@mulmoclaude/core@3.12.0
Shared server-side core for MulmoClaude and MulmoTerminal — the always-shipped-together subsystems consolidated behind subpath exports so the two hosts can't drift. Server-only except the browser-safe ./artifacts, ./whisper/client, ./workspace-setup/slug,
AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe package contains an explicit runtime pathway that installs externally sourced Claude skills into a project control surface. Its lack of lifecycle hooks and path allowlisting make this a guarded extension-lifecycle risk rather than concrete malicious install behavior.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- Exports a skill bridge that writes allowlisted files into .claude/skills.
- Runtime collection import downloads a bundle then writes and mirrors it into active Claude skill paths.
- Remote collection import is callable at runtime; no npm lifecycle hook triggers it automatically.
- package.json defines only build, typecheck, test, and lint scripts; no preinstall/install/postinstall.
- Bridge restricts slugs and mirrored files to SKILL.md, schema.json, and allowlisted template paths.
- No credential harvesting, secret exfiltration, shell execution, or covert persistence was found in inspected paths.
Source & flagged code
4 flagged · loading sourcePackage metadata claims a different repository identity while copied source loads a runtime dependency bridge.
dist/discovery-B9zdNkgW.jsView on unpkg · L1418Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @mulmoclaude/core@3.12.0.
See all versions of @mulmoclaude/core for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @mulmoclaude/core@3.12.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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