--- canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@mulmoclaude/core" markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@mulmoclaude/core/report.md" package: "@mulmoclaude/core" report_status: "published" title: "@mulmoclaude/core@5.11.4 npm security report" verdict: "malicious" version: "5.11.4" --- # @mulmoclaude/core@5.11.4 npm security report > **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document. ## Verdict summary **Blocked & quarantined** — A registry publisher can cause local records to be added to or changed in a user's Google Calendar without specific consent for those account actions. - **Verdict:** Malicious - **Product-default install policy:** Block - **Firewall policy:** Matched malicious - **Public report status:** Published - **Threat category:** Malware - **Selected version:** 5.11.4 - **Selected version is latest:** No - **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai) This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions. AI assessment: malicious; recommendation: publish block. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy. Imported registry schemas retain publisher-selected calendar settings, and the scheduled sync automatically pushes records when automatic push is enabled. Because the package performs those writes through the linked Google account without a separate consent gate, this is a concrete unrequested account-action path. ## Latest scan - **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1 - **Recorded final verdict:** Malicious - **Recorded analysis confidence:** 94.0% - **Started:** 2026-10-18T06:48:34.399Z - **Finished:** 2026-10-18T06:52:26.222Z - **Download time:** 56398 ms - **Static scan time:** 2742 ms - **AI review time:** 172682 ms - **Total time:** 231823 ms The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs. ## Security analysis ### Published attack-surface review - **Summary:** An imported registry schema can configure automatic pushes to Google Calendar. When the host runs the scheduled sync, mapped collection records can be written to the schema-selected calendar without a separate confirmation. - **Trigger:** A caller imports a registry collection with automatic push enabled, and the consuming host runs the scheduled sync while a Google account is linked. - **Impact:** A registry publisher can cause local records to be added to or changed in a user's Google Calendar without specific consent for those account actions. - **Evidence paths:** dist/collection/registry/server/index.js, dist/discovery-CbwHtcwk.js, dist/google/index.cjs - **Review source:** ai\_review - **Reviewed:** 2026-10-18T06:52:26.222Z ### AI review details - **Review stage:** source\_first\_review - **Mechanism:** The importer preserves the registry schema's calendar settings. The sync uses its calendar identifier and field mapping to create or update events through the linked account. - **Attack narrative:** A registry import preserves publisher-supplied Google Calendar settings, including automatic push. If the host runs the scheduled sync with a linked account, the package pushes mapped records to the calendar selected by that schema. This creates an account-action path controlled by imported content without a separate confirmation. - **Rationale:** Imported registry schemas retain publisher-selected calendar settings, and the scheduled sync automatically pushes records when automatic push is enabled. Because the package performs those writes through the linked Google account without a separate consent gate, this is a concrete unrequested account-action path. - **Files touched:** data/skills/\/schema.json - **Network endpoints:** https://www.googleapis.com/calendar/v3 ### Review decision - **Verdict:** Malicious - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Recommended action:** publish\_block - **Intent class:** Malware - **False-positive risk:** Low - **Evidence for block:** The registry importer fetches remote bundles, validates their schema, preserves parsed fields while normalizing the data path, and writes the resulting schema into the imported collection., The Google Calendar schema accepts an automatic-push setting; the sync path invokes a push when that setting is enabled, and the package exposes a scheduled task that runs the sync., The push uses the schema-selected calendar and linked Google account, then creates or updates calendar events through Google Calendar API requests. - **Evidence against:** This requires a registry import and a consuming host to run the scheduled task; package.json shows no npm install lifecycle hook. ## Affected versions and remediation This report applies to @mulmoclaude/core@5.11.4. - Avoid installing @mulmoclaude/core@5.11.4. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies. - Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe. - If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment. ## Public findings ### 1. Low: Scripts Present - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 100.0% Package declares npm scripts. ### 2. Medium: Network - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references network APIs. ### 3. Medium: Environment Vars - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references environment variables. ### 4. Low: Filesystem - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references filesystem APIs. ### 5. High: Copied Package Dependency Bridge - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 83.0% - **Path:** dist/discovery-CbwHtcwk.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package metadata claims a different repository identity while copied source loads a runtime dependency bridge. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript package = @mulmoclaude/core; repositoryIdentity = mulmoclaude; dependency = @duckdb/node-api L1447: async function duckDbInstance() { L1448: if (instancePromise === null) instancePromise = import("@duckdb/node-api").then((mod) => mod.DuckDBInstance.create(":memory:")); L1449: try { ``` ### 6. High: Trigger Reachable External Ai Agent Control Surface Mutation - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** dist/skill-bridge/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Manifest-trigger-reachable source writes behavior-bearing configuration into a user or project AI-agent control surface. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Manifest-trigger-reachable source links an external AI-agent control path to a behavior-bearing write operation. import { t as issafeactiontemplatepath } from "../templatepath-k_wnbl_q.js"; import { mkdirsync, readfilesync, renamesync, rmsync, writefilesync } from "node:fs"; import path from "node:path"; var data_skills_dir = path.join("data", "skills"); var claude_skills_dir = path.join(".claude", "skills"); var sk[redacted] = "skill.md"; var schema_filename = "schema.json"; var slug_re = /^[a-z0-9]+(-[a-z0-9]+)*$/; var rm_re = /^\s*rm\s+((?:-[a-za-z]+\s+)+)['"]?data\/skills\/([a-z0-9-]+)\/?['"]?\s*$/; var recursive_flag_re = /[rr]/; function dataskilldir(workspaceroot, slug) { ``` ### 7. Low: High Entropy Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 55.0% Package source contains high-entropy string patterns. ### 8. Low: Telemetry - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references telemetry or analytics APIs. ### 9. Low: Url Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 65.0% Package source contains URL literals. ### 10. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 90.0% Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean. ### 11. High: Semantic Analysis Limited - **Category:** Scanner Coverage - **Confidence:** 100.0% - **Path:** dist/promptSafety-yET9jLep.cjs\#virtual:normalized:round1 - **Public source:** [View source]() A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```text stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 2 ``` ### 12. High: Ai Review Evidence - **Category:** Ai Review - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** dist/collection/registry/server/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() The registry importer fetches remote bundles, validates their schema, preserves parsed fields while normalizing the data path, and writes the resulting schema into the imported collection. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript const bundle = await fetchBundle(entry, manifest.files, { workspaceRoot }); if (!bundle.ok) return { ok: false, status: bundle.status, error: bundle.error }; try { return await writeImportedCollection({ ``` ## Dependencies and install lifecycle - **Lifecycle scripts present:** No - **Dependencies:** 10 - **Optional dependencies:** 0 - **Peer dependencies:** 5 - **Development dependencies:** 9 - **Published dependency-graph edges:** 15 ### Published dependency entries - @duckdb/node-api ^1.5.6-r.1 (Dependency) - @gui-chat-plugin/common ^0.1.0 (Dependency) - @mulmoclaude/common ^1.5.0 (Dependency) - @mulmoclaude/markdown-utils ^3.0.2 (Dependency) - dompurify ^3.4.17 (Dependency) - fast-xml-parser ^5.11.2 (Dependency) - google-auth-library ^11.3.0 (Dependency) - iconv-lite ^0.7.3 (Dependency) - js-yaml ^5.4.3 (Dependency) - zod ^4.6.7 (Dependency) - @receptron/task-scheduler ^1.0.3 (PeerDependency) - firebase ^12.0.0 (PeerDependency) - gui-chat-protocol ^2.3.0 (PeerDependency) - vue ^3.5.0 (PeerDependency) - vue-i18n ^11.4.4 (PeerDependency) ## Package metadata - **Package:** @mulmoclaude/core - **Ecosystem:** npm - **Version:** 5.11.4 - **License:** MIT - **Version published:** 2026-10-18T06:28:30.403Z - **Package first seen:** 2026-07-01T07:21:19.663Z - **Package last seen:** 2026-10-21T11:28:30.726Z - **Known versions:** 65 - **Latest version:** 5.12.1 - **Appeal under review:** No - **Description:** Shared server-side core for MulmoClaude and MulmoTerminal — the always-shipped-together subsystems consolidated behind subpath exports so the two hosts can't drift. Server-only except the browser-safe ./artifacts, ./whisper/client, ./workspace-setup/slug, - **Keywords:** mulmoclaude, mulmoterminal, claude-code, ai-agent, collections, scheduler - **Artifact files:** 473 - **Artifact unpacked size:** 7,157,997 bytes - **Artifact signatures:** 2 - **Attestations:** No ## References - [HTML security report]() - [Repository]() - [Homepage]() - [Issues]()