@mulmoclaude/core@4.5.0
Shared server-side core for MulmoClaude and MulmoTerminal — the always-shipped-together subsystems consolidated behind subpath exports so the two hosts can't drift. Server-only except the browser-safe ./artifacts, ./whisper/client, ./workspace-setup/slug,
AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe package contains an explicit runtime agent-skill installation capability, but inspection found no automatic npm lifecycle trigger or concrete malicious behavior. Treat it as a guarded first-party agent-extension risk.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- Runtime import fetches a registry bundle and writes it into the project skill area.
- Imported allowlisted files are mirrored into Claude's active skill directory.
- The mirrored files can include SKILL.md, schema.json, and safe templates that affect agent behavior.
- package.json has no preinstall, install, postinstall, or bin entry.
- The skill write path is bounded to a slug and allowlisted files.
- No import-time invocation, credential harvesting, secret exfiltration, or covert execution was found.
Source & flagged code
4 flagged · loading sourcePackage metadata claims a different repository identity while copied source loads a runtime dependency bridge.
dist/discovery-2TvulIz8.cjsView on unpkg · L1451Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @mulmoclaude/core@4.5.0.
See all versions of @mulmoclaude/core for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @mulmoclaude/core@4.5.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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