@mulmoclaude/core@4.1.1
Shared server-side core for MulmoClaude and MulmoTerminal — the always-shipped-together subsystems consolidated behind subpath exports so the two hosts can't drift. Server-only except the browser-safe ./artifacts, ./whisper/client, ./workspace-setup/slug,
AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe package has a real project-level AI-agent extension write path, including remote collection import, but it is runtime/host-invoked and constrained to workspace-local allowlisted paths. No malicious execution, secret theft, or install-time mutation was found.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- Runtime bridge writes allowlisted staged skill files into project `.claude/skills`.
- Registry import fetches collection bundles and can mirror their skill files into `.claude/skills`.
- package.json has no npm lifecycle hook.
- Bridge rejects paths outside `data/skills`, invalid slugs, and non-allowlisted files.
- Active preset sync does not auto-create unstarred skills and checks symlink containment.
- No credential harvesting, covert exfiltration, eval, or shell execution found.
Source & flagged code
4 flagged · loading sourcePackage metadata claims a different repository identity while copied source loads a runtime dependency bridge.
dist/discovery-D88x2DmW.jsView on unpkg · L1418Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @mulmoclaude/core@4.1.1.
See all versions of @mulmoclaude/core for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @mulmoclaude/core@4.1.1 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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