@mulmoclaude/core@3.7.0
Shared server-side core for MulmoClaude and MulmoTerminal — the always-shipped-together subsystems consolidated behind subpath exports so the two hosts can't drift. Server-only except the browser-safe ./artifacts, ./whisper/client, ./workspace-setup/slug,
AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiNo concrete malicious chain was found, but the exported Claude skill activation/removal capability is an AI-agent extension lifecycle risk and warrants a warning under the supplied policy.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- dist/skill-bridge/index.js mirrors staged files into .claude/skills.
- The bridge permits SKILL.md, schema.json, and safe action-template paths.
- Mirror/delete functions write or recursively remove active Claude skill directories.
- package.json has no npm lifecycle scripts or bin entrypoint.
- Bridge actions require an importing host to call exported functions; no import-time invocation is present.
- Skill slug and relative paths are validated; writes remain under workspace .claude/skills/<slug>.
- Whisper subprocess/network behavior is explicit runtime transcription support, with a fixed Hugging Face model URL and localhost sidecar.
- No credential harvesting, arbitrary shell execution, eval, or covert exfiltration was found.
Source & flagged code
3 flagged · loading sourcePackage metadata claims a different repository identity while copied source loads a runtime dependency bridge.
dist/store-_61sO8K8.jsView on unpkg · L2596Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @mulmoclaude/core@3.7.0.
See all versions of @mulmoclaude/core for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @mulmoclaude/core@3.7.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.