@mulmoclaude/core@0.29.0
Shared server-side core for MulmoClaude and MulmoTerminal — the always-shipped-together subsystems consolidated behind subpath exports so the two hosts can't drift. Server-only except the browser-safe ./whisper/client, ./workspace-setup/slug, ./translatio
AI Security Review
scanned 3mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiNo concrete malicious chain was found. The package has an explicit runtime capability to install first-party workspace Claude skills from remote registry content, so it warrants a non-blocking warning under the stated policy.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- dist/collection/registry/server/index.js exports performImport, which fetches a collection bundle.
- Imported allowlisted SKILL.md, schema.json, and templates are mirrored into .claude/skills/<slug>.
- dist/skill-bridge/index.js restricts mirrors to validated slugs and an allowlist.
- package.json has no preinstall, install, or postinstall hook.
- No import-time invocation of performImport or the skill mirror was found.
- Google OAuth/token handling is explicit runtime integration and targets fixed Google/broker endpoints.
- Whisper child-process use has fixed arguments for ffmpeg/local whisper-server.
Source & flagged code
1 flagged · loading sourceThis package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review.
dist/google/index.cjsView on unpkgFindings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @mulmoclaude/core@0.29.0.
See all versions of @mulmoclaude/core for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @mulmoclaude/core@0.29.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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