation automatically signals matching running PM2 AI bridge processes. The matching rule includes a generic command argument, so it can affect processes beyond a uniquely owned instance. ## Latest scan - **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1 - **Recorded final verdict:** Malicious - **Recorded analysis confidence:** 98.0% - **Started:** 2026-09-11T06:55:40.689Z - **Finished:** 2026-09-11T06:56:43.171Z - **Download time:** 261 ms - **Static scan time:** 9259 ms - **AI review time:** 52961 ms - **Total time:** 62482 ms The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs. ## Security analysis ### Published attack-surface review - **Summary:** A global installation automatically signals matching running PM2 AI bridge processes. The matching rule includes a generic command argument, so it can affect processes beyond a uniquely owned instance. - **Trigger:** Installing the package globally through npm, unless the opt-out environment variable is set. - **Impact:** Running agent bridge processes can be interrupted or forced into their restart path without an explicit operator command. - **Evidence paths:** package.json, scripts/postinstall-restart.cjs - **Review source:** ai\_review - **Reviewed:** 2026-09-11T06:56:43.171Z ### AI review details - **Review stage:** source\_first\_review - **Mechanism:** Postinstall PM2 process enumeration followed by SIGUSR2 delivery. - **Attack narrative:** On global installation, npm invokes the package lifecycle script. It queries PM2 for running processes, matches both the package name and the broader director-bridge argument, then sends SIGUSR2 to each match. This automatically changes the execution state of active AI bridge processes and is not limited to a process established by the current installation. - **Rationale:** The automatic postinstall hook mutates a broad AI-agent control surface by signaling matching external PM2 processes. Its global-install guard and opt-out do not establish consent for each affected process. - **Files touched:** scripts/postinstall-restart.cjs ### Review decision - **Verdict:** Malicious - **Confidence:** 98.0% - **Recommended action:** publish\_block - **Intent class:** Malware - **False-positive risk:** Low - **Evidence for policy risk:** The package runs a postinstall hook automatically during npm installation., The hook enumerates all PM2 processes and selects any online process named mrrlin-bridge or with director-bridge arguments., The hook sends SIGUSR2 to every matching process, changing running AI bridge behavior without an explicit command from the operator. - **Evidence against:** The hook is limited to global installs and supports an environment-variable opt-out., The inspected bundled configuration changes are behind an explicit CLI configure command, not the lifecycle hook. ## Affected versions and remediation This report applies to @mrrlin-dev/mcp@0.4.72. - Avoid installing @mrrlin-dev/mcp@0.4.72. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies. - Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe. - If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment. ## Public findings ### 1. High: Install Time Lifecycle Scripts - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall-restart.cjs ``` ### 2. Low: Scripts Present - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 100.0% Package declares npm scripts. ### 3. High: Child Process - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** dist/bin.cjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references child process execution. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L20647: var import_node_path38 = __toESM(require("node:path"), 1); L20648: var import_node_child_process21 = require("node:child_process"); L20649: var import_node_fs24 = require("node:fs"); ``` ### 4. Low: Eval - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 45.0% - **Path:** dist/bin.cjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references a known benign dynamic code generation pattern. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L417: try { L418: const utilInspect = eval("require('util').inspect"); L419: _custom = utilInspect.custom; ``` ### 5. Low: Weak Crypto - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 64.0% - **Path:** dist/bin.cjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references weak cryptographic algorithms. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L417: try { L418: const utilInspect = eval("require('util').inspect"); L419: _custom = utilInspect.custom; ... L1620: if (global.Buffer && global.Buffer.isBuffer(str)) { L1621: str = str.toString("utf8"); L1622: } ... L2063: "use strict"; L2064: var debug = typeof process === "object" && process.env && process.env.NODE_DEBUG && /\bsemver\b/i.test(process.env.NODE_DEBUG) ? (...args) => console.error("SEMVER", ...args) : () ... L2065: }; ... L4016: kStatusCode: Symbol("status-code"), L4017: kWebSocket: Symbol("websocket"), L4018: NOOP: () => { ``` ### 6. Medium: Network - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references network APIs. ### 7. Medium: Environment Vars - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references environment variables. ### 8. Low: Filesystem - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references filesystem APIs. ### 9. High: Same File Env Network Execution - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** dist/bin.cjs - **Public source:** [View source]() A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L21464: // src/agent-version.ts L21465: var import_node_child_process2 = require("node:child_process"); L21466: var import_semver = __toESM(require_semver2(), 1); L21467: var SEMVER_RE = /\b\d+\.\d+\.\d+(?:-[A-Za-z0-9.-]+)?\b/; L21468: var CODEX_PACKAGE = process.env.MRRLIN_CODEX_PACKAGE?.trim() || "@openai/codex"; L21469: var distTagsUrl = (pkg) => `https://registry.npmjs.org/-/package/${encodeURIComponent(pkg)}/dist-tags`; L21470: function parseCodexVersion(raw) { ``` ### 10. High: Credential Redirect Persistence - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** dist/bin.cjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration. dist/bin.cjs: delete opts.headers.authorization; if (opts.auth && !options.headers.authorization) { options.headers.authorization = "Basic " + Buffer.from(opts.auth).toString("base64"); var fs$writeFile = fs12.writeFile; fs12.writeFile = writeFile5; function writeFile5(path25, data, options, cb) { return go$writeFile(path25, data, options, cb); function go$writeFile(path26, data2, options2, cb2, startTime) { ``` ### 11. High: Command Output Exfiltration - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 82.0% - **Path:** dist/bin.cjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L417: try { L418: const utilInspect = eval("require('util').inspect"); L419: _custom = utilInspect.custom; ... L1620: if (global.Buffer && global.Buffer.isBuffer(str)) { L1621: str = str.toString("utf8"); L1622: } ... L2063: "use strict"; L2064: var debug = typeof process === "object" && process.env && process.env.NODE_DEBUG && /\bsemver\b/i.test(process.env.NODE_DEBUG) ? (...args) => console.error("SEMVER", ...args) : () ... L2065: }; ... L4016: kStatusCode: Symbol("status-code"), L4017: kWebSocket: Symbol("websocket"), L4018: NOOP: () => { ``` ### 12. High: Obfuscated Payload Loader - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 86.0% - **Path:** dist/bin.cjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Source contains an obfuscated payload loader that reconstructs and executes hidden code. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L8122: if (!fs11[gracefulQueue]) { L8123: queue = global[gracefulQueue] || []; L8124: publishQueue(fs11, queue); ``` ### 13. Low: High Entropy Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 55.0% Package source contains high-entropy string patterns. ### 14. Low: Url Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 65.0% Package source contains URL literals. ### 15. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 100.0% Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean. ### 16. Medium: Wildcard Dependency - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 80.0% Package manifest contains a wildcard dependency. ### 17. Low: No License - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 80.0% Package manifest does not declare a clear license. ### 18. High: Semantic Analysis Limited - **Category:** Scanner Coverage - **Confidence:** 100.0% - **Path:** scripts/postinstall-restart.cjs\#virtual:normalized:round1 - **Public source:** [View source]() A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```text stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 1 ``` ### 19. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/bin.cjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @mrrlin-dev/mcp@0.4.61 matchedPath = dist/bin.cjs matchedIdentity = npm:QG1ycmxpbi1kZXYvbWNw:0.4.61 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 20. High: Known Malware Source Fingerprint Signature - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** dist/bin.cjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Source fingerprint signature matches a known malicious package signature; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = malicious_source_fingerprint_signature signature = a5388ff737d688ee signatureType = suspicious_hashes sourceLabel = final_verdict:malicious matchedPackage = @mrrlin-dev/mcp@0.4.61 matchedPath = dist/bin.cjs matchedIdentity = npm:QG1ycmxpbi1kZXYvbWNw:0.4.61 similarity = 1.000 shingleOverlap = 2 summary = package final verdict is malicious ``` ## Dependencies and install lifecycle - **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes - **Published lifecycle scripts:** postinstall - **Dependencies:** 10 - **Optional dependencies:** 0 - **Peer dependencies:** 0 - **Development dependencies:** 13 - **Published dependency-graph edges:** 10 ### Published dependency entries - @iarna/toml ^2.2.5 (Dependency) - @modelcontextprotocol/sdk ^1.0.0 (Dependency) - @mrrlin-dev/external-agents latest (Dependency) - @playwright/mcp 0.0.76 (Dependency) - playwright-core 1.61.0-alpha-1781023400000 (Dependency) - proper-lockfile ^4.1.2 (Dependency) - qrcode ^1.5.4 (Dependency) - semver ^7.8.0 (Dependency) - ws ^8.18.0 (Dependency) - zod ^4.0.0 (Dependency) ## Package metadata - **Package:** @mrrlin-dev/mcp - **Ecosystem:** npm - **Version:** 0.4.72 - **Version published:** 2026-09-11T06:53:55.309Z - **Package first seen:** 2026-07-01T00:19:40.404Z - **Package last seen:** 2026-10-03T23:09:26.581Z - **Known versions:** 61 - **Latest version:** 0.4.92 - **Appeal under review:** No - **Description:** CLI that runs the local Director bridge under PM2 and forwards chat turns to a locally-spawned Codex \`app-server\`. Installed globally on operator boxes via \`npm install -g @mrrlin-dev/mcp\` (the official install path; \`pnpm install -g\` also works if the op - **Artifact files:** 21 - **Artifact unpacked size:** 2,764,930 bytes - **Artifact signatures:** 2 - **Attestations:** No ## References - [HTML security report]()