@mulmoclaude/core@4.2.0
Shared server-side core for MulmoClaude and MulmoTerminal — the always-shipped-together subsystems consolidated behind subpath exports so the two hosts can't drift. Server-only except the browser-safe ./artifacts, ./whisper/client, ./workspace-setup/slug,
AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThis is a real first-party AI-agent extension lifecycle capability, but it is runtime host-invoked, scoped to a project workspace, and guarded by path and file allowlists. It does not meet the threshold for malicious install-time or broad foreign control-surface mutation.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The exported skill bridge mirrors staged skill content into a project .claude/skills control surface.
- Runtime schema writes explicitly invoke that mirror for project collections.
- package.json has no npm lifecycle hook.
- Bridge accepts only validated slugs and an allowlist of SKILL.md, schema.json, or safe template paths.
- No credential harvesting, exfiltration, stealth persistence, or remote code execution was found in inspected paths.
Source & flagged code
4 flagged · loading sourcePackage metadata claims a different repository identity while copied source loads a runtime dependency bridge.
dist/discovery-P64fgtuD.jsView on unpkg · L1436Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @mulmoclaude/core@4.2.0.
See all versions of @mulmoclaude/core for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @mulmoclaude/core@4.2.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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