@mulmoclaude/core@3.10.0
Shared server-side core for MulmoClaude and MulmoTerminal — the always-shipped-together subsystems consolidated behind subpath exports so the two hosts can't drift. Server-only except the browser-safe ./artifacts, ./whisper/client, ./workspace-setup/slug,
AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThis is a real agent-extension lifecycle risk because externally sourced skill content is activated in a Claude workspace, but it is runtime-only, constrained to explicit skill paths, and lacks a concrete malicious chain.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- Runtime collection import mirrors allowlisted files into a workspace’s active .claude/skills tree.
- The bridge atomically copies staged SKILL.md, schema.json, or safe templates to that Claude-discovered location.
- Registry endpoints are configurable through environment variables, so imported skill content may originate remotely.
- package.json has no preinstall, install, postinstall, bin, or default main entrypoint.
- The mirror is path- and slug-constrained and only permits SKILL.md, schema.json, and allowlisted template paths.
- No credential harvesting, exfiltration, eval, or remote code execution was found in inspected files.
Source & flagged code
4 flagged · loading sourcePackage metadata claims a different repository identity while copied source loads a runtime dependency bridge.
dist/discovery-B9zdNkgW.jsView on unpkg · L1418Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @mulmoclaude/core@3.10.0.
See all versions of @mulmoclaude/core for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @mulmoclaude/core@3.10.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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