@mulmoclaude/core@4.7.0
Shared server-side core for MulmoClaude and MulmoTerminal — the always-shipped-together subsystems consolidated behind subpath exports so the two hosts can't drift. Server-only except the browser-safe ./artifacts, ./whisper/client, ./workspace-setup/slug,
AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThis is a guarded runtime capability rather than an automatic install attack. Its ability to activate workspace Claude skills warrants a warning, while the absence of lifecycle hooks, self-dependency, and exfiltration evidence does not support a malware verdict.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The package publicly exports a skill bridge.
- The bridge copies allowlisted staged skill content into a workspace Claude skills directory.
- The bridge can recursively remove a mirrored active skill directory.
- The manifest has no install lifecycle hook or self-dependency.
- The bridge only runs when a host calls its exported functions and constrains paths to a staged directory and allowlist.
- No concrete secret harvesting, covert exfiltration, or remote payload execution was found.
Source & flagged code
4 flagged · loading sourcePackage metadata claims a different repository identity while copied source loads a runtime dependency bridge.
dist/discovery-2TvulIz8.cjsView on unpkg · L1451Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @mulmoclaude/core@4.7.0.
See all versions of @mulmoclaude/core for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @mulmoclaude/core@4.7.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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