@mulmoclaude/core@4.10.0
Shared server-side core for MulmoClaude and MulmoTerminal — the always-shipped-together subsystems consolidated behind subpath exports so the two hosts can't drift. Server-only except the browser-safe ./artifacts, ./whisper/client, ./workspace-setup/slug,
AI Security Review
scanned 14d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe package contains an explicit collection-import path that mirrors skill content into `.claude/skills`, creating a guarded agent capability. No automatic install-time mutation or separate malicious behavior was established, so this warrants a warning rather than a publish block.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- Registry imports write validated collection skill files into the workspace’s `.claude/skills` directory.
- The registry mirrors allowlisted files during an explicit collection import; no npm install lifecycle hook was found.
- The skill bridge writes files from the workspace staging directory into the matching active skill directory.
- The package scripts shown are build, typecheck, test, and lint; none is an install hook.
- The manifest maps the registry server through package exports, and inspection found no automatic install-time activation of the mirroring code.
Source & flagged code
4 flagged · loading sourcePackage metadata claims a different repository identity while copied source loads a runtime dependency bridge.
dist/discovery-BR8gifOX.jsView on unpkg · L1448Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @mulmoclaude/core@4.10.0.
See all versions of @mulmoclaude/core for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @mulmoclaude/core@4.10.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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