@mulmoclaude/core@4.0.1
Shared server-side core for MulmoClaude and MulmoTerminal — the always-shipped-together subsystems consolidated behind subpath exports so the two hosts can't drift. Server-only except the browser-safe ./artifacts, ./whisper/client, ./workspace-setup/slug,
AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe package has a real runtime AI-agent control-surface write capability, warranting a warning. Source inspection shows it is host-triggered and constrained rather than malicious install-time behavior.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- Runtime skill bridge copies staged content into a workspace .claude/skills tree.
- Collection import conditionally mirrors imported bundles into .claude/skills.
- This can alter project AI-agent instructions, but only through exported runtime host functionality.
- package.json has no preinstall, install, or postinstall hook.
- Bridge restricts slugs and allowlisted files before copying.
- No hidden exfiltration or remote payload execution was found; network URLs serve declared OAuth/registry features.
Source & flagged code
4 flagged · loading sourcePackage metadata claims a different repository identity while copied source loads a runtime dependency bridge.
dist/discovery-C_3gXoin.cjsView on unpkg · L1421Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @mulmoclaude/core@4.0.1.
See all versions of @mulmoclaude/core for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @mulmoclaude/core@4.0.1 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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