@mulmoclaude/core@3.11.0
Shared server-side core for MulmoClaude and MulmoTerminal — the always-shipped-together subsystems consolidated behind subpath exports so the two hosts can't drift. Server-only except the browser-safe ./artifacts, ./whisper/client, ./workspace-setup/slug,
AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiDirect inspection found ordinary exported runtime functionality, including a constrained Claude-skill bridge, but no lifecycle trigger or concrete malicious chain. Static hints conflate package-aligned features with attack behavior.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- package.json has no npm lifecycle hook; scripts are build/test/lint only.
- Skill bridge only mirrors allowlisted workspace files when its exported functions are called.
- Whisper downloads named speech models from Hugging Face and launches a configured local sidecar with argument arrays.
- No install-time or import-time execution found.
- No credential harvesting, exfiltration, eval, shell execution, or persistence chain found.
- The .claude skill write is path- and allowlist-constrained, not an unconsented lifecycle action.
Source & flagged code
3 flagged · loading sourcePackage metadata claims a different repository identity while copied source loads a runtime dependency bridge.
dist/discovery-B9zdNkgW.jsView on unpkg · L1418Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @mulmoclaude/core@3.11.0.
See all versions of @mulmoclaude/core for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @mulmoclaude/core@3.11.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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