@mulmoclaude/core@0.25.0
Shared server-side core for MulmoClaude and MulmoTerminal — the always-shipped-together subsystems consolidated behind subpath exports so the two hosts can't drift. Server-only except the browser-safe ./whisper/client, ./workspace-setup/slug, ./translatio
AI Security Review
scanned 3mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiNot malicious: no install hooks or automatic execution were found. Warn because explicit remote content is activated in a Claude skill control surface.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- dist/collection/registry/server/index.js imports remote bundles into .claude/skills.
- dist/skill-bridge/index.js mirrors SKILL.md and templates to active Claude skill paths.
- Registry defaults fetch from receptron.github.io and raw.githubusercontent.com.
- dist/google/index.js handles OAuth tokens and Google Calendar/Tasks/Drive APIs.
- package.json has no preinstall, install, or postinstall hooks.
- Skill import is an exported performImport/importRegistry operation, not import-time behavior.
- Skill mirror restricts paths to an allowlist and safe slugs.
- Google token files are written with mode 0600; broker requires HTTPS.
- No covert exfiltration, eval, or shell-command execution found.
Source & flagged code
1 flagged · loading sourceThis package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review.
dist/google/index.cjsView on unpkgFindings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @mulmoclaude/core@0.25.0.
See all versions of @mulmoclaude/core for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @mulmoclaude/core@0.25.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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